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SHAKEDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH:
THE NEW LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY & LINDA R. COHEN*

Ever since Mancur Olson's 1965 classic The Logic of Collective
Action, the dominant view of politics has featured the specialinterest model. Small groups with high stakes in legislative
outcomes solve their coordination and free-riderproblems and then
descend on Washington and other bastions of power, seeking rents.
In this model, the special interests are the predators, legislatorsthe
prey. In this Article, we argue that in an important set of cases the
process works in reverse. Legislators proactively solve the
coordination and free-riding problems identified by Olson so that
they can then shake down the groups so formed for campaign
contributions. We illustrate this model of a reverse Mancur Olson
phenomenon with the extended example of estate tax repeal/nonrepeal over the last two decades, and suggest further extensions such
as tort reform, military spending, and regulation of the broadcast
spectrum. The key properties of the phenomenon are small groups
with high stakes that Congress has helped to frame or set up; two or
* McCaffery is the Robert C. Packard Trustee Chair in Law and Political Science,
University of Southern California Law School, and Visiting Professor of Law and
Economics at the California Institute of Technology; Cohen is Professor of Economics,
University of California (Irvine), and Professor of Social Science and Law, University of
Southern California Law School. We especially thank Fred S. McChesney, who worked
with us closely on prior drafts of this Article. Earlier versions were given at workshops at
the American Law & Economics Association, University of Chicago Law School,
University of Michigan Law School, NYU Law School, and USC Law School, and we
thank all participants at these occasions. We especially thank Alan Auerbach, Larry Baer,
Dhammika Dharmapala, Beth Garrett, Thomas Hazlett, Jim Hines, Ehud Kamar, Rod
Kiewiet, Ed Kleinbard, John Ledyard, Saul Levmore, Douglas Lichtman, Kyle Logue,
John Matsusaka, Nina Mendelson, Jeff Pennell, Eric Posner, Alex Raskolnikov, Dan
Shaviro, Matthew L. Spitzer, Chris Stone, Cass Sunstein, Eric Talley, and David Weisbach
for helpful conversations, and Arun Abraham, Greg Barchie, Alex Baskin, Nina Kang,
Mayer Nazarian, and Keith Padien for outstanding research assistance. Finally, we thank
the USC-Caltech Center for the Study of Law & Politics for financial assistance. Our title
is a play on the popular work on the Tax Reform Act of 1986, JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM &
ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE

UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987). "Gucci Gulch" refers to a corridor in the
Capitol Building where literally well-heeled lobbyists gather. For a critical commentary
on the work, in the spirit of our current effort, see Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S.
McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 891 (1987).
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more sides to the issue; plausible legislative action; and plausible
longevity for any legislative action. The key predictions are that,
once Congress has found rich territoryfor the game, it will string
matters along, frequently voting, rarely acting, and avoiding
sensible compromises at every turn. We conclude by suggesting it is
time to invert our gaze, and to better watch the legislative
watchdogs.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF POLITICS, AND
BEYOND

Special-interest groups dominate politics in the United States
today. They are the predators, Congress the prey; or so says the
traditional view of politics.' In this Article, we mean to reverse that
usual view of things. We argue that Congress, not special-interest
groups, is the predator, and special-interest groups are the prey-at
least a good deal of the time, and in some very important cases. We
believe that it is time to invert our gaze, and to start better watching
the watchdogs.
Let's back up.
Ever since Mancur Olson's classic text, The Logic of Collective
Action, was published in 1965 2-if not before-the dominant view of
legislative action has given pride of place to "special-interest
groups." 3 In the now-standard view of politics, these small groups
with high stakes arise independently, motivated by common interests
and able to solve the "free-rider" problem4 of collective action on
account of their small size. Special interests then descend on
Washington and other bastions of power, in the guise of corporate
lobbyists, and seek the non-market returns-goodies-that
contemporary politics so amply provides.
This special-interest conception of politics pervades the academy,
the press, and even politicians' own self-awareness of politics, such as
it is. In the 2004 presidential election, both George W. Bush and
John Kerry lamented the role of special interests in American
1.

(1983).
2.

STEPHEN MILLER, SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN POLITICS

MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).

1-8

PUBLIC GOODS AND

3. For statements and analyses employing the standard special-interest conception,
see DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY:
A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1-46 (1969); DAVID R. MAYHEW,

CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5-6, 13-17, 36-39 (1974); Gary S. Becker, A
Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groupsfor PoliticalInfluence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371,
371-72, 392 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15, 18 (1984); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of
the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 713-15 (1984); Kevin B. Grier & Michael C.

Munger, ComparingInterest Group PAC Contributionsto House and Senate Incumbents,
1980-1986, 55 J. POL. 615,615-16, 637-40 (1993); Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The
Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 45-50

(1988); and James M. Snyder, Jr., Campaign Contributionsas Investments: The U.S. House
of Representatives, 1980-1986, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1195, 1196-97 (1990); see also RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 682 (5th ed. 1998).

4. "Free-riding" refers to receiving the benefits of an action or state of affairs
without bearing commensurate burdens. See infra text accompanying note 11.
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politics5 while each took more money from special-interest groups
than ever before. 6 Four years prior, attacks on the power of specialinterest groups had formed the basis of campaigns by Senator John
McCain, on the right, and Ralph Nader, on the left.7 On a (slightly)
sub-national level, Arnold Schwarzenegger rose to populist power as
the governor of California, America's most populous state, promising
to terminate special-interest politics, and has continued to make the

attack on special interests the lynchpin of his governorship.8 While no
candidate has yet been successful in actually mitigating the power and

influence of special interests, the various campaigns gave voice, as
Ross Perot had years earlier, 9 to the widespread public perception

that special interests, through their campaign contributions and other
efforts, dictate and corrupt public policy.
It is not just the people who think this way. Both tracking and
shaping popular political perceptions, an extensive literature in
economics and political science analyzes public policy under the
special-interest-group model. The analysis typically begins by noting
the conditions under which an interest group can be politically
effective. Here, Olson, roughly four decades ago, seminally identified
two crucial barriers to the formation of a political interest group. 10
The first is a coordination problem. Benefits from political action
5. David M. Halbfinger, The Massachusetts Senator: Shedding Populist Tone, Kerry
Starts Move to the Middle, N.Y. TIMES, May 8,2004, at A14; Adam Nagourney, Tightening
Race Increases Stakes of Final Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2004, at Al; Jim Rutenberg,
RepublicansAttack Kerry in Video and E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at A20; see also
Richard L. Berke, Bush and Gore, in Last Debate, Stage Vigorous Give and Take, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2000, at Al.
6. See The Center for Responsive Politics, President George W. Bush - 2004
Election: Introduction, http://www.opensecrets.org/bush/index.asp (last visited Apr. 17,
2006); The Center for Responsive Politics, 2004 Presidential Election, http://www.
opensecrets.org/presidential/index.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
7. See James Dao, 10,000 Turn Out To Hear Nader Urge 'Shift in Power,' N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2000, at A28; Stephen LaBaton, As Commerce Chairman, McCain is Hard
to Define, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2000, at Al; Ralph Nader, Why I'm Running, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 29, 2000, § 4, at 16; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., McCain and Perot Stealing Glances, Some
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at Al; Sam Howe Verhovek, What Makes Ralph (and Pat)
Run?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2000, § 4, at 5; Press Release, John McCain, Remarks by U.S.
Senator John McCain (Dec. 15, 1999), available at http://mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm?
fuseaction=Newscenter.ViewPressRelease&Contentid=791.
8. See Dean E. Murphy, Schwarzenegger Lays Foundationfor a Transition, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2003, at Al; Rene Sanchez & Kimberly Edds, Schwarzenegger to Run for
Governor, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2003, at Al.

9. R.W. Apple, Jr., Why Perot Could Pose a Threat with $100 Million: It's His Own,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1992, at Al; Peter Applebome, Perot, the 'Simple' Billionaire, Says
Voters Can Force His Presidential Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1992, § 1, at 14; Kevin
Phillips, The Politics of Frustration,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992, § 6, at 38.
10. OLSON, supra note 2, at 9-16.
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give each group member reason to participate in the group effort
once the group is formed, but the formation costs-including
identifying the group members, organizing the group, and agreeing on
a political strategy-are high. While the actual cost of the political
campaign-how much it takes in campaign contributions or whatever
to get something done-may be largely independent of the group size,
the coordination costs are not; these increase, sometimes
exponentially, with the number of members in the group. The second
and related problem involves free-riding. Political action yields a
public (or at least a group) good: a bill or policy that affects the
entire population whether or not a particular individual participates
in the lobbying effort.1 Beneficiaries benefit even if they do not bear
any of the burdens, and this gives rational people an incentive to freeride, or opt out of the group without paying their dues. A political
action group will have trouble keeping its members from defecting.
These two Mancur Olson problems help predict both what
politically effective interest groups will emerge and what policies they
will support. Critical to success is not just the extent of benefitsmore, of course, is better than less-but also their distribution: the
larger the per capita benefits, the smaller the group need be to cover
the costs of political participation."
The smaller the group, the
smaller the coordination problems. Further lessening the free-rider
problem is the extent to which the small group exclusively benefits
from the policy. Non-member beneficiaries, through their free-riding,
impose a negative externality on the conscientious participants.
Hence small groups with high stakes tightly fitting a potential policy
objective are the most likely special-interest groups to flourish.
In this now-familiar story, politicians enter at a relatively late
stage. Special-interest groups form on their own, out somewhere in
the hustings, spontaneously generating themselves as the occasionssmall group/high stakes-arise. The groups then come to legislators.
Political theory in this special-interest vein divides into two branches,
following the two basic goods-money and votes-that the interest
groups offer to legislators. The money side helps to illuminate many
commercially-oriented public policies, such as the regulation of
business13 and foreign trade,14 where a "capture" or "rent-seeking"
11. See id.
12. See id. at 22-36.
13. For seminal works in the area, see Becker, supra note 3, at 376-81 (developing a
model of interest group competition that may lead to more efficient government tax and
spending policies); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3-7 (1971) (modeling how policies benefit regulated firms).
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model of politics flourishes. The vote side plays out when interest
groups with geographic concentration help shape congressional
support for public works bills, some spending "earmarks," and other
traditional "pork barrel" legislation. 5
So goes the traditional tale. To be clear, we accept this story as
far as it goes: special-interest groups are undeniably a major part of
the American political landscape. But we do not think that the
traditional tale goes far enough-specifically, far enough back in time.
In this Article, we push the standard view of special-interest
politics back to a stage prior to the formation of the groups. We
argue that in a wide and important set of cases, lawmakers
themselves, addicted to the money that special interests provide,
actually proactively solve the problems of group formation.
Lawmakers give birth to the very special interests that later "plague"
them. Congress, our primary focus, through its powers-importantly
including its taxing and agenda-setting powers-helps to create small
interest groups with high stakes in the first instance, which it can then
"shake down" for campaign contributions in the second instance. We
sometimes call this the "reverse Mancur Olson" phenomenonreverse because, in our conception, the politicians come first and the
special-interest groups second. Ironically, the groups thereby become
the victims of the political process, the prey and not the predators. At
first blush, this phenomenon is simply an analytic possibility, a
prediction easily derived on the chalkboard or from an armchair. We
set out in Part II how and why the reverse Mancur Olson
phenomenon occurs, and also term it "ex ante rent extraction," for
reasons made clearer below.
An extended example helps illustrate the possibility of-and to
confirm the real world occurrence of-ex ante rent extraction. We
believe that the estate tax, and the recent legislation to repeal-or
not-this tax, is a perfect case study.16 Here is a tax falling on a very
few people, but at high stakes. The tax is largely avoided through

Summaries and interpretations of the literature are contained in Roger G. Noll, Economic
Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 1254, 1254-81 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) and
Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcTIVITY-MICROECONOMICS 1, 1 (1989).
14. See Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Protectionfor Sale, 84 AM. ECON. REV.

833, 833-49 (1994).
15. JOHN A. FEREJOHN, PORK BARREL POLITICS:
LEGISLATION, 1947-1968, at 1-24 (1974).

RIVERS AND

HARBORS

16. See Jonathan Weisman, Erosion of Estate Tax Is a Lesson in Politics, WASH.
POST, Apr. 13,2005, at El.
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private planning: transactions that generate large financial returns to
a small, highly remunerated group of "players." Thus there are two
Mancur Olson groups, counterpoised on both sides of the issue.
Repeal of the estate or so-called death tax has an important and
plausible asymmetry to it: if the tax ever dies, it is unlikely to be
revived. Thus, private parties harmed by the presence of the tax-the
putative taxpayers-would rationally pay to kill the tax. On the other
side, parties benefited by the existence of the tax-financiers such as
insurance companies, lawyers, accountants, and sophisticated
nonprofits-would rationally pay to keep the tax. Congress has
perfect shakedown territory.
The ex ante rent-extraction
phenomenon suggests that Congress will milk this lucrative cow for
all it is worth (to add another metaphor to the fray), voting over and
over and coming up short-just short-of permanent repeal. And so
they have. In spades."7
But ours is not just a tale of taxing. Congress has monopolistic
power over many acts of benefit and coercion. Whenever Congress
can help set the stage for a pitched battle between two or more small
groups with high stakes, we predict that it will do so, and will string
matters along, avoiding sensible compromise, while seeing its coffers
lined. We extend the model to help explain medical malpractice and
17. See House Votes To Repeal Federal Estate Taxes: Republicans Hope To Prevail in
Senate After Past Losses, CNN.COM, Apr. 13, 2005, http://edition.cnn.com/2005/
POLITICS/04/13/house.estatetax.ap/ (subscription service) [hereinafter House Votes To
Repeal]; David E. Rosenbaum, True to Ritual, House Votes for Full Repeal of Estate Tax,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at A23; Weisman, supra note 16. It is important to understand
that the reverse Mancur Olson phenomenon does not suggest that Congress will never act;
indeed, action must be plausible to drive the dynamic, and must therefore sometimes
come. See, e.g., discussion infra Part V.A (explaining how Congress must sometimes act, if
only in piecemeal fashion, to perpetuate ex ante rent extraction in the context of medical
malpractice and tort reform). But action typically will be a long time, and many dollars, in
coming.
Note that our analysis stands in contrast to that found in the recent book by
Michael Graetz and Ian Shapiro, written after earlier versions of our thesis were
circulated. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS:
THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005). Although it is difficult at times

to pin down Graetz and Shapiro's precise thesis, they argue that conservative political
forces, through skillful political and rhetorical manipulation, were able to bring about the
end to the estate tax. This thesis sounds in the traditional special-interest conception of
politics. Our thesis is that the Senate, in particular, deliberately strung along the issue of
estate tax repeal, signaling that it had the power to kill the tax without really doing so,
resisting principled compromises along the way, and staging multiple votes on the issue
before resolving it in a way that could have been done ab initio-all in order to keep alive
an issue of value in generating campaign contributions. Our thesis sounds in the "new
logic of collective action," emphasizing as it does the centrality of lawmakers' actions (and
inactions). We discuss Graetz and Shapiro's book and our differences with it further
below. See infra notes 113-23 and accompanying text.
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tort reform, military spending policies, and regulation of the
broadcast spectrum. 8 And we invite readers to come up with their
own versions of the new story.
Anticipating here at the start the two most likely objections, we
emphasize, first, that nothing in the ex ante rent-extraction
phenomenon depends on Herculean acts of foresight, prescience, or,
for that matter, literal and overt ex ante coordination. Congress may
not have known what a good thing it had, in estate tax repeal/nonrepeal, for example, until history dumped the issue in its collective
lap. But once it stumbled onto the example, like the proverbial
drunken sailor, the conception predicts what it would-and did-do.
In general, the ex ante rent-extraction technique predicts that
Congress will generally avoid "ballot box" issues, preferring instead
to devote its time to issues of high stakes to small groups. When it
finds such issues, it will often string matters along. It will avoid
sensible, good-faith compromises, and often produce laws
unintelligible except as signals of its power to help, harm--or help to
form-special-interest groups. Indeed, it is the "stringing along" or
"milking" of issues lucrative from a campaign-contribution generating
perspective that is our principal prediction and our most general
finding. Whether Congress or any other lawmaking body acts first or
second, and whether lawmakers know in advance what they are doing
or not, we predict that politicians ultimately will recognize a "good"
issue when they see it-with "good" specifically and exclusively
meaning "good for generating campaign contributions"-and will
prolong their consideration of the issue as long as possible. 19 Ex ante
rent extraction, in which Congress creates the very special interests
from whom it will later extract campaign contributions, is simply an
interesting, and in a certain sense limiting (because it covers the full
range of the transactional spectrum, beginning with special-interest
group formation), case of this more general propensity of legislative
bodies.
Second, we do not suggest that the ex ante rent-extraction effect
explains all or even any specifically quantifiable part of politics today.
American politics are complex. Sometimes lawmakers do indeed
respond reactively to special-interest pressure; sometimes they
respond to popular sentiment; sometimes they even act on principle.
We mean merely to suggest, and to illustrate with one extended and
several short examples, that in at least some very important cases,
18. See infra Part V.
19. We thank Nina Mendelson for pressing this point on us.
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Congress is acting to create and/or perpetuate special interests, in
order to extract money from them.
Part II sets out the ex ante rent-extraction phenomenon in broad
outline. Part III gives background about the estate tax and recent
legislation affecting it. Part IV connects the dots by arguing that the
contemporary estate tax story is best explained by the ex ante rentextraction model of politics. Part V offers extensions of the model.
Part VI offers brief conclusions-hoping, perhaps against hope, to
suggest some way to stop the insanity.
II. THE NEW LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

A.

The Basics: Two Facts
The ex ante rent-extraction phenomenon places the legislator
front and center, and makes special-interest groups themselves the
creatures of the political process. At the outset, this phenomenon is
simply an analytic possibility, one that follows from emphasizing two
factual aspects of contemporary politics.
1. Fact No. 1: Money Matters
The first fact is that politicians care about money. A lot.2"
The traditional conception of special-interest-group politics still
often emphasizes the centrality of legislators getting votes: the reelection motive. Clearly, politicians care about getting votes, and
they might even attempt to form groups to help them garner votes.
But the centrality of vote-oriented behavior in theoretical models has
endured long past the point where votes have centrally mattered in
real-world politics. Today, most congressional seats are safe:
incumbents not only are overwhelmingly re-elected, but do so with
large majorities and only token opposition.21 In 2004, 98% of House
members who sought re-election were re-elected (up from 96% in
2002 and equal to the re-election rates in 2000 and 1998), and 96% of
20. See Richard L. Hall & Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and
the Mobilization of Bias in CongressionalCommittees, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 797, 797-99
(1990); Laura I. Langbein, Money and Access: Some Empirical Evidence, 48 J. POL. 1052,
1060-61 (1986).
21. See JEFFREY MILYO, CITIZENS' RESEARCH FOUND. REPORT, THE ELECTORAL
EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING IN HOUSE ELECTIONS 26 (1998); Stephen
Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Campaign War Chests in Congressional Elections, 2
Bus. & POL. 9, 9-20 (2000); Jay Goodliffe, The Effect of War Chests on ChallengerEntry in
U.S. House Elections, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 830, 830 (2001); Jonathan S. Krasno & Donald
Philip Green, Preempting Quality Challengers in House Elections, 50 J. POL. 920, 920-21
(1988).
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Senate incumbents seeking a new term were re-elected as well (up
from 86% in 2002 and 79% in 2000).22 The high degree of electoral
security of most legislators provides them with wide latitude to
support interest groups whose goals might be inimical to a narrowly
vote-centric re-election model.
Indeed most bills and issues
promoted by interest groups simply have no ballot box implications
for a large majority of legislators, because these issues are lowsalience ones in crude, multi-issue, winner-take-all election contests.23
At the same time, and perhaps counter-intuitively, money still
matters. Legislators still care deeply about the financial benefits
provided by special-interest groups. Representatives from the safest
districts almost always devote enormous time and effort to
fundraising. Politics today is much more the story of getting money

22. See Carl Hulse & David E. Rosenbaum, The 2004 Elections: In the States - The
House; With Texas Redistrictingas a Backdrop, Republicans Retain Their Majority in the
House, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at P11; The Center for Responsive Politics, The Big
Picture: Re-Election Rates over the Years - The House, http://www.opensecrets.org/
bigpicture/reelect.asp?cycle=2002 (last visited Apr. 17, 2006); The Center for Responsive
Politics, The Big Picture: Re-Election Rates over the Years - The Senate, http://www.
opensecrets.org/bigpicture/reelect.asp?Cycle=2002&chamb=S (last visited Apr. 17, 2006);
The Center for Responsive Politics, Get Local!, http://www.opensecrets.org/states/
index.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2006); cf The Center for Responsive Politics, 2004 Election
Overview: 108th Congress Casualty List, http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/casualties.
asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2006); The Center for Responsive Politics, 2004 Election
Overview: Stats at a Glance, http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/stats.asp?cycle=2004
&display=T&type=R (last visited Apr. 17, 2006) (allows for comparison between
incumbents and challengers as to campaign contributions and spending). The sole Senate
re-election casualty out of twenty-six incumbents was Senate Minority Leader Tom
Daschle (D-S.D.). Only six House incumbents out of a total of 401 were denied reelection.
23. For example, when it comes to taxes in general and the estate tax in particularour principal example or case study in this Article-most voters care very little. It is hard
to see that this issue would swing many voters one way or another, especially as most
Republicans vote for estate tax repeal, and most Democrats vote against repeal; but even
the "flippers" who change sides on the issue, as Appendix I, infra, shows and as we discuss
extensively below, did not pay a price at the polls for their changing positions. See OMB
Watch, Estate Tax Polling Data (June 11, 2002), http://www.ombwatch.org/article/article
view/813/1/125?TopiclD=1 (showing that cutting estate taxes was a low priority for most
respondents in relation to other tax cut proposals and also showing that tax cuts are not a
strong priority in relation to the federal budget). There were five states, Minnesota, South
Dakota, Missouri, Iowa, and Arkansas, where Republicans tried to push the estate tax
issue into the forefront of the 2002 Senate elections. See Carl Hulse, Ads Push Estate Tax
as Issue in Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2002, § 1, at 22. In those states, only one
Democratic incumbent, Missouri Senator Jean Carnahan, lost re-election. Id. In
Arkansas, a Democratic challenger, Mark Pryor, won the Senate seat. Id. In South
Dakota and Iowa, the Democratic incumbents, Tim Johnson and Tom Harkin, kept their
seats. Id. In Minnesota, the Republican challenger, Norm Coleman, won after the
unexpected death of Senator Paul Wellstone several days before the election. Id.
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than of getting votes.2 4 Money's importance, as claimed by Perot,
Nader, McCain, Schwarzenegger, and countless others, and as
verified by a plethora of statistics, has intensified over time.25 Well
over one billion dollars was raised by Democrats and Republicans in
the 2001-2002 election cycle, with slightly more than one-half of the
total coming from "hard" money (relatively small donations to
individual candidates) as opposed to "soft" money, which at the time
came in the form of unlimited contributions to political parties. 26 The
2004 presidential campaign was easily the most costly ever, with both
major party candidates, George W. Bush and John Kerry, swearing
off federal matching funds during the primary, thus freeing
themselves to spend all that they could raise. 27 And they raised a

24. See Norman Ornstein, Lobbyists Often Get More Shakedowns than They Give,
ROLL CALL, Feb. 25, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 4022396.
25. Ansolabehere et al. dispute this conclusion in their important paper, Stephen
Ansolabehere et al., Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. ECON. PERSP.
105 (2003). The authors point out that, whereas the absolute level of real campaign
contributions has increased substantially over the past one hundred years, the share of
gross national product or income (contributions divided by gross national product) has
been essentially constant. Id. at 120, 125. The paper concludes with three puzzles. The
first, formulated by Gordon Tullock over thirty years ago, is why contributions are not
larger, given the importance of government to business. Id. at 110. The second is why
contributions appear ineffective, as the link between contributions and votes appears so
tenuous. Id. at 116. The third is why anyone gives at all, when it appears useless to do so.
Id. at 126. We cannot address these puzzles or conclusions fully at this time, but we do
note that the combination of the puzzles preserves the importance of our analysis even if
Ansolabehere's and his coauthors' conclusions are accepted. People do still make
campaign contributions, and the apparent lack of effect of these transfers is consistent with
our story, wherein nothing, more often than not, happens. Our basic hypothesis is that
Congress can force special interests to "pay to play" where the risks of not "playing" are
great enough, even if the odds against any action transpiring are long.
26. The Center for Responsive Politics, Democratic Party: 2001-2002 Election Cycle,
http://www.opensecrets.org/parties/total.asp?Cmte=DPC&Cycle=2002 (last visited Apr.
17, 2006); The Center for Responsive Politics, Republican Party: 2001-2002 Election
Cycle, http://www.opensecrets.org/parties/total.asp?Cmte=RPC&Cycle=2002 (last visited
Apr. 17, 2006). So-called soft money is now limited to some extent by the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified at
scattered sections of 2, 28, and 47 U.S.C. (Supp. 2002)), popularly known as "McCainFeingold." The Act was largely upheld in McConnell v. FederalElection Commission, 540
U.S. 93 (2003), where the Court acknowledged the practical limitations of the Act.
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 224 ("We are under no illusion that BCRA will be the last
Congressional statement on the matter. Money, like water, will always find an outlet.").
For a discussion of the limits of the law and the jurisprudence of campaign finance reform,
see generally John de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Payingfor Politics, 78 S. CAL. L.
REV. 591 (2005).
27. Glen Justice, Irrelevance Stalks a Post-WatergateInvention, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2003, § 4, at 3; The Center for Responsive Politics, 2004 Presidential Election, http://www.
opensecrets.org/presidential/index.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
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lot-over $300 million for each Bush and Kerry when all was said and
28
done (with over $2 billion spent by all candidates for federal office).
Why do legislators, at lower levels in the government hierarchy
in particular, continue to seek ever-higher amounts of money, when
their own re-elections are rarely at stake? A complete answer to this
question is complex, and beyond the scope of this Article. For our
purposes, we need only be concerned with the observed facts that
Congresspersons do indeed raise and spend large amounts of money.
But we can speculate on some reasons for the continued addiction to
cash. One, there is a partly irrational "arms race, 2 9 whereby all
Congresspersons attempt to keep up with their peers, and, in the
process, create large entry barriers to any outsiders ever challenging
them;30 the high re-election rate is related in part to the continued
amassing of funds by elected officials. Two, having sums of money
available helps to fuel Congresspersons' own ambitions for higher, or
different, offices, beyond their presently "safe" seat; Senators in
particular often amass sums for their own presidential campaigns.
Three, individual lawmakers raise money to help out their parties; the
role of money is connected to the rise of party politics.3' The two
main political parties, Democrats and Republicans, act as large,
coercive coordinating devices. They require their members to raise
sizable sums of money. They police this requirement in various ways:
by allocating scarce and prized committee chairpersonshipscommittee and subcommittee chairs literally have quotas for the
28. $2,052,751,282 was raised in the 2004 election cycle for the Presidential, House,
and Senate campaigns by both parties. Glen Justice, Both PartiesSay Fund-Raising Was
Big and Nearly Equal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2004, at A20; The Center for Responsive
Politics, 2004 Presidential Election, http://www.opensecrets.org/presidential/index.asp (last
visited Apr. 17, 2006). Bush raised $367,228,801, and Kerry raised $326,236,288. The
Center for Responsive Politics, 2004 Presidential Election, http://www.opensecrets.org/
presidential/index.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
29. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960)
(discussing rational actors acting irrationally).
30. See tutor2u Tm, http://www.tutor2u.net/economics/content/topics/monopoly/barriers
_toentry.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2006) ("Barriers to entry are designed to block
potential entrants from entering a market profitably. They seek to protect the monopoly
power of existing (incumbent) firms in an industry and therefore maintain supernormal
(monopoly) profits in the long run. Barriers to entry have the effect of making a market
less contestable."). In the political context, the large campaign "war-chest" of any
incumbent gives her an advantage against any potential competitor, deterring challengers
ex ante.
31. JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES?: THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF
POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 48-50 (1995); PAUL ALLEN BECK, PARTY POLITICS IN
AMERICA 92-95, (8th ed. 1997); V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE
GROUPS 488-89 (1995); see also Mark Z. Barabak, No Rest for the Elected, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 2005, at Al.
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funds that they must raise, we have been told 32-by supporting (or
not) intra-party challenges in political primaries, by helping (or not)
with ambitions for higher electoral office, by assisting in post-elective
office career placements, and so on. In turn, the parties use the
money that they compel members to provide to wage pitched battles
in those surprisingly few marginal contests there are to gain control of
the chambers of Congress, and to throw into the increasingly
expensive presidential campaigns every four years.33
This is the modern game of politics in a nutshell, and there is
solid reason to believe that perfectly rational individuals would form
parties to effect these ends. The increasingly expensive elections of
the last decade have underscored how partisan control of the houses
of Congress and the executive branch of government are still up for
grabs-and with them the power each of the Members of Congress
can wield. The 2002 midterm elections were fought in a few districts
and a few states, with parties redistributing campaign funds and
dispatching important players to campaign for a handful of candidates
in marginal races; the 2004 presidential election similarly turned into
intense electoral trench warfare in a small number of hotspots across
the country. In sum, even with far more than ninety percent of
legislative seats safe, money still matters. A lot.
2. Fact No. 2: Legislators Are (Rational) People
The second fact is even more elemental than the first: legislators
are rational, in the simple sense of acting consistently on the basis of a

32. Interview with Rep. William Archer (R-Tex.) in L.A., Cal. (Jan. 29,2003).
33. According to the watchdog organization The Center for Responsive Politics,
redistribution of campaign contributions grew from essentially zero in 1992 to over ten
percent of the total raised by incumbent Congresspersons in the 2002 election cycle. See
The Center for Responsive Politics, The Big Picture: Spreading the Wealth - 2002 Cycle,
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/wealth.asp?cycle=2002 (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
The money is distributed from one candidate to another in one of two ways-through
either a Congressperson's candidate committee or a so-called leadership Political Action
Committee ("PAC"). The Center for Responsive Politics, 2004 Election Overview:
Candidate to Candidate Giving, http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/cand2cand.
asp?cycle=2004 (last visited Apr. 17, 2006); The Center for Responsive Politics, Candidate
Committees, Long Term Contribution Trends, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/
indus.asp?Ind=Q16 (last visited Apr. 17, 2006). Note that prior to this time period, the
rules regarding disposition of campaign contributions-in particular, the ability of
Representatives to convert funds to personal use on retirement-had changed. See Ethics
Reform Act of 1989, Pub L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
app. § 107 (2000)).

1172

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

well-defined utility function. As rational persons, they will seek out
what they want, measuring marginal costs against marginal benefits.34
The central role of money in modern politics, combined with this
further fact of legislative rationality, leads to a change in emphasis
from the traditional special-interest conception of politics. In the
usual setup, the legislator is passive: she simply sits, waiting for the
special-interest groups to come to her. Indeed, more often than not,
the politician laments this sorry state of affairs: she complains that
she must spend all her time dealing with lobbyists and yearns for
some higher path of enlightenment. Thus the Perot-McCain-NaderSchwarzenegger line of critique places blame at the feet of the
special-interest groups themselves, who must be reined in or exposed
for what they are:
corrupt predators on the socio-economic
landscape.
Yet given the political addiction to campaign contributions, it
would be surprising indeed if legislators simply sat around and waited
to be approached by special-interest groups in search of a policy
favor. We do not believe that they do. Applying the second fact, a
rational person who needs money and has power will use that
power-fully within the confines of the law, mind you-to obtain
money. Of these simple premises, the ex ante rent-extraction
phenomenon arises.
B. A New Beginning: Rent Seeking and Rent Extraction
Political theorists refer to lobbying activities initiated by specialinterest groups as "rent seeking," the term "rent" referring to nonmarket economic returns. An alternative perspective posits an
activist legislator who threatens to take rent away from a relevant
interest group.35 This model is one of "rent extraction." Rent seeking
is to rent extraction as bribery is to extortion.
In a rentseeking/bribery game, potential beneficiaries from political action pay
politicians for their gains. In a rent-extraction/extortion game,
potential victims pay politicians not to have losses imposed on them.
Of course, gains and losses are but opposite sides of a single coin: not
34. Gary S. Becker, IrrationalBehavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1, 1

(1962) ("[Niow everyone more or less agrees that rational behavior simply implies
consistent maximization of a well-ordered function, such as a utility or profit function.");
see also Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why It Matters, 1994 Wis. L.

REV. 71, 72-73 ("Most economic theory presumes that individuals are rational, in the
rather weak sense that they act consistently with their own perceived self-interest .... ).
35. See FRED

S.

MCCHESNEY,

MONEY

FOR NOTHING:

POLITICIANS,

RENT

EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 45 (1997) ("[I]ndividuals are made to pay,
rather than suffer welfare (wealth) losses.").
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to get a gain is a loss, not to suffer a loss is a gain.36 What matters
more to a deeper understanding of the political story is who initiates
the action. The traditional special-interest conception is a rentseeking model, because the groups come first, offering bribes. The
reverse Mancur Olson phenomenon is a rent-extracting model,
because the politicians come first, establishing the groups and then
asking them to pay or be harmed/not benefited.37

The importance of rent extraction emerges from studies of
legislative responses to campaign contributions. The idea behind rent
seeking-that money buys votes-is surprisingly difficult to prove.38
The empirical literature on campaign contributions has in fact
established such a link, but the results are highly qualified, depending
on such factors as the tenure of the legislator, and typically require
sophisticated econometrics to perceive small effects.39 At the core of

the econometric difficulty is a simultaneous equations problem: we
know that money flows from interest groups to politicians who
support them, but which came first, the money or the support?
Compounding the difficulty is the complexity of the political process.
Logrolling among members of Congress, the mediating effects of
parties, and rules limiting campaign contributions from individual
interest groups to individual legislators all muddy the trail of rent
seeking.4" Rent extraction only complicates the link between money

36. People do not always understand matters this way. The behavioral economist
Richard Thaler relates a real-world observation under which consumers will pay cash
when a gas station advertises a "penalty" for using credit cards (e.g., $1.90 cash versus
$2.00 credit card price) but will use credit cards when a station advertises a "bonus" for
using cash (e.g., $2.00 credit card versus $1.90 cash). See Richard H. Thaler, Toward a
Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 45 (1980). Of course
the two differing descriptions match the same underlying facts. So deep is the confusion
that the law often reflects it; for example, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.1(a) (West 2006)
actually makes it wrongful to charge a penalty for using a credit card but permits a bonus
for using cash. It is all a matter of how one understands the baseline or default condition.
In politics, if one thinks that she will get a benefit-say that a favored program will be
funded-and then that benefit is taken away, a loss is perceived; if, in contrast, one expects
to incur a loss, say a tax increase set to take effect, and then that loss or tax increase is
canceled, a gain is perceived.
37. See Ornstein, supra note 24.
38. Ansolabehere et al., supra note 25, at 112-16, provide an excellent summary and
critique of this literature.
39. Id. at 125.
40. Id. Logrolling refers to the common practice of trading votes across issues;
member A votes for member B's favored project, on the (typically implicit) condition that
member B will vote for member A's favorite project. See Thomas Stramann, The Effects
of Logrolling on Congressional Voting, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 1162, 1162-63 (1992);
American Politics 101B, Notes on Logrolling, http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/-polisci/miller/
american/lecture/logrolling.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
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and legislative outcomes further, as the "payoff" from campaign
contributions might not be a vote at all, but rather the absence of any
vote, and indeed any bill, to change a current policy: stringing along
becomes a norm of congressional business-as-usual under a rentextraction model. All of these facts and activities make it difficult to
see a precise connection between money and action.
But now we can see that many of the usual questions are
mistaken. The point is not to prove that money buys influence.
Indeed, the ex ante rent-extraction model suggests that payments to
politicians might be needed simply to maintain the status quo, and to
preserve the possibility of action for a later day. Our goal instead is
to explore further the implications of the two basic facts noted above:
that legislators need money and that they are rational. These two
facts alone suggest the possibility of ex ante rent extraction: a
lawmaking individual or body such as Congress can use its agendasetting powers to create or perpetuate (or create and perpetuate) the
conditions under which special-interest groups arise and flourish. In
technical terms we argue that the formation of interest groups is or
can be endogenous to the political process; in the traditional view, the
groups had arisen exogenously to that process. In less formal terms,
we argue that Congress first helps to create the groups that it can later
shake down to elicit campaign contributions. Rational actors who
have the power to do so make their own market.
The taxing power creates a prototype for rent extraction.
Congress has the constitutional power to tax.41 This ability to tax
necessarily entails the ability not to tax, that is, to propose taxation
but then not levy the tax threatened. Proposing onerous legislation
and then-for a price-agreeing not to push or even withdrawing the
legislation is a paradigm for rent extraction. (Note how the threat to
tax helps change the baseline, so that not taxing can come to look like
a "bonus.") Rent-extracting games are observed routinely as part of
tax legislation proposals: private individuals pay, not for affirmative
special favors, but to avoid disfavor.42
41. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 204 (1920).

In the

principal case under consideration here, the estate tax, Congress's constitutional power to
tax makes it the central player. Further, the different rules for House and Senate action,
in particular the super-majority rules of the Senate, discussed in Part IV.B, infra, make the
Senate pivotal. We hypothesize that the President and House use other areas to
perpetuate their own rent extraction. This is a topic for further research.
42. For various examples, see Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the
Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 946
(1987); Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, When Higher Taxes Loom, Lobbyists Realize Profit
Potential,WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2005, at El.
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Both rent-seeking and rent-extraction activities can only come
after the Mancur Olson problems have been solved. Special-interest
groups need to form themselves in order to seek rents (except in
those rare cases where an individual alone can command the
resources to play the game, but we can think of this as a special case
where the group number is one). Similarly, Congress will typically
need a group to extort in a rent-extraction game. This is where ex
ante rent extraction comes into play.
Here then is our new beginning in the analysis of legislative
behavior. In the traditional version of special-interest politics, the
groups arise independently, exogenous to the political process on
which they hold such sway." Politicians are mere "pawns" of special
interests, as the saying goes. In an ex ante rent-extraction game, in
contrast, Congress creates the occasions for the special interests to
form in the first place. That is, Congress proactively "solves" the
collective action problem for political groups through its power over
the political agenda and the economy, importantly including its taxing
authority. Congress's actions allow groups to be small enough-and
with large enough stakes-to organize into effective advocacy units.
Congress then proceeds to shake down the groups. Special interests
become the victims of politicians.
Once again, the taxing power is especially illustrative. The
traditional Mancur Olson-style approach, as applied for example by
Gary Becker,' suggests the likely nature of tax bills. A tax that is
evenly distributed-so that its per capita incidence is small-has clear
political benefits, for it may raise money without promoting interest
group outcry." The interest group in question becomes all taxpayers,
a large number, and each member has small stakes: precisely a
framework that promotes free-riding and non-cooperation. This
perspective does indeed help explain the two major taxes in America,
the personal income and payroll taxes, which impose broadly diffuse
taxes at (relatively) low marginal rates, and account for over eighty
percent of all federal revenues.4 6 The ex ante rent-extraction
43. This is true by stipulation in Becker's classic 1983 text. Becker, supra note 3, at
375.
44. Id.; see also Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, Deadweight Costs and the Size
of Government, 46 J.L. & ECON. 293 passim (2003) (analyzing the relationships between
tax systems and the size of government).
45. Jonathan Baron & Edward J. McCaffery, Masking Redistribution (or Its Absence),
in BEHAVORIAL PUBLIC FINANCE 85, 85-112 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds.,
2006).
46. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUBL'N No. 05-10024, UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS 8

(2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10024.html; Andrew Mitrusi & James Poterba,
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phenomenon, in contrast, suggests that the precise opposite form of
tax may also be attractive: taxes that fall heavily (not lightly) on a
small (not large) group, most likely to organize and be politically
active. These are groups with rent-extraction potential. The estate
tax is a perfect example of such a tax. Regulations that fall heavily on
a small group, such as the tort reform and other proposals we discuss
briefly in Part V, act in much the same way as a tax for the affected
group.4 7 These, too, are prime territory for ex ante rent extraction. In
these cases, the purpose of the tax or regulation is not to raise general
revenues-it is hard for the government to raise money from small
groups, even with high stakes-but to create occasions for
congressional fundraising.
There can be many shades of the congressional fundraising game.
Sometimes legislators may start the process in motion, by helping to
create the special-interest groups vital to success, in the purest
instantiation of the game, the reverse Mancur Olson phenomenon.
Other times, Congress may react to preexisting groups or issues. In
all cases, Congress will string the issue along, milking it for what it is
worth. Our point, in the end, is not to replace the simple Mancur
Olson story with any equally simple reverse Mancur Olson story, so
much as it is to complexify our understanding of special interests and
the role of money in politics. We see a two-way street where others
have seen only a one-way one; we aim to view the legislative or
demand-side of campaign finance as well as the special interest or
supply side, as part of a dynamic, multi-faceted systemic process.4 8
C. Properties
We argue for the existence of the reverse Mancur Olson
phenomenon on the basis of one extended and several suggested
*examples, rather than by presenting a formal analytic model. There
are good reasons for this expository strategy. It is difficult to model
the actual activities of large, complex political institutions such as
Congress and special-interest groups writ large. The "game" almost
The Distributionof Payroll and Income Tax Burdens, 1979-99, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 765, 76980 (2000). Up-to-date tax rate tables can be found at http://www.irs.gov. Note that this
fact suggests that Becker was right, at least in large part: most revenues come from large,
broad-based taxes, where the groups affected are big and the costs of the tax to each
individual rather small.
47. See MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE? THE CHOICE BETWEEN
REGULATION AND TAXATION 2 (1999).
48. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive PoliticalDimensions of Regulatory Reform,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2-3 (1994) (aiming to complexify and view dynamically the
relationship between lawmakers, courts, and regulators).
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certainly does not have a stable, predictable equilibrium outcome-if
it did, then the principle of backwards induction would lead rational
actors not to play in the first place, because they could see the end in
sight.49 The game looks rather more like an irrational arms race that
Congress helps to initiate, or, as our title suggests, a shakedown
scheme or protection racket.5" Imagine being told by some powerful
actor (Congress/the police/organized crime) that you must "pay to
play" a round of a certain game. If you do not ante up this round,
something bad might happen (or, conversely, but equivalently,
something good might happen if, but only if, you have paid up). If the
something bad/good was bad/good enough, and if the likelihood of
action/inaction in the next round was high enough, you would indeed,
quite rationally, pay to play this round. And you would pay over and
over again, up to the point at which it was no longer profitable to
keep doing whatever it was you were doing to avoid the harm/seek
the good. Although the phenomenon may not lend itself to simple
axiomatic presentation, we believe that it occurs in the real world and
in a wide range of important cases. We can sketch the general
properties that will accompany the phenomenon.
One, there will be an issue of high stakes to a small, well-focused
group, with a tight-fitting policy option capable of inflicting pain or
gain on the identifiable group. These are simply the Mancur Olson
conditions.5
In a classic, reverse Mancur Olson phenomenon,
Congress will have played a role in creating and/or perpetuating these
conditions; in variants, Congress may have acted later in the process,
stumbling onto the lucrative landscape.
Two, the issue will likely have low salience for most voters and so
have little or no ballot box significance, aside from its effect on
lawmakers' abilities to raise money (which can of course affect
electability). Lawmakers will feel little pressure to cease the rentextracting activities on account of any narrow re-election motive.
Three, the issue had best be at least two-sided: there will be
small, well-funded positions on two (or more) sides of the policy
issues. This allows lawmakers to reap financial benefits regardless of
where they stand on the issue; it prevents a "tipping" phenomenon
49. See

DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELING 120-21
AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME

(1990); ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION:

THEORY 88 (1989); David Austen-Smith, Interest Groups, Campaign Contributions,and
ProbabilisticVoting, 54 PUB. CHOICE 123-39 (1987).

See generally ROBERT GIBBONS,
GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 57-61 (1992); DOUGLASS C. NORTH,
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
50. See generally SCHELLING, supra note 29.
51.

OLSON, supra note 2, at 166-67.
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wherein legislators would cluster together and actually do
something. 2
Four, action on one or the other side of the issue must be
plausible. Rational people will not pay-or not pay much-for longshots. There must be a good chance that Congress will act, as in
obtaining the typically requisite sixty votes in the Senate and having
the President sign the bill into law, for anyone to pay to see the
legislation enacted or blocked.
Five, there ought to be something in the nature of the issue such
that any legislative action will be plausibly long-lived. This feature is
needed for lawmakers to "capitalize" the rents. 3 If Congress could
easily undo in one term what it had done in the prior one, why would
any individual or group pay a large amount of money to effect the
initial result? Thus the stakes must be high and likely to persist for
some time; short-term, small-dollar appropriations bills will not get
the game started.
On the final two conditions-plausibility and plausible
longevity-the phenomenon is spectral, not binary. The bigger the
stakes, the lower the odds and the shorter the time horizon need be to
generate the preconditions for the game. It is all a matter of math. 4
Our primary example, the estate tax repeal/non-repeal efforts
over the last decade or so, satisfies all these conditions. The tax itself,
on account of its high marginal rates and exemption levels, is of
intense interest to a small group of real or putative taxpayers.
Congress has clearly played a role in creating and perpetuating this
state of affairs: the estate tax continues to feature a high exemption
52. As with "irrational arms races" and so much else, the recent Nobel Laureate
Thomas Schelling was instrumental in furthering the understanding of the "tipping"
phenomenon, whereby people cluster on one side of an outcome or policy choice. See
Thomas Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation,1 J. MATHEMATICAL SOC. 143, passim
(1972). The idea was recently popularized in MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT
(2002).
53. See Doernberg & McChesney, supra note 42, at 946 (noting that in negotiations
between legislators and lobbyists, long-term legislation or "deals" between the parties
hold higher value because they reduce transaction costs and risks).
54. Simply put, rationality dictates incurring marginal costs up to but not exceeding
marginal benefits. We can assume that the relevant marginal cost is a campaign
contribution. The marginal benefit is the change in probability of effecting the positive
outcome occasioned by the marginal contribution, multiplied by the capitalized rent or
benefit of the action. An expenditure that moves the likelihood of a favorable outcome
worth $100 million by one percent is worth $1 million, and so on. Of course there are
various tipping points clustered around obtaining the required number of votes; this is
entailed in the plausibility condition and plays into the discussion of the required number
of votes to effect action, which we discuss at length below. Again, we are not presenting
an axiomatic model in this Article.
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level and rate structure, meaning that small groups pay high stakes
under it, all in contrast to Congress's enacting a lower rate tax on a
broader base, an option that at critical junctures lawmakers neglected
even to consider. The estate tax issue, narrow and technical and of
immediate concern to a mere handful of persons, is highly unlikely to
be a decisive one in many voters' ballot box decisions. The issue is
two-sided: there are small, specific, well-financed groups opposed to
repeal as well as those for it. Action, in the form of repeal, has
become highly plausible over the last several years. Finally, there is a
strong case to be made that any ultimate, final repeal of the estate tax
would be unlikely to be reversed by any subsequent Congress, on
account of several factors we discuss below. The conditions also
obtain in the other examples we canvass briefly in the final Part: tort
reform, defense spending programs, and broadcast spectrum sales and
licensing. These issues feature big stakes, small groups, low salience,
two (or more) sides, plausible action, and long-term effects. And
everywhere-in each of these cases-Congress continually
perpetuates the state of affairs, stringing along votes and action on
matters of high stakes to small groups. In essence, Congress sets in
motion bidding wars among a small number of small groups with high
stakes. Such issues take up a good deal of the legislative agenda,
often with nothing-apparently-really happening.
With some or all of the conditions in place, the stage is set for a
rent-extraction game. The game will have at least two salient
features. One, Congress is likely to string the issue along, often
voting, rarely finally resolving the issue. This allows for multiple bites
at the apple, with no effect on electability, given the "no ballot box
significance" condition. Note, incidentally, that campaign finance
laws, by limiting the amounts that special interests can give to
lawmakers in any one year, may actually exacerbate this tendency to
prolong matters; Congress wants to get paid over many years. Two,
and clearly related to the stringing-along, sensible compromises will
be ignored or defeated. A pitched, all-or-nothing battle will ensue,
seemingly partisan, but in fact reflecting the common interest of all
insiders, Democrats and Republicans, against any potential invaders
at the gate. The rapacious need for cash fuels the game, and matters
go on and on, all the while appearing to the outside as if nothing of
any great importance is ever finally happening.
III. SETTING THE STAGE: THE FACTS OF THE ESTATE TAX

The saga of estate tax "reform" over the last decade or so
provides an excellent case study for the reverse Mancur Olson
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phenomenon. In this Part, we give the background facts and
information to understand that story.
A.

Estate Tax Basics

The estate tax began in 1916, at a now modest sounding top
marginal rate of ten percent." We have little doubt that the initial
motivation for the tax was public-spirited. The tax was designed both
to raise revenue and, in the progressive spirit of the times, to break up
large concentrations of wealth.16 To close an obvious loophole-the

ability to give everything away on death-Congress added the gift tax
in 1924. 57 The two taxes were unified in 1976, although they have
been somewhat torn asunder by recent law, discussed below. We
shall refer to the unified gift and estate tax as the "estate tax" for

convenience.
The estate tax is a wealth transfer tax, as opposed to a wealth tax

per se or an accessions tax that would fall on the recipients of
gratuitously transferred wealth. The estate tax is levied on the
transferor of wealth: the giver in the case of inter vivos transfers or
the estate in the case of a decedent. Three major-and very many
minor (in scope, not in economic significance)-exceptions and
exclusions whittle down the number of people subject to the tax.
One is the marital deduction." Either spouse can transfer to the
other, in life or upon death, an unlimited amount-there are limits on
the forms of transfer-of wealth. The marital deduction means that
55. For background on the history of and reasons for the estate tax, see generally
Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV. 223 (1956)
(discussing at length the history of and reasons for the estate tax); Debra Silberstein, A
History of the Death Tax - A Source of Revenue or a Vehicle for Wealth Redistribution,
http://www.debrasilberstein.com/deathtax.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2006); Financial
Planners Index, The History of the Estate Tax, Estate Tax History, Tax Act of 2001 Effecting 2010 and 2011, http://www.plannersindex.com/estate-taxhistory (last visited
Apr. 17, 2006).
56. See Eisenstein, supra note 55, at 224 (noting that the estate tax is most often seen
as motivated by a single purpose, "the confiscation of excessive accumulations of wealth");
see also John E. Donaldson, The Future of Transfer Taxation: Repeal, Restructuring and
Refinement, or Replacement, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539, 563-564 (1993) (advocating
abandonment of present estate and gift tax system and proposing two alternative models
focusing on transferee); David M. Hudson, Tax Policy and the Federal Taxation of the
Transfer of Wealth, 19 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 1, 9-32 (1983) (discussing history of federal
wealth transfer taxation); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Estate and Gift Tax Changes of 1981:
A Brief Essay on Historical Perspective, 60 N.C. L. REV. 821, 821-30 (1982) (using
historical context to review actions by the 97th Congress to reform transfer taxes).
57. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 204(a)(2)(4), 43 Stat. 253; Gary
Robbins, Estate Taxes: A Historical Perspective (Jan. 16, 2004), http://www.heritage.org/
research/Taxes/bgl719.cfm.
58. I.R.C. § 2056 (2000).
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the estate tax usually falls on the second-to-die in the case of a
married couple, giving more time and ability to plan for its ultimate
incidence-or avoidance. Proper use of the marital deduction also
means that the next two features of the tax, the annual gift exclusion
and the unified credit or exemption level, can easily be doubled for a
married couple, with planning.
Two is the annual gift exclusion.59 This is a per donor, per donee,
per year exemption from the tax. The amount (in cash or fair market
value of non-cash gifts) was raised to $10,000 in 1981; it has since been
indexed for inflation, and is currently set at $12,000 beginning in
2006. 0 Under the annual gift exclusion, therefore, two parents can
transfer $24,000 a year to each of their children, on and on. The
amount of wealth that can be removed from one's estate through
sophisticated use of the annual exclusion is significant. Consider a
married couple, age forty, with three young children. Were the
couple to give each child $24,000, cash, on January 1 of each year for
forty years, and were the cash invested in a vehicle yielding six per
cent, compounded daily-about the inflation-free rate of return on
the stock market over the past seventy years, the inflation adjustment
allowing us to keep the example simple in current dollar terms61 each child would have approximately $3.7 million by their parents'
eightieth birthdays. The couple would have extracted over $11
million from their combined estates, altogether tax-free.62
Nor does the annual exclusion story end there. By nowlongstanding administrative practice, the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") allows a "discount" to be given to fractional shares of certain
entities, such as a "family limited partnership" ("FLP"), which might
even be a vehicle simply holding the family's investment portfolio.63
59. Id. § 2503.
60. For general background see INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, PUBL'N No. 950, INTRODUCTION TO ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES (2004), http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p950.pdf. For the 2006 dollar amounts, see Internal Revenue
Service, Tax Law Changes for Gifts and Estates and Trusts, http://www.irs.gov/formspubs/
article/0,,id=112782,00.html#gift-excl_2006 (last modified Nov. 19, 2005).
61. See Roger G. Ibbotson & Peng Chen, Long-Run Stock Returns: Participatingin
the Real Economy, 59 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 88,95 (2003).
62. See GEORGE COOPER, A VOLUNTARY TAX?
PERSPECTIVES
ON
SOPHISTICATED ESTATE TAX AVOIDANCE 38 (1979) ("The most important technique for
avoiding high taxation of extant wealth has traditionally been the making of lifetime
gifts"); EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT: How To MAKE THE TAX SYSTEM
BETTER AND SIMPLER 68-69 (2002) (discussing a similar example with advice to give
early, often and in trust).
63. See Martin A. Sullivan, Estate Tax Compromise or Repeal: The Rich Versus the
Super Rich, 88 TAX NOTES 298,298-300 (2000) (stating how, as a result of planning, only a
small percentage of family businesses and family farms pay the estate tax); see also
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Assuming a generous but not unheard of discount of fifty percent, for

simplicity of exposition, a family could in effect double the wealthtransmission values countenanced above. By putting assets into an
FLP, and giving each child a fractional share of assets with an
underlying, undiscounted value of $48,000 each January 1, the couple
in the running example can double their transfer-tax-free wealth
transmission, getting more than $22 million out of their estates,
altogether gift and estate tax-free, and also income tax-free to the

children. 6' The outlines of the estate tax as a "voluntary" one ought
to be becoming clear. But note that the more ambitious strategies
require some planning piper to be paid: we shall hear more on this,
below.
Three, over and above the annual exclusion, there is an
exemption level, set out in a so-called unified credit, from the
combined gift and estate tax regime.65 This is the "zero bracket" of
the tax. The amount was increased to $600,000 in 1981 and gradually
raised again starting in the late 1990s. It was initially set at $1 million
by the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
("EGTRRA"),6 6 of which we shall hear much more before we are

through. The exemption became $1.5 million by 2004, and $2 million
in 2006, on its way to $3.5 million in 2009 and, in effect, to infinity in
2010.67 During this gradual weakening of the estate tax via a higher
exemption level, the gift tax exemption stays at $1 million per donor,
MCCAFFERY, supra note 62, at 148-49 (mentioning some benefits of the FLP); Martin A.
Sullivan, ForRichest Americans, Two-Thirds of Wealth Escapes Estate Tax, 87 TAX NOTES
328, 332 (2000) [hereinafter Sullivan, Richest Americans] (explaining how FLPs can cut the
value of included or taxable assets by one-quarter or one-half). Recent cases, such as
Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478 (2000), affd in part,rev'd in part sub nom.
Gulig v. Commissioner,293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002), remanded sub nom. Estate of Strangi
v. Commissioner, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331 (2003), affd, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005), and
Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004), have injected some uncertainty into
the FLP field, but the device, as well as similar devices, continues to be used. For articles
discussing the Strangi cases and how to properly form an FLP, see, for example, Michael
E. Mares, Est. of Strangi Finally Settled, TAX ADVISER, Nov. 1, 2005, at 661; Michael E.

Kitces, Knockout Blow? The Strangi Case May Finally Be Lost, but Family Limited
Partnerships Remain a Viable Estate Planning Tool, FIN. PLAN., Oct. 1, 2005,
http://www.financial-planning.com/pubs/fp/20051001024.html.
64. See Edward J. McCaffery, A Voluntary Tax? Revisited, NAT'L TAX ASS'N
PROCEEDINGS 268-69 (2000) (explaining current annual exclusion amounts); see also
MCCAFFERY, supra note 62, ch. 4.

65. See I.R.C. § 2505 (2000) (unified credit against gift tax); id. § 2010 (unified credit
against estate tax); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 60 (explaining in more
depth the credits available).
66. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), Pub.
L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38.
67. See infra Part IV.C for more detail on EGTRRA.
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meaning that the gift and estate taxes are no longer fully unified. 68 A
large effect of EGTRRA's keeping the gift tax exemption frozen at $1
million was to assure that one must, in fact, die to take advantage of
the higher estate tax exemptions. Indeed, 2010, the year that the
estate tax is scheduled for repeal, quickly got dubbed the "throw
Momma from the train" year by the usually not-so-witty estate tax
profession.69

A husband and wife with proper planning can once again double
any of the numbers noted in the prior paragraph. By using the gift
exemption early on in their lives, taxpayers can obtain significant
leveraging. Suppose, for example, that the couple in the running
example gives each of their three children fractional shares of an FLP
valued for tax purposes at a fifty percent discount, to one-half of its
underlying asset value, using their combined lifetime gift exemptions
when they, the parents, are forty, in addition to commencing the
program of annual gift exclusions described above. Under the $1
million per person exemption, each child's fortune would increase by
an additional $7 million or more, to an excess of $15 million per child,
by their parents' eightieth birthday parties.
Summing this all up, the way the estate tax works is as follows.
Once a donor has gone over the annual exclusion amount (more than
$12,000 to one particular person in one particular year), she fills out a
gift tax form and begins to subtract from her $1 million lifetime
exemption. On her death, the government adds up the value of her
estate and then subtracts debt to get at a net financial figure for her
estate.
Qualified transfers to a surviving spouse are further
subtracted. Finally, the government takes off $2,000,000, or the thenprevailing death-time exemption level, less any taxable gifts that have
diminished the exemption level during the decedent's life. Any value
left in the estate is then taxed at a rate that starts at approximately
forty percent and quickly reaches a maximum of nearly fifty percent.7 °

68. See John Buckley, Estate and Gift Taxes: What Will Congress Do Next?, 91 TAX
NOTES 2069,2069 n.1 (2001).

69. See Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Startfor the U.S.
Tax System, 112 YALE L.J. 261, 262 (2002) (noting that the phrase was first used by Paul
Krugman, Bad Heir Day, N.Y. TIMES, May 30,2001, at A23).
70. EGTRRA, as with so many other matters, made these numbers a moving target
throughout the decade. See infra note 166, Table 4, and related discussion.
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Revenue and Rates

Rather few decedents leave an estate large enough ever to
actually pay the estate tax: one to two percent of decedents a year, to
be more precise."1 In total, the tax does not raise much revenue, and
never really has, as Table 1 illustrates. Note that this pattern of a high
Table 1. Gift and Estate Tax Revenues, 1950-2000
Gift and Estate Tax
Revenues
(in billions of dollars)

Percent of
Federal
Revenues

1950
1955
1960

0.7

1.8

0.9
1.6

1.4
1.7

1965
1970
1975
1980

2.7
3.6
4.6
6.4

2.3
1.9

Year

1985
6.4
1990
11.5
1995
14.7
2000
29
2005*
23.8
Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget.
*estimated.

1.7
1.2
0.9
1.1
1.1
1.4
1.2

tax rate falling on a few is inconsistent with Gary Becker's general

model of taxation but consistent with a tax used for other, nonrevenue-raising purposes, such as rent extraction. There is a heated
dispute over the administrative costs of the tax, and also over its
effects on equilibrium. Opponents of the tax claim that it costs
money because of its impact on work, savings, and investment
behaviors; proponents tend to dismiss these ideas." Another claim of
71. See, e.g., Paul Taylor, Reasons To Keep the "Death Tax" Alive, FIN. TIMES (U.K.),
Aug. 14, 2003, at 21, availableat 2003 WLNR 8156719.
72. See Douglas A. Shackelford, The Tax Environment Facing the Wealthy, in DOES
ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 114, 135 (Joel

B. Slemrod ed., 2000) (discussing the uncertain effects that would follow the elimination of
the tax); see also Comments on the 2003 Economic Report of the President: Testimony
Before the J. Economic Comm., 108th Cong. 2-3 (2003) (statement of Daniel Mitchell,
McKenna Senior Fellow in Political Economy, The Heritage Foundation), available at
http://jec.senate.gov/_files/Mitchel102262003.pdf (commenting on reasons why the tax
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interest is that the estate tax as now constituted even loses money in a
static sense for the federal Treasury, because the types of complex
planning it helps to induce-especially the sophisticated insurance
and charitable trusts we discuss below-generate greater income tax
losses than the estate tax brings in.73 Whatever one thinks of these
diverse claims, it is hard to argue under just about any light that the
revenue effects of the estate tax are highly significant in a budget of
some two trillion dollars.
These revenue figures are hardly critical to the Treasury. But
they are central to the political story. The low yield of the tax is due
to the confluence of three factors: high exemption levels, high
marginal tax rates, and the very structure of the tax. The first factor
keeps low the numbers of persons and estates even possibly subject to
the tax: it makes the group small. The second factor makes those
persons in the shadows of the tax potentially liable for large sums: it
makes the stakes high. Here we have the classic Mancur Olson
conditions: small group/high stakes. The third factor makes the
stakes, or the tax, largely avoidable, thereby creating a second set of
players in the ex ante rent-extraction phenomenon. The key element
of the structure of the tax is that it is a back-ended wealth transfer
tax-it applies to wealth that is left over after a taxpayer's life-and
hence it is a tax that is easily anticipated. The high marginal tax rates
give wealthy persons living in the shadows of the tax every incentive
to plan to avoid it. From a traditional public finance perspective, this
combination of structural elements is puzzling.
Basic principles of optimal taxation-supplemented with
common sense and recent political economic history-suggest that
lowering both the exemption and the marginal tax rate levels would
most likely increase the revenue yield while enhancing efficiency and
diminishing incentives to evade or avoid the tax.74 This lowering of
should be repealed); WILLIAM G.

GALE ET AL.,

RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT

TAXATION 1-2 (2001).
73. See B. Douglas Bernheim, Does the Estate Tax Raise Revenue?, in 1 TAX POL'Y &
ECON. 113, 124-32 (Lawrence H. Summers ed., 1987) (discussing ways in which the estate
tax is mitigated by various estate planning tools that lead to fewer income tax revenues for
the government).
74. J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38
REV. ECON. STUD. 175, 206-08 (1971); see also A.B. ATKINSON, PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN
ACTION:
THE BASIC INCOME FLAT TAX PROPOSAL 46-61 (1997); EDWARD J.
MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 170-78 (1997); C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY

U.S. TAX POLICY 136 (2004) (noting that "lower marginal tax rates encourage better use
of both time and money"); A.B. Atkinson, Optimal Taxation and the Direct Versus
Indirect Tax Controversy, 10 CANADIAN J. ECON. 590, 602-03 (1976); F.P. Ramsey, A
Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47, 58-61 (1927); Joel Slemrod,
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rates and broadening of bases has in fact been a motif in basic
comprehensive tax policy since Ronald Reagan.75 A fundamental
principle of public finance, the Ramsey inverse elasticity rule,
maintains that the deadweight loss associated with a tax is
proportional to its tax rate squared.7 6 All things being equal, a tax at
a fifty percent rate is more than four times as inefficient as one at a
twenty-five percent rate. It is thus no surprise that many academics
and other tax reformers have proposed lowering the estate tax's rate
and broadening its base.77 Congress, however, has moved in almost
precisely the opposite direction. The exemption level of the estate
tax has continually increased over time-with proposals afoot to raise
it further 78 -constricting the tax's base, while its marginal tax rates
have remained stubbornly higher than the parallel income tax rates,
as Figure 1 in the notes reveals.7 9
Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 157, 168-70 (1990) (noting
how lowering the marginal tax rate in fact lowers the marginal administration cost and
"thus minimizes the total resource cost of raising revenue").
75. See generally Edward J. McCaffery, The Missing Links in Tax Reform, 2 CHAP. L.
REV. 233 (2000) (discussing tax reform attempts since President Reagan's overhaul in the
1980s). The recently-released report of the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax
Reform, Simple, Fair and Pro-Growth: Proposals To Fix America's Tax System (2005),
available at http://www.taxreformpanel.gov,
followed precisely this strategy,
recommending broadening the base by repealing or restricting the benefits of various
deductions or exclusions, then lowering the tax rates and repealing the alternative
minimum tax.
76. See Atkinson, supra note 74, at 596-99; Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith,
Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 1905, 1957 (1987); Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender
Discrimination, Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595, 658 n.216
(1993); see also MCCAFFERY, supra note 74, at 170-71.
77. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 69, at 263 (discussing the need to increase exemptions
and lower and flatten the rates).
78. See Barry W. Johnson et al., Elements of Federal Estate Taxation, in RETHINKING
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 65, 67-106 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001) (discussing
changes in the tax, including exemptions and proposed exemptions in the Bush
administration). See generally Donald Kiefer et al., The Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001: Overview and Assessment of Effects on Taxpayers, 55 NAT'L
TAX J. 89 (2002).
79. See Figure 1 on next page.

1187

SHAKEDOWNAT GUCCI GULCH

2006]

C. The Players
The government and the public writ large might in good faith
care generally about the revenue yield and other effects, good and
bad, from the estate tax. In this Section we look at actors who might
have a more direct, narrow economic stake in the outcome of the
estate tax repeal/non-repeal saga: groups who might be players in a
reverse Mancur Olson, ex ante rent-extraction game. We set aside
legislators, for now. Discussed here are players who might supply
campaign contributions to Congresspersons. In the next Part of the
Article, we shall see what, exactly, Congress was able to do on the
demand side of the political equation, to make sure that there were
suitable occasions for the players described here to pay the piper.
There are several groups with a direct, monetary stake in the outcome
of the estate tax repeal saga, all comparatively small, each of which
plays an important role in the story.
1. Putative Taxpayers
One group, of course, is the individuals, or their families, whose
estates would pay up to one-half of their net worth to the federal
government absent some planning. There are not many such people,
as we have just seen: the size of the group is inversely related to the
size of the exemption level under the tax, and this level is and has
Figure 1. Marginal Tax Rates Under Income and Estate Taxes
Top Tax Rates - Income v. Estate
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This Figure reflects the state of the law pre-EGTRRA, discussed below in the
text. EGTRRA slowly lowers the top rate of the estate tax to forty-five percent, still well
above the thirty-three percent rate scheduled to apply to the highest income tax bracket
under the law and then eliminates the estate tax for the single year 2010.
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always been high, compared to typical American wealth levels. 8° Few
Americans have net wealth in excess of $2 million per person, $4
million per married couple. But those that do have such estates, or
reasonably expect to, live in the shadows of the estate tax.
Not all wealthy individuals necessarily care about avoiding or
minimizing the estate tax, of course. George Cooper anecdotally
found that wealthy people fell into three distinct, roughly equal
groups.8 1 One group was unconcerned about the tax, whether out of
unease with considering their own mortality, a belief that the tax was
just, or a desire not to leave their personal heirs excess wealth.
Andrew Carnegie actually thought the latter, at least insofar as his
male heirs went; today prominent spokespersons for retention of the
estate tax include Warren Buffett and Bill Gates, Sr.82 The second
group includes people willing to engage in moderate planning to
minimize the tax. In the third group are people who, in the words of
one quoted by Cooper, "would stand on one ear, wiggle their four
toes, and disavow their families to save $20 in tax."8 3 The latter two
groups-especially the last-generate a pool of what we call putative
taxpayers, waiting to be saved from the tax's dreaded effect by the
next groups of players. It is a putative tax because few of the wealthy
pay it in full; estimates are that the effective yield of the estate tax is
close to one-half or less of its nominal yield of approximately fifty
percent. 8' This means that something closer to twenty-five percent of
the value of taxable estates is paid out in actual taxes. Even this
figure far overstates the true yield of the tax as a percent of its
potential yield, however, because many-probably most-wealthy
people living in its shadows have engaged in years of planning to
avoid being caught with too much loot on their deathbeds. We have
already seen, for example, how a married couple that begins planning
at age forty could-fairly easily-get some $40 million or more of
wealth out of their estates by their eightieth birthdays.
Cooper
80. In fact, the estate tax only affects about two percent of households. See Taylor,
supra note 71.
81. See COOPER, supranote 62, at 6-7.
82. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. GATES, SR. & CHUCK COLLINS, WEALTH AND OUR
COMMONWEALTH: WHY AMERICA SHOULD TAX ACCUMULATED FORTUNES 1-2
(2002); GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 169-70; Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Carnegie
Conjecture: Some Empirical Evidence, 108 Q.J. ECON. 413, 413 (1993).
83. See COOPER, supranote 62, at 7.
84. See Sullivan, Richest Americans, supra note 63, at 331.
85. Note that, in this running example, it make no difference what wealth the parents
started with, as long as they had enough money to fund the transfers, or what they ended
with; the idea is that parents who would have had, without any planning, an estate of $40
million, leading to an estate tax bill of $20 million, could altogether avoid that tax.
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devoted a chapter of his study to explaining-in the context of the
DuPont family, no less-that " 'zero-based budgeting' is a reasonable
starting point for any person with serious estate tax avoidance
designs."8 6 And the record shows that the gift and estate tax has been
weakened in significant ways since Cooper wrote this study in the
mid-1970s. 7
Very wealthy people with bequest motives form a narrow pool of
people who care enough to engage in some lobbying or other tax
avoidance/minimization activity. Groups of taxpayers in this category
have indeed organized and lobbied against the estate tax; examples
include the National Association of Realtors, the National Federation
of Independent Businesses ("NFIB"), the National Beer Wholesaler
Association, the National Restaurant Association, and the National
Cattlemen's Beef Association. We mention these five organizations
in particular because each had a PAC that identified on its official
Web site "permanent repeal of the estate tax" as one of its highest
lobbying priorities, during the period we study, from 1998 to 2004.
Appendices II through IV chronicle the nearly $3.5 million given by
these five PACs alone to Senators over that six-year period, sorted by
the Senator's pattern of voting on key estate tax repeal legislation, as
presented in Appendix I. A summary of this data is included in the
notes.' 8 The money we set forth in the Appendices is but a small part
86. See COOPER, supra note 62, at 77.
87. See McCaffery, supra note 64, at 268.
88.
Table 2. Summary of Donations to Senators by Pro-Repeal PACs, 1998-2004
(sorted by Senators' voting history on estate tax repeal)
Senators' Voting History

Average Amount of
Donations (per Senator)

Total Donations

Consistently pro-repeal Senators

$34,521

$2,485,512

Senators that would be consistently pro-repeal ifnot
for not voting one or more times

$27,116

$162,696

Senators with flipping votes on repeal

$24,920

$323,960

Senators that would be consistently anti-repeal if not
for not voting one or more times

$15,700

$31,400

Consistently anti-repeal Senators

$9,454

$425,430

All Senators (Total)

$24,848

$3,428,998

See infra Appendix I (vote histories); infra Appendices II-IV (campaign
contribution data). This Table evinces a clear pattern with the average dollars going to the
most consistently pro-repeal Senators.
We emphasize that, as with other data we have unearthed on campaign
contributions, this is not a scientific survey. It is virtually impossible precisely to trace all
the money there is in politics, let alone to understand the cause or the effects of any
particular expenditure. The PACs we examine were concerned about other issues, after
all, and so the dollars reported cannot be linked to the estate tax issue alone. But, on the
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of the whole. It simply illustrates the fact that private groups of
putative estate taxpayers are concerned about the estate tax, enough
to pay Senators to consider repealing it.
The cash flow to Congress indicates the putative taxpayers'
concern. The extent of the concern is rather easily mapped out:
putative tax = tax rate (intended bequest - exempt level)
With a nominal tax rate of roughly fifty percent, this putative tax is
quite high, indeed, for the very wealthiest Americans. For a rational
person in this situation concerned only with making a bequest, the
decision metric is simple enough. Such a person will spend one dollar
in estate tax avoidance or minimization in order to save at least one
dollar in tax. In fact, estate tax avoidance expenditures are far more
efficient than that. The actual private cost of the tax, which consists
of the sum of taxes paid plus the transaction costs of avoiding the tax,
is much smaller than the putative tax that sets an upper bound to the
range. But these costs are hardly trivial. The fees paid over to estate
tax experts, plus the taxes paid and other transaction costs, combine
to create the "rent" of the estate tax as it exists: the non-market
economic impact. Eliminating the tax completely would save wealthy
individuals this much money. Some of this money goes to the
government: the rather small, in relative terms, dollars in Table 1.
Some of this money goes to the next three groups of players we
discuss. Because a rational bequest-minded donor would pay one
dollar to a politician for a chance worth more than one dollar of
potentially avoided private costs, some of this money can also go to
Congress-or to lobbyists-as we shall develop later on.89
2. Estate Tax Specialists
Some portion of the dollars that would otherwise go to the
government in estate taxes gets paid out in fees to estate tax
practitioners: lawyers, accountants, financial planners who specialize
in whole or in part in estate tax minimization, trust companies, and
other fiduciaries. In theory, the rational bequest-motivated individual
or family would pay out almost as much in fees as she would
other hand, there were many more groups and individuals in this category of seeking
estate tax repeal, some of whose expenditures have been chronicled elsewhere. See, e.g.,
GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 239-52 (chapter titled "Money, Money, Money");
id. passim.
89. Graetz and Shapiro, while curiously denying that money played a dominant role in
the estate tax saga, also detail that wealthy families spent a lot of money lobbying for
repeal. See generally GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 239-52 (detailing the
lobbying efforts of the "ultra-wealthy" in the estate tax battle).
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otherwise pay to the government: the fees would approach the
putative tax. Aside from the obvious fact that individuals may not be
so bequest-motivated (that is, they might be willing to leave their
wealth to heirs if it could all pass through, but not if one-half of it
would be taken by the government), 9° the forces of competition on
the supply side of the estate tax minimizing market drive down the
costs of estate tax reduction. Yet these costs do not fall all the way to
approach zero. There are several reasons for this.
One, estate tax specialists serve a relatively small market, on the
demand side, as we have just sketched out. Since there are not many
rich persons or families seeking sophisticated estate tax reducing
advice, there are also not many people or firms supplying it.
Two, there are significant entry barriers to becoming an estate
tax specialist: not only need most specialists obtain some advanced
professional degree (juris doctor, certified public accountant, certified
financial planner), but they must also invest a significant amount of
human capital to master the techniques of estate tax minimization.
These techniques change frequently and remain complex, on account
of legislative and administrative developments, insuring that the pool
of estate tax specialists remains small. A looming cloud of repeal
further suppresses the numbers, deterring young practitioners from
entering the field.9 1

Three, there is considerable inelasticity on the demand side of
the estate tax advising market. Wealthy individuals in the shadows of
the estate tax are unlikely to trust their intimate family and financial
details to anonymous firms. The estate tax specialist does not simply
dispense relatively simple advice, such as to use the annual exclusion
gift amounts each year or to take advantage of the lifetime exemption
level as soon as possible. Most sophisticated wealthy donors do not
want to pass unfettered control of significant economic assets to their
children when the kids are young, and so the simplest forms of wealth
transfer (outright gifts) are rarely used by the very wealthy. Various
forms of complex ownership structures, such as the FLPs alluded to
above or popular Crummey trusts, operate to use the donor's
exemptions and exclusions while keeping present control out of the
90. In other words, the very existence of the estate tax might push some wealthy
taxpayers to consume more of their wealth and give less to their heirs. See, e.g., Edward J.
McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283, 312-22
(1994).
91. Alan F. Rothschild, Seven Habits of Highly Effective Estate Planners, PROB. &
PROP., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 58; Scott C. Fithian, Is Your CareerAbout To Be Repealed? Part I, PLANNED GIVING DESIGN CENTER, May 17, 2001, http://www.pgdc.com/usa/item/
?itemlD=27339&glln.enc=ISO-8859-1.
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hands of young beneficiaries. 2 Hence the advice becomes more and
more complex, and ever-changing. At the same time, the estate tax
specialist must be acquainted with the personal and psychological
relationships within the family, for she will be crafting documents
about passing on large amounts of wealth, perhaps including a family
business. Many wealthy, bequest-minded persons are reluctant to
fully trust such details to associates in large anonymous firms; as a
result, the world of the estate tax specialist is small and intimate, with
relatively little turnover. Estate tax specialists are well-compensated
for their time and loyalties. 3

3. Insurance Industry
The insurance industry plays a large and important role in estate

tax minimization. The reasons sound in three interconnected
provisions of the tax laws. One, the proceeds of life insurance are not
included in the beneficiary's (recipient's) income tax.94 Two, by
longstanding legislative exemption, the "inside buildup" of a cashvalue, whole life, or (all synonymously) universal life insurance policy

is not income to the policyholder.95 Three, as long as an individual is
not the "owner" of an insurance policy on her own life-once again,
sophisticated planning is needed to ensure this result obtains, as by
having a life insurance trust "own" the policy-the policy's value is
not includible in her estate. 96

Put this all together and this is what you get: A wealthy
individual can use her annual exclusion gifts and/or all or part of her
lifetime exemption level to set up an irrevocable life insurance trust
92. See generally Crummey v. Comm'r, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968); Estate of
Cristofani v. Comm'r, 97 T.C. 74, 84-85 (1991); Dora Arash, Crummey Trusts: An
Exploitation of the Annual Exclusion, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 83 (1993) (describing the
Crummey line of cases and mechanisms for controlling access to trusts).
93. Estate tax specialists, who were widely opposed to repeal, also seem to have
benefited economically from the uncertainty surrounding repeal. See Sandra Block, Estate
Tax Chaos Lingers: FinancialPros Needed Now More than Ever, USA TODAY, June 15,
2001, at B3. This article argues that EGTRRA actually created a windfall for estate tax
specialists because of the complexity of its provisions. Stephen McDaniel, an estate
attorney in Memphis, commented about the law: "It's a lawyer relief act .... We've got a
10-year estate-planning attorney windfall." Id. For some sense of the dollars involved in
estate tax-savvy trusts, see Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional
Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuitiesand Taxes, 115 YALE
L.J. 356, 359 (2005), finding that there was over $100 billion in "Dynasty Trusts" by the
year 2003.
94. I.R.C. § 101 (2000).
95. Andrew D. Pike, Reflections on the Meaning of Life: An Analysis of Section 7702
and the Taxation of Cash Value Life Insurance,43 TAX L. REV. 491,493 n.2 (1988).
96. I.R.C. §§ 2038, 2042.
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for her children. 97 The gifts to the children are sent to the insurance
company as policy premia, via the trust. After deducting the current
period mortality premium to compensate for the pure (term) risk
component of the insurance, the excess is held by the insurance
company, on the trust's account, and invested. When the donor dies,
the proceeds go to the trust without being brought within the
decedent's estate. The money is then distributed, altogether tax-free,
to the heirs as beneficiaries of the trust, or used to buy assets from the
estate to give it the liquidity with which to pay any remaining tax. 98
There are even more complex means of estate tax minimization
using insurance, including the now-notorious "split-dollar"
arrangements. Under these plans, a wealthy donor purchases an
insurance policy with a high face value and gifts away the cash value
component (the complement of the pure risk one) to a beneficiary. A
large portion of the initial, large premium is allocated to the actuarial
risk component, leaving a small value to be placed on the gift of the
residual interest. The dollars here can be staggering.99
It is thus not surprising that there is growing evidence that
insurance companies have lobbied extensively to retain the estate
tax."° As with most special interests, it is difficult to pin down exactly
the flows of funds from insurance companies inside the Beltway. And
like the other groups with a specific interest in keeping the estate
tax-estate tax specialists, discussed above, and large nonprofits,
discussed below-insurance companies had to be subtle, in part
because it is a delicate matter to explain to one's clients that you are
lobbying to keep in place a tax that you are getting paid to help a

97. See CCH Business Owners Toolkit: The Irrevocable Life Trust, http://www.tool
kit.cch.com/text/P12_3595.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2006) (providing a brief overview of
irrevocable life insurance trusts).
98. The need for liquidity is a large theme in estate planning. Because the tax comes
due shortly after a death, and is based on the decedent's total assets, whether liquid or not,
it is often difficult to come up with cash to pay the tax bill. Some limited statutory
provisions ameliorate this issue in certain cases. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6166 (installment
method of paying estate taxes in certain cases). Life insurance trusts, coupled with
"buy/sell" agreements from the family business or trust, are a common technique for
practitioners to address the concern.
99. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Death Still Certain, but Taxes May Be Subject to a
Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2002, at Al (featuring New York lawyer Jonathan
Blattmachr describing the multimillion dollar insurance policies used by his estate tax
planning clients).
100. See Michael Forsythe, 'Death Tax' Death Knell? Insurers' Opposition, Deficit
Politics Threaten Permanent Repeal of Estate Tax, PITr. POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 17, 2005, at
C8. For a comparison of Senate contributions by anti-repeal life insurance PACs and
individual Senatorial voting patterns on estate tax repeal, see infra Appendices V-VII.
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client avoid. 10 1 Nonetheless, insurance companies have given money
to Senators in the relevant periods; Appendices V through VII,
parallel to the pro-repeal analyses in Appendices II through IV,
present the Senatorial campaign contributions of the PACs for
Metropolitan Life, New York Life, and Northwestern Life Mutual,
three major insurance companies. With the qualifications as noted
above-namely that an anti-estate tax repeal focus cannot explain all
this money, but, on the other hand, these snippets do not capture all
of the anti-estate tax repeal money, either-a quick summary of these
figures, which totaled over $1 million in the six year period 19982004, is presented in the notes. 112 Professors Michael Graetz and Ian
Shapiro unearthed the fact that the Association of Advanced Life
Underwriting formed a lobbying coalition and spent $2 million to hire
former Senator Alan Simpson, Republican of Wyoming, to lead their
charge against death to the death tax. 103 So far, this anti-repeal
money has worked perfectly well-although the Senate has made sure
that the pro-repeal money continues to flow, as well.

101. In the case of insurance companies, there was another reason for subtlety: we
were told by insiders "off the record" that the Republican leadership, largely and
nominally pro-estate tax repeal, was threatening to take away many of the insurance
company's longstanding tax breaks, such as the non-taxation of the "inside build-up" of
insurance reserves, if they lobbied too vigorously against repeal. Like many other pieces
of information helping to develop and confirm our basic thesis, we were told this by a
prominent lobbyist who asked to remain anonymous (we were also given supporting data
by Congresspersons and congressional aides). Insurers did publicly support certain
"reform/don't repeal" options for the tax. See, e.g., JOANNE WOJCIK, BETWEEN THE
LINES: DEATH, TAXES, AND LIFE INSURERS 12 (2005); Arthur D. Postal, Vital Issues for
Life Insurers Are on the Table, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, LIFE & HEALTH (Fin. Servs. Ed.),
Sept. 5, 2005, at 6, available at 2005 WLNR 14500942.
102.
Table 3. Summary of Donations to Senators by Anti-Repeal Insurance PACs, 1998-2004
(sorted by Senators' voting history on estate tax repeal)
Average Amount
Senators' Voting History

of Donations
Senator)

Total Donations

Senators that would be consistently anti-repeal if not for not
votin one or more times

$19,750

$39,500

Senators with flipping votes on repeal

$14,423

$43,269

Consistently pro-repeal Senators

$8,892

$640,249

Consistently anti-repeal Senators
Senators that would be consistently pro-repeal if not for not
voting one or more times

$7,158

$322,099
$31,002

All Senators (Total)

$7,798

S(per

103. GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 246-47.

$5,167
$1,076,119
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4. Large Nonprofits
Much sophisticated estate tax minimization involves charitable

giving, typically to large nonprofit organizations, through devices such
as charitable lead and remainder trusts and private foundations.', n
Absent fraud, 10 5 one needs some charitable inclination to give to
charity, but the combined income and estate tax savings of structured
charitable giving can mean that one does not need all that much
altruism. Under today's tax rates, a fairly simple gift to charity by a
wealthy person living in the shadows of the estate tax will cost the
donor approximately thirty-five cents on the dollar, the rest coming
from her distant Uncle Sam. One dollar given to charity generates
thirty-five cents in income tax savings to a high bracket taxpayer; the
remaining sixty-five cents would have generated some thirty cents in
estate tax. A sophisticated use of trusts and future interests can
leverage charitable propensity even further. Thus, Ted Turner's $1
billion contribution to the United Nations, for example, was
estimated to cost Turner, after taxes, somewhere between $100 and
$300 million.0 6 The rest was in effect borne by the federal Treasury,
as foregone revenue. Large nonprofits, acutely aware of this math
and the effects that it has on their donor base,107 are serious

opponents of estate tax repeal. 08
104. See Don R. Weigandt, Charitable Giving Without Fearof Death, 54 MAJOR TAX
PLAN. 2002, § 1100, at 11-3 to -4 (2002); see also Edward J. McCaffery & Don R.
Weigandt, Lobbying For Life: Protecting Charitable Giving Without a Death Tax, 98 TAX
NOTES 97, 98 (2003).
105. See, e.g., Richard Lezin Jones, A Violin's Value and What To Pay the l.R.S.
Fiddler, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2004, at All (describing the possible inflation of the value of
a set of violins sold to an orchestra for the tax benefits of the transaction).
106. David Rohde, Ted Turner Plans a $1 Billion Gift for U.N. Agencies, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 1997, at Al. Given an income tax rate of approximately forty percent, the $1
billion would save $400 million on income taxes, netting $600 million. Since this $600
million would have stayed in Turner's estate, growing at the discounted rate, it would have
generated another $300 million in estate taxes, at present value, costing Turner a net $300
million. Additional reductions would occur because of the timing of the gift, and various
valuation rules not relevant here.
107. See Jon M. Bakija & William G. Gale, Effects of Estate Tax Reform on Charitable
Giving, TAX POL'Y ISSUES & OPTIONS (Urban Inst.-Brookings Inst. Tax Policy Ctr.,
Wash., D.C.), July 2003, at 1, 1, available at http://brookings.edu/views/articles/gale/
20030617.pdf (estimating, with economic tools, that estate tax repeal would reduce
charitable giving by $10 billion in the United States); see also Michael J. Brunetti, The
Estate Tax and CharitableBequests: Elasticity Estimates Using Probate Records, 58 NAT'L
TAX J. 165, 186-87 (2005) (predicting that, based on empirical evidence of the relationship
between charitable contributions and the estate tax, "repeal of the federal estate tax ...
[will] decrease charitable bequests from 7.74 to 1.98 percent of after-tax wealth for
[federal estate tax return] filers").
108. Nonetheless, many large charitable organizations have not been vocal about their
stance on estate tax repeal for fear of antagonizing their wealthy benefactors that favor
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5. Lobbyists
Lobbyists form a final group of players in the battle over estate
tax repeal or reform. They represent groups of putative taxpayers
(including, for example, the NFIB, the Newspaper Association of
America, beer manufacturers, and farmers) and those on the other
side (large nonprofits, insurance companies, gift and estate tax
advisers and financial intermediaries such as trust companies).1 °9
Lobbyists play a complex and multi-faceted role in the traditional
special-interest conception of politics as well as under the ex ante
rent-extraction phenomenon. They help form the very groups that
they will later help to shake down-all for a fee, of course. Not
surprisingly, tax is by far the most common specialty listed by
And also not surprisingly, there is credible
registered lobbyists.'
evidence that lobbyists often feel the brunt of a shakedown scheme
themselves, as politicians repeatedly demand, personally, that
lobbyists pay to play the game."' In the shakedown game, lobbyists
help Congress shake down the special-interest groups, whom they
also shake down-and then they get shaken down themselves by
legislators. Play with fire, and get burned, as they say. Lobbyists are
the quintessential players in the fire-filled game of politics and
money.
D. Ex Ante Rent Extraction: A Synthesis
The roster of players in the estate tax drama begins with the
taxpayers subject to the tax. These putative taxpayers do not avoid
the estate tax for free. They must pay estate tax specialists, insurance
companies and other financial intermediaries, and, sometimes,
charities, in order to avoid the tax. Economists call the sums paid
over to these groups on account of estate tax avoidance motives
"transaction costs." 112 Thus, in simple terms, the putative taxpayers
estate tax repeal. See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 246-47; Stephanie Strom,
CharitiesAre Silent on Loss of Estate Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2005, at A28.

109. For a comparison of Senate contributions from pro- and anti-repeal PACs and
individual Senators' voting patterns on repeal of the estate tax, see infra Appendices IVII.

110. The Center for Responsive Politics, Top Issue Areas, http://www.opensecrets.org/
pubs/lobby00/issueareas.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2006). There are seventy-six different
specialties for congressional lobbyists, and tax is the most common one. Nearly a quarter
of Washington's 12,113 lobbyists listed tax as one of their specialties.
111. Ornstein, supra note 24.
112. See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:
A Theory of Vertical and LateralIntegration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691,692 (1986); Oliver Hart
& John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J.POL. ECON. 1119, 1120
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stand on one side, and beneficiaries of transaction costs of the tax
stand on the other. Lobbyists are a transaction cost of interacting
with Congress, which both sides have been paying-a lot-lately.
Our basic story is that Congress has been stringing along the saga of
estate tax repeal/non-repeal, which is an issue of high stakes to
several small groups, in order to reap the benefits of multiple bites at
the campaign contribution apple. In passing in this Part and in the
Appendices, we have chronicled some of the money-some $4.5
million over a six-year period-involved in the game. We believe that
this is just the tip of an iceberg, but nailing down the precise role of
money in politics is hard.
Instead of searching for more signs of dollars devoted to estate
tax repeal/non-repeal inside the Beltway, we move the story along in
the next Part to Congress's, especially the Senate's, actions during
critical periods during the story. Here we shall see multiple votes
with no final action; unprincipled legislative resolutions that are
clearly temporary and hence require later votes; powerful actors such
as the President and the Republican leadership unable to get their
self-proclaimed desired outcome even when literally nothing seems to
stand in their way; Senators "flipping" their votes or switching back
and forth between repeal and non-repeal, with nary an explanation of
their inconsistency, such that, at critical times, more than sixty sitting
Senators had voted for repeal, and more than forty had voted against
it; and so on. All the while money keeps flowing in to help fight these
legislative battles, which turn on no new data or analysis of the
underlying facts, and which resist obvious, sensible compromises at all
turns. We believe that the sketch of the background, presented in this
Part, shows that the preconditions for a reverse Mancur Olson game
were in place-small groups/high stakes, no ballot box significance,
two sides, and plausible, long-lived action-and that there is ample
evidence, as presented in the next Part, that Congress in fact played
its role, by stringing the issue along and avoiding sensible
compromises. That is our story, and we see no reason not to stick to
it.
We do note that others see a different story. In their recent
book-length account of the estate tax saga, Professors Graetz and
Shapiro give a contrasting account, both in general and in specific
terms regarding the importance of money." 3 Graetz and Shapiro
chronicle at some length the various players giving large sums to
(1990); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics:
ContractualRelations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 240-41 (1979).
113. See generally GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 17.
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effect permanent repeal. But the authors curiously back off from any
implication that this money played an important role in Congress's
actions and inaction. They claim, in the end, that "while money was
an essential ingredient of the repeal movement's success, campaign
contributions were a comparatively small part of the story. ' 114 Graetz
and Shapiro want instead to lay the blame for repeal of the estate tax
on the concerted, organized, and rhetorically adept moves of a
comparative handful of "true believers," combined with the fact that
opponents of repeal were asleep at the switch.
This explanation sounds in the traditional special-interest
conception of politics, looking throughout at the role of the outside
interests. There are, however, several serious questions about the
Graetz-Shapiro explanation of the estate tax repeal. One, it does not
quite explain why the estate tax was not in fact quite repealed.'15
Two, it also does not explain why the particular idea to repeal the
estate tax got as far as it did, given that there are many issues now
supported by a comparative handful of true believers (such as gun
control, the protection of endangered species, prevention of global
warming to name but a few). Finally, it does not explain the
particular pattern of particular Senate votes, as we present in the next
Part. If the true believers were so adept, why didn't the estate tax
actually get repealed? And why did the Senate vote so often with no
apparent effect? It seems implausible that rhetoric aimed at changing
public opinion would lead to the precise, present-and bizarre-state
of the law, with the odd one-year repeal of EGTRRA, and so on.
Focusing more narrowly on the role of money in the story,
Graetz and Shapiro appear to have two reasons for seeing campaign
contributions as limited in importance. One, they point out that the
sums given to individual Congresspersons were small in relationship
to the total amounts spent on campaigns. 16 Similarly, we concede
that the $4.5 million we point to in the various Appendices is but a
drop in the bucket of political campaign contributions these days;
recall that over $2 billion was spent by candidates for federal office in
2004 alone." 7 But, of course, the sums noted by us and by Graetz and

114. Id.
115. Graetz and Shapiro did add a three-and-a-half-page Epilogue to their book; the
main part of the text had taken the story through 2001 and EGTRRA's one-year "repeal"
of the estate tax. See id. at 279-82. Graetz and Shapiro seem to believe that repeal is still
imminent. See id.
116. Id. at 250.
117. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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Shapiro were still large in the aggregate; 8 and contributions were
repeated year in and year out, as we have argued, even outside the
temporal ranges that both we and Graetz and Shapiro study. The
story of estate tax repeal/non-repeal has been a major one inside the
Beltway for well over ten years by now, as we detail in the next Part.
Further, much of the money was likely well-hidden from view, as the
careful researchers Graetz and Shapiro note: they point out that it is
especially hard to find money supporting the tax, as from life
insurance companies." 9 Also worth bearing in mind is the fact that
there were other shakedown schemes going on at the same time, as
we note in Part V. The estate tax story is but a part of a broader
theme.
Graetz and Shapiro also argue that lobbyists (not
Congresspersons) collected much of the money, as an argument
against any central role for campaign contributions in the story. 2
But, of course, lobbyists are an essential part of our tale, not an
exception to. it: they are critically important lubricants for the
transactions, on all sides. Finally, and most important, the fact that
the estate tax story does not explain all-or even possibly a great
deal-of the money going to Congress simply does not mean that the
converse is false: Money can still explain all (or possibly a great deal)
of the estate tax story as it played out in Congress.
Two, Graetz and Shapiro, citing the views of lobbyists, assert that
money, while it helps to explain elections, does not so much help to
explain legislation.2 ' But aside from the facts that one would expect
118. See The Center for Public Integrity, LobbyWatch: Policy & Taxation Group,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/lobby/profile.aspx?act=clients&year=2003&cl=LOO2521
(last visited Apr. 17, 2006); The Center for Responsive Politics, Lobbying Database:
Policy & Taxation Group: Client Summary, 2000, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobbyists/
clientsum.asp?year=2000&txtname=Policy+%26+Taxation+Group;
The Center for
Responsive Politics, Lobbying Database: Policy & Taxation Group: Client Summary,
1999,
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobbyists/clientsum.asp?year=1999&txtname=Policy+
%26+Taxation+Group; The Center for Responsive Politics, Lobbying Database: Policy &
Taxation Group: Client Summary, 1998, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobbyists/clientsum.
asp?year=1998&txtname=Policy+%26+Taxation+Group. For general information about
the estate tax repeal agenda advocated by the Policy and Taxation Group, see Policy &
Taxation Group, http://www.policyandtaxationgroup.com/htmI/repeal.html;
see also
Mayling Birney & Ian Shapiro, Death and Taxes: The Estate Tax Repeal and American
Democracy 16-20 (Oct. 5, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina
Law Review), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-csdp/events/pdfs/BirneyShapiro.pdf
(describing the large expenditures of several wealthy Americans over a span of many
years to lobby for estate tax repeal).
119. GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 114-16.
120. Id. at 249-51.
121. Id. at 251 ("Many lobbyists echoed the view that campaign contributions might be
important to getting politicians elected, but they are greatly overrated when it comes to
getting legislation enacted, or halting it.").
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lobbyists to say such a thing, and that elections are connected to
legislation, we emphasize, again, that not explaining legislation is a
critical aspect of the ex ante rent-extraction story. 122 In the traditional
special-interest view of politics, groups buy results. And here, indeed,
there would be a puzzle-largely omitted from Graetz's and Shapiro's
book, which is about the death of the death tax 123-as to why, in point
of fact, the estate tax has not died, notwithstanding the large sums of

money spent to kill it.
Of course, in the ex ante rentextraction/reverse Mancur Olson model, Congress, given a lucrative
issue, does not want to do anything permanent. They want to string
the issue along. The story lies, that is, in the dog's not barking-in
nothing apparent happening. The proof in our particular pudding
comes in the range of money given, as Graetz and Shapiro note, and
in the continued voting on repeal of the estate tax without ever
obtaining permanent repeal, a fact on which Graetz and Shapiro do

not dwell.
IV. SHAKEDOWN AT Gucci GULCH: A TALE OF DEATH AND
TAXES

We now connect the dots of the prior two Parts by showing how
the story of the estate tax, particularly the recent saga of attempts to
repeal it (or not), illustrate the ex ante rent-extraction model of
politics.
A.

The Road to EGTRRA

The story as we tell it begins in the early 1990s, after the Reagan
124
years made tax-cutting both possible and fashionable again.
122. Jack Abramoff, a once-powerful lobbyist, is at the center of a large-scale public
corruption investigation. In January 2006, he pled guilty to fraud, tax evasion and
conspiracy to bribe public officials, as part of an agreement that requires him to cooperate
with government investigators. Susan Schmidt & James V. Grimaldi, Abramoff Pleads
Guilty to 3 Counts: Lobbyist To Testify About Lawmakers in Corruption Probe, WASH.
POST, Jan. 4, 2006, at Al. In congressional hearings, a former Abramoff associate,
Michael Scanlon, was questioned about the $4.2 million the Tigua, or Yselta del Sur
Pueblo tribe of Texas, paid him to help it reclaim a license to operate a casino. Witnesses
testified before the Senate that Scanlon and his business partners falsely promised, after
taking money from the tribe, that they had been assured the license would be slipped into
congressional legislation. However, in the same year, these lobbyists were working with
former Christian Coalition head Ralph Reed to lobby the Texas legislature to close the
Tigua's El Paso casino. ConsultantAccused of Cheating Indian Tribes: Advisor Takes the
Fifth in Senate Casino Lobbying Hearing, MSNBC.COM, Nov. 17, 2004, http://msnbc.msn.
com/id16516189/. This particular instance is an example of a prominent lobbyist being on
both sides of the same issue, hence clearly wanting to string the issue along.
123. But see supra note 115 (discussing Graetz and Shapiro's Epilogue to their book).
124. See McCAFFERY, supra note 62, at 22.
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Representative Philip Crane (R-Ill.) and Senator Jesse Helms (R-

N.C.) tried in 1991 and again in 1993 to introduce legislation to kill
the estate tax.125 Various versions of bills combined a repeal of the
gift and estate taxes with repeal or deep cuts of all corporate income
taxes and a ten percent cap on the individual income tax. Not

surprisingly, these efforts12 6were seen as a fringe cause and the bills
were killed in committee.
The tale picked up intensity starting in July 1993, however, when

Christopher Cox, a conservative Republican Congressman (and now
Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission) from
Orange County, California, a bastion of tax aversion, introduced H.R.
2717, the Family Heritage Preservation Act ("FHPA"). FHPA was a

simple, clean bill-its dedicated purpose, in its own words, was "to
repeal the federal estate and gift taxes and the tax on generationskipping transfers.' 1 7 Cox initially flew solo, with no cosponsors.
FHPA lingered in Congress. 28 But by 1994 the bill began attracting

support, mainly conservative Republicans, largely from Cox's taxhating home base of California and the South. Dick Armey of Texas,
a rising power in Republican legislative circles, signed on in July 1994,
nearly a year after Cox's initial submission. 2 9 By the time FHPA died

on the legislative vine, in the fall of 1994, it had twenty-nine
cosponsors, 13 0 including three Democrats: still a small drop in the
House's 435 total-Member bucket, but enough to cause a ripple or
two. The tide was beginning to turn; plausibility, a critical condition

in the ex ante rent-extraction game, was beginning to rear its head.
Meantime, out in the real world, Americans were getting richer.
Throughout the boom time of the 1990s, America spawned thousands
125. To see Crane's proposals, see Crane Tithe Tax Act of 1991, H.R. 313,102nd Cong.
(1991) and Crane Tithe Act of 1993, H.R. 1190, 103rd Cong. (1993). To see Helms's
proposals, see Tithe Tax Act of 1991, S. 1900, 102nd Cong. (1991) and Flat Tax Act of
1993, S.193, 103rd Cong. (1993).
126. The bills introduced by Crane were referred to the House Committee on Ways
and Means where there was no further action taken. More information on the Crane
Tithe Act of 1991 and the Crane Title Act of 1993 is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d102:h.r.00313: (last visited Apr. 17, 2006) and http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d102:h.r.01190: (last visited Apr. 17, 2006). More information on the Tithe
Tax Act of 1991 and Flat Tax Act of 1993 is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibinlbdquery/z?d102:s.01900: (last visited Apr. 17, 2006) and http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibinfbdquery/z?d103:s.00188: (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
127. Family Heritage Preservation Act, H.R. 902,105th Cong. (1997).
128. FHPA was introduced by Cox on July 23, 1993, but did not attract another
cosponsor until June 22, 1994.
Further background on FHPA is available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binbdquery/z?d103:h.r.02717: (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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of new millionaires."' Looking back over time, a pattern emerges, as
Table 1 suggested. Whenever a suitably large percentage of
decedents became subject to the estate tax, change-in the form of
weakening-was imminent.132 As many individuals got involved in
tax planning, tax avoidance, and even paying estate taxes, pressure for
change reform mounted. The typical way for lawmakers to offer
relief was to raise the exemption level, while maintaining high
marginal tax rates-backwards from an optimal tax policy
perspective, but consistent with an ex ante rent-extraction play.133

Conditions were ripe for the game in the mid 1990s.13'
Back inside the Beltway, while academics and commentators
continued to fiddle, Congress seemed ready to burn, showing
sympathy for killing the estate tax in toto. Representative Cox kept
introducing bills to deliver the fatal blow. By 1996, Cox had enlisted
102 fellow Members as cosponsors (up from 0 in 1993 and 29 in 1994),
and, by 1998, 204, including the entire Republican leadership. 135 As
the tide tipped tax repeal solidly into the domain of the plausible,
other Representatives started spearheading their own legislation. In
February 1999, in the 106th Congress, Representatives Jennifer Dunn
(R-Wash.) and John Tanner (D-Tenn.) introduced H.R. 8, the Death
Tax Elimination Act, a bill to phase out and ultimately eliminate the
gift and estate tax over a ten-year period. 3 6 Unlike Cox's bills, Dunn
and Tanner's bill took off all the way to the legislative floors. It was
put up for a vote in the House on June 9, 2000, and passed by the
131. See David Leonhardt, Top Drawer; Defining the Rich in the World's Wealthiest
Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, § 4, at 1 (citing a near doubling or more of millionaires
in the United States between 1980 and 2000).
132. The legislative response can be seen with the continuing rise of estate tax
exemption levels under current law, I.R.C. § 2010 (2000), from $60,000 in 1976 to $500,000
in 1986 and then to $600,000 in 1996. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 increased the
effective exemption to $625,000 in 1998, $650,000 in 1999, $675,000 in 2000 and 2001,
$700,000 in 2002 and 2003, $850,000 in 2004, $950,000 in 2005, and $1 million in 2006 and
thereafter. Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 530 (2000)).
This constant rise kept the number of people who were subject to the estate tax small.
David Joulfaian, A Quarter Century of Estate Tax Reforms, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 343, 352
(2000). The additional increases made by EGTRRA are discussed infra notes 164-66 and
accompanying text.
133. Joulfaian, supra note 132, at 355.
134. See Leonhardt, supra note 131.
135. See The Library of Congress, Thomas, H.R. 784, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d104:h.r.00784:. The FHPA, introduced by Representive Christopher Cox
(R-Cal.), attracted substantial bipartisan support each year it was filed. WILLIAM W.
BEACH, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, TIME To REPEAL FEDERAL DEATH TAXES:

THE NIGHTMARE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2001), http://www.heritage.org/Research/
Taxes/BG1428.cfm#pgfld=1128712; see also supranotes 127-30 and accompanying text.
136. Death Tax Elimination Act, H.R. 8,106th Cong. (2000).
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overwhelming margin of 279 to 136, including the votes of sixty-five
Democratic representatives. 37

The Senate followed suit a month

later, passing the bill 59 to 39; this is the first of several Senate votes
for which we set out roll calls in Appendix I. Note that there was
broad bipartisan support, with nine Democrats, including several
prominent "liberals," voting for repeal.'38 President Bill Clinton, as
he had said he would do all along, vetoed the bill in August 2000, and
the House just barely failed to override the veto.'39 The estate tax
lived to die another day. 140 But plausibility had arrived, and, with it,
both sides-pro-death and pro-life, as it were, vis-A-vis the death

tax-had arisen, awoken, and formed.
B.

Senate Rules.4 '

We pause at this point in the running story, after the 106th
Congress and before George W. Bush ascended into the Presidency
along with the start of the 107th Congress, to discuss certain

procedural aspects of tax and budget legislation that play a major role
in the ongoing tale. The popular press and many scholarly accounts
have tended to blame the odd status quo that EGTRRA wrought, as

discussed more fully in the next Section-weakening the tax gradually
through 2009, killing it in 2010, bringing it back to life in full force in
2011-on the constraints imposed by Senate budgeting and voting

rules.'42 We believe that this blame is misplaced, for two broad
reasons.

One, the rules are endogenous, that is, almost exclusively of

legislators' own making, and subject to their change.'43 Indeed, the
137. 146 CONG. REc. H4163 (daily ed. June 9,2000).
138. 146 CONG. REC. S6781 (daily ed. July 14, 2000). The nine Democrats who voted
for the Senate bill were John Breaux (La.), Max Cleland (Ga.), Diane Feinstein (Cal.),
Mary Landrieu (La.), Blanche Lincoln (Ark.), Patricia Murray (Wash.), Charles Robb
(Va.), Robert Torricelli (N.J.), and Ronald Wyden (Or.).
139. 146 CONG. REC. H7335 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2000). The veto override vote was 274
to 157. With two-thirds of those voting needed to override a veto, the vote came up short
by thirteen votes.
140. With sincere apologies to James Bond.
141. We are very grateful to Elizabeth Garrett for her help on this Section.
142. See, e.g., GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 190-91; Karen C. Burke &
Grayson M.P. McCouch, Estate Tax Repeal and the Budget Process, 104 TAX NOTES 1049,
1050 (2001) (examining the "budgetary impact" and "procedural obstacles to repeal" of
the estate tax).
143. To draw a close parallel, consider the recent controversy over the use of the
filibuster in the judicial confirmation process. Here Republicans, frustrated by the
Democrats' use of filibusters to block judicial confirmations, considered invoking the
"nuclear option" of eliminating, by rule, the potential to filibuster. In the end a tacit
agreement was reached, and the use of the filibuster endures. But the point is that the
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alleged pathologies may at least arguably have been chosen by the
Senate, the pivotal actor in the game, to produce the end result-that
is, to foster better rent-extraction potential. We do not press this
particularly dark interpretation. We remain agnostic on the original
motivation for the relevant rules: they may indeed have been put in
place for other, "legitimate" reasons, such as to control runaway
deficit spending, but then later became features in ex ante rentextraction games, which we consider to be business as too often usual
in contemporary politics. But in any case, blaming these rules for
specific legislative outcomes is like Ulysses blaming the mast for his
confinement. As the story unfolds, we will see critical times when the
rules could have allowed for real action-permanent repeal for
example-but lawmakers chose instead to hide behind the rules,
prolonging the game.
Two, even accepting the budgeting and voting rules as being
somehow fixed, at least in the short term, these rules by no means
dictated the specific legislative outcomes that emerged. They
certainly do not explain EGTRRA's bizarre resolution of the estate
tax issue. There were choices throughout. Congress chose an
unprincipled route that guaranteed future votes and legislative
actions over sensible compromises that could have laid the matter to
rest; the compromises would have been far fairer and more efficient
to boot.
In any event, the federal budgeting process, and especially the
Senate rules for budgeting bills, is an enormously complex topic, well
beyond the scope of this Article.1" A quick sketch, however,
establishes the main themes just noted.
sixty-vote rule could have changed. See generally Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky,
In Defense of Filibustering Judicial Nominations, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 331 (2005)
(defending the filibuster as a valuable part of the judicial confirmation process); Orrin G.
Hatch, Judicial Nomination Filibuster Cause and Cure, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 803
(recommending a "sliding scale approach" to reform filibuster); Nuclear Nonsense, NEW
REPUBLIC, May 23, 2005, at 7 (arguing that Democrats should use the filibuster to block
appointment of "conservative extremist judges"); James Werrell, Op-Ed., Republicans
Contemplate the 'Nuclear Option', HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), Apr. 29, 2005, at 4A,
available at 2005 WLNR 6714123 (opining that if Republicans use the nuclear option to
end filibuster, they will later regret it).
144. For good general sources on the federal budgeting process and rules, see generally
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (3d ed. 2001); WALTER J. OLESZEK,
CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 41-74 (5th ed. 2001); Michael

W. Evans, The Budget Process and the "Sunset" Provision of the 2001 Tax Law, 99 TAX
NOTES 405 (2003); Elizabeth Garrett, Accounting for the Federal Budget and its Reform,
41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 189 (2004); Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework
Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717 (2005); Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the
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The House, by and large, acts by simple majority vote, and for
this reason-and the fact that the membership in the House
throughout the relevant time period was suitably anti-tax (that is,
largely Republican)-that chamber became a minor player in the
particular story of estate tax repeal/non-repeal. 145 The Senate, in
contrast, largely acts as a super-majority institution because of the
possibility of a filibuster, which can only be broken by a sixty-vote
"cloture" motion, on almost all bills. 46 Making the situation more
acute-more prone to inertia-is the fact that almost any amendment
can be added to almost any bill.1 47 Thus it is fairly easy to sink
legislation that might otherwise get enacted by more than sixty votes
simply by adding amendments that drive the support for the bill
below sixty Senators, at which point the proposed legislation can be
effectively filibustered.
To help obviate these difficulties, especially in passing acts aimed
at reducing a deficit-that is, that entail tax increases and/or spending
cuts-the Senate developed a "reconciliation process," whose roots
lay in the Budget Act of 1974.148 As it ultimately evolved over the

next decade or two, reconciliation is a process that allows the Senate
to limit debate and pass budget legislation with fifty votes (fifty-one in
the case of a tie), provided that the total cost of the reconciliation bill
stays within the confines of a budget resolution sanctioned by the
Congressional Budget Office ("CBO"). The so-called Byrd Rule is
now an integral part of the reconciliation process. 149 A matter of
Senate rules and procedures, this "rule" is actually a series of
provisions designed to keep "extraneous" matters out of a

Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387
(1998).
145. Subsequent work can address how the House, with its rules, can play variants of
the ex ante rent-extraction game.
146. See Evans, supra note 144, at 406.
147. See id.
148. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,
88 Stat. 297 (1974); see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 144, at 433-37 (discussing the
reconciliation process); GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 180 (same); Evans, supra
note 144, at 406-07 (discussing effect of the 1974 Budget Act on Senate procedure).
149. ROBERT KEITH, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION
PROCESS: THE SENATE'S "BYRD RULE" 1 (2005), available at http://opencrs.cdt.
org/rpts/RL30862 20050407.pdf (Apr. 7, 2005); David Baumann, The Octopus That Might
Eat Congress, 37 NAT'L J. 1470,1473-75 (2005); Byrd's Rule, CONG. DAILY, Mar. 29, 2001,
available at 2001 WLNR 4209145; Ryan Lizza, White House Watch: Hardball 101, NEW
REPUBLIC, Jan. 24, 2005, at 15, 16.
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reconciliation bill.150 Any Senator can raise a "point of order" to a
proposed amendment to a reconciliation bill.' If the point of order
is sustained by the Senate parliamentarian-meaning that the
substance of the amendment is found to be "extraneous" within the
terms of the Byrd Rule-it requires sixty votes to reinstate the
offending amendment.
This mechanism keeps unrelated
amendments, which would generally be subject to the usual sixty-vote
procedures, from sneaking into a fifty-vote reconciliation bill process.
Of course, the whole rub then becomes what is and is not
"related," that is, what potential amendments are and are not subject
to the Byrd Rule. Perhaps the best known provision of the rule by
now is subparagraph (E), added in 1987, and defining any amendment
that "leads to a net increase in outlays or decrease in revenues
beyond the years covered by the bill" as extraneous. 5 2 This rule was
designed to prevent timing tricks-such as paying for an expenditure
provision enacted now in an out year-from undermining the goal of
deficit reduction.'53 There was much debate following 1974 and into
the 1980s as to whether or not the reconciliation process even applied
to tax cutting measures-recall that an initial goal of the process was
to make it easier to raise taxes as a means of reducing the deficit.154
This dispute was resolved in favor of the application of the rule,'55 and
subparagraph (E) of the Byrd Rule led to the many "sunset"
provisions in EGTRRA, which play a large role in the story to which
we shall soon return. To still qualify within the fifty-vote process,
amendments could not decrease revenues beyond the ten-year period
of the reconciliation bill unless offset by a specific spending cut or
other revenue increase.'5 6

Hence EGTRRA simply expires after

2010, and, with its expiration, the estate tax will be revived.
The panoply of rules mean that sometimes fifty or fifty-one, and
other times sixty, votes would be needed to deal a final or near-final
150. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 144, at 443-46 (discussing the Byrd Rule);
George Hager, The Byrd Rule: Not an Easy Call, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2027 (1993);
Evans, supra note 144, at 409-10.
151. Keith, supra note 149, at 4.
152. Hager, supra note 150, at 2027; see also Evans, supra note 144, at 410 (discussing
subparagraph (E)).
153. See Evans, supra note 144, at 410.
154. Id. at 407.
155. See id. at 410.
156. But another possibility, it appears, is that the Senate could simply agree to ignore
the Byrd Rule. See Brody Mullins, Move To Extend Lower Tax Rates on Capital Gains,
Dividends Stalls, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2006, at A5 (referring to a possible compromise on
the extension of capital gains preference under which Democrats would agree not to raise
a Byrd Rule objection).
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death blow to the estate tax. Fifty votes would suffice to kill the tax
for the entire ten-year period, and longer with a specific spending cut
to offset it; and fifty votes would also be enough once the Byrd Rule
expired, as it was set to do in the fall of 2002. Otherwise, sixty votes
would be needed for a permanent tax cut not offset by a spending cut.
In order to maintain plausibility, one of the conditions for ex ante
rent extraction, the Senate thus had to approach sixty votes on
occasion, as it repeatedly has. But in order to maintain and prolong
the shakedown scheme-one of the principal predictions of the
phenomenon-the same Senate must then find a way not to act when
but fifty votes would be needed. This it did, perfectly.
C.

EGTRRA: The Case Gets Curious

With the election of George W. Bush in 2000, the estate tax
seemed dead for sure. Candidate Bush had been clear and consistent
in campaigning for a total abolition of the tax:
a veto was
inconceivable. 157 A majority of the Members of the 107th Congress
were on record as having voted to repeal it as well under H.R. 8. In
the Senate, fifty-one of the fifty-nine Senators who had voted to
repeal the estate tax in the summer of 2000, in the 106th Congress,
were still in office, and only fifty-one votes would be needed to
include estate tax repeal in a reconciliation bill. On December 16,
2000, Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert was thus both speaking
from a position of power and stating the then-reigning conventional
wisdom when he said:
Because we had such success in passing bipartisan measures to
end the marriage penalty and the death tax in this session of
Congress, I believe that these two bills could quickly be enacted
in the law at the beginning of next year. That is why I advocate
that we start with these two bills in the 107th Congress.15 8
President-elect Bush showed no signs of disagreeing. By January
2001, the media was reporting the death of the estate tax as an "easy"
first step in Bush's tax-cutting plans.159
On March 14, 2001,
Representatives Dunn and Tanner, with 224 cosponsors, reintroduced

157. See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 135-36.
158. Lizette Alvarez, Congress; Speaker Clarifies Stand on Bush's Tax Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2000, at A16 (quoting Representative Hastert).
159. Glenn Kessler, Bush's Hand Greatly Strengthened, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2001, at
Al; Francine Kiefer & Abraham McLaughlin, Bush Starts on Clear, Simple Plan,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 22,2001, at 1.
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H.R. 8, the Death Tax Elimination Act; within weeks, on April 4, the
House overwhelmingly approved it by a vote of 274 to 154.160
The estate tax seemed dead at last.
But a funny thing happened on the way to the wake. The Senate
never voted on stand-alone death tax repeal. Not this time-not, that
is, at the first point in the story when they could have actually done
something final.
Even as H.R. 8 was making its way through Congress, the
nascent Bush administration was preparing its own general tax
reduction bill, in consultation with prominent legislators. The
administration's bill became 2001 H.R. 1836, the Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 .161 EGTRRA was
introduced into the House on May 15 and passed the next day.16 The
Senate amended the bill and passed it as such on May 23, 2001;
conference reconciliation followed, with both chambers approving the
ultimate act on May 26. President Bush signed Public Law 107-16, his
first major legislative coup, on June 7, 2001.163
As noted, EGTRRA also killed the estate tax-sort of. More
particularly, EGTRRA did indeed repeal the estate tax-but only for
one year, 2010. Over the nine prior years, from 2001 to 2009, the law
gradually raises the estate tax's exemption level and reduces its rates.
Prior law had set the exemption level at $675,000 per person in the
year 2000, set to increase to $1 million by 2006.16 EGTRRA
accelerated the increase to $1 million, to take effect in 2002. The
exemption was set to increase to $1.5 million in 2004, $2 million in
2006, and $3.5 million in 2009. The top rate was to be cut-"slashed"
would not be accurate-from 55% to 50% in 2002, then by 1% a year
for the next five years, until it reached 45% in 2007, where it stays
until 2009. The year 2010 sees total repeal of the estate tax. 165 And

160. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 84, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2001/rol1084.xml
(last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
161. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), Pub.
L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38.
162. For an overview on the legislative and executive actions taken with this bill, see
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR01836:@@@X.
163. EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38.
164. I.R.C. § 2010 (1986) (amended); see also supra note 128.
165. One "price" of total repeal is a repeal of the long-standing rule of the stepped-up
basis for assets acquired on death. I.R.C. § 1014 (2000); see MCCAFFERY, supra note 62,
at 31-32. EGTRRA replaces this role with a "carryover" basis rule akin to I.R.C. § 1015,
for gifts. EGTRRA §§ 541-542, 115 Stat. 38, 76-86. See generally Roby B. Sawyers &
Dennis I. Belcher, Reform or Repeal the Transfer Tax System?, TAX ADVISER, Oct. 2004,
available at http://www.allbusiness.com/periodicals/article/231654-1.html.
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2011 sees a total reinstatement, all the way back to 2001 levels. Table
4, in the notes, sets out these curious facts.1 66
Throughout the whole period, the gift tax remains intact, with a
$1 million per person exemption level. 167 This assures that wealthy
citizens cannot gift away their wealth in the years in which the estate
tax has a higher exemption level or is altogether eliminated in 2010.
An often-stated rationale for these provisions of EGTRRA was that
the dollars involved fit within the $1.3 trillion tax cut budget
resolution, and thus came within the reconciliation process, thereby
requiring only fifty votes. A complete repeal of the estate tax
throughout the ten-year period of the reconciliation bill would have
required paring back on other tax cuts, cutting spending, or even
raising some taxes. A permanent repeal of the estate tax would have
had budget impacts beyond the ten-year period, triggering
subparagraph (E) of the Byrd Rule, and hence requiring sixty votes.
Thus, the story goes, the Senate's hands were tied, and Table 4
reflects the best that could have been done.
We do not buy that story.
It is true that the reconciliation process constrained the total
budget impacts of EGTRRA. But EGTRRA's bizarre outcome visA-vis the estate tax was not dictated in any sense by those constraints.
Consider four basic questions.
One, given the strong support for the Death Tax Elimination
Act, H.R. 8, including the endorsement of the President and its
overwhelming passage in the House, why not vote on it first, outside
of EGTRRA? It seemed quite possible to get the requisite sixty
votes simply to make this happen. Appendix I details the roll call
votes of the Senators on H.R. 8 in the 106th Congress, three (of
many) relevant votes in the 107th Congress, and one in the 108th
Congress, a span of less than three years. Analysis (which is made
166.
Table 4. Estate Tax Exemption Level and Rates Under EGTRRA
Year
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

]

Exemption Level
$1,000,000
$1,000,000
$1,500,000
$1,500,000
$2,000,000
$2,000,000
$2,000,000
$3,500,000
Infinite
$1,000,000

167. See Buckley, supra note 68, at 2070.

[

Tax Rate
50%
49%
48%
47%
46%
45%
45%
45%
n/a
55%
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easier by looking to Appendix II, which sets out the "flippers," or
Senators who changed votes on repeal issues) reveals that,
throughout these latter two Congresses, measured against the H.R. 8
baseline, there were more than sixty Senators who had voted for repeal
of the estate tax at one time or another. Of course, the rub-and a
central piece of evidence in the rent-extraction story-is that there
were also more thanforty Senators who had voted against repeal of the
estate tax at one time or another. Consider, for example, the Kyl (RAriz.) Amendment of February 13, 2002, to get a "sense of the
Senate" on permanent estate tax repeal. This vote passed 56 to 42,
with two abstentions: not enough to signal a possible sixty-vote
passage. But four Senators (McCain (R-Ariz.) plus Democrats
Breaux (La.), Murray (Wash.), and Torricelli (N.J.)) had flipped their
votes, from pro-repeal on H.R. 8 in 2000 to anti-repeal on the Kyl
Amendment in 2002, and the two Senators not voting (Bennett (RUtah) and Domenici (R-N.M.)) were consistently pro-repeal when
they did vote. With the two nonvoters and any two of the four
flippers, and but for the nonbinding nature of the vote, repeal would
have happened in February 2002. The math shows enough play with
the flippers and nonvoters that, at any point in time, the Senate in the
107th Congress could have gotten sixty votes for estate tax repeal-or
not.
Two, why not allocate some of the funds within the budget bill's
scope, $1.3 trillion, to repeal of the estate tax? Based on estimates by
the independent Urban Institute-Brookings Tax Policy Center, less
than $350 billion would have been lost by a total repeal of the estate
tax for the ten-year period, 2002-2012.168 If the traditional specialinterest conception of politics were in play, simply repealing the tax
for all of the ten-year period would seem to make sense (as would a
stand-alone vote, as in the first question). After all, there were more
small, targeted, well-financed interest groups concerned with total
repeal of the estate tax than there were with the (comparatively)
small rate reductions in the income tax-the latter being just the kind
of broad-based tax relief not predicted by the traditional specialinterest model. Indeed, a recurring theme in the story of estate tax

168. See Tax Policy Center, Estate Tax Returns and Liability, 2001-2015 (July 6, 2005),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/TaxModel/tmdbfrMTemplate.cfm?TfN=T05-0119. Based
on the most recent simulation by the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy
Center, only $333.4 billion would have been lost by complete estate tax repeal for the tenyear period from 2002 to 2012. This is well within the $1.3 trillion available for allocation
under EGTRRA for the 2001-2011 period.
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repeal/non-repeal is of Congress's spending money in the form of
broad-based tax relief without permanently repealing the estate tax.
Three, why was there no serious attempt to get a sixty-vote
majority to override any possible point of order and repeal the estate
tax anyway, with EGTRRA? During the reconciliation process,
various amendments fell short-just short-of enactment. Yet a
simple vote-counting, as noted above, indicates that sixty votes were
well within reach.
Four-and most disturbing-why did EGTRRA do what it did
vis-A-vis the estate tax: why did Congress take the funds used for
estate tax relief and allocate them so oddly to the years 2002-2009
and, especially, 2010? Why not use these monies to lower the estate
tax rates, and raise the exemption level, evenly throughout the
decade?
We believe that there are no compelling answers to these
questions outside the ex ante rent-extraction model. Principle cannot
do the trick. It is hard to overstate how bizarre EGTRRA's
"resolution" of the estate tax debate looks from the perspective of
normatively appropriate lawmaking. Even before the ink was dry on
Bush's signature, columnists and letter writers across the country had
begun to complain about the fundamental unfairness and
arbitrariness of the law's phase-in-out-down-and-up provisions. 169 As
we have noted, the year 2010 was already being referred to by estate
170
tax practitioners as the "throw Momma from the train" year.
EGTRRA's "compromise" on estate tax repeal could hardly
withstand minimal scrutiny under more principled areas of American
law. Consider the noted jurisprudential and constitutional scholar
Ronald Dworkin's defense of the principle of integrity, or "principled
consistency," in the law. We aspire to get the law right, Dworkin
argues, to help the "law work itself pure."17' And so we abstain from
"checkerboard" legislation, where a given government benefit or
right is handed out arbitrarily to citizens. Dworkin illustrates this
idea with a proposed law to make abortions criminal for those women
born in even, but not in odd years. 72 The intended rhetorical effect is
powerful:
readers respond in horror and see the obvious
169. See, e.g., Estate-Tax Reform Adds to FinancialPlanning Confusion, Experts Say,
BESTWIRE, May 31, 2001, available at LEXIS News & Business Library; John Hall,
Resurrection Possible for "Death Tax", RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, May 31, 2001, at All;
Krugman, supra note 69.
170. See Krugman, supra note 69.
171. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 47 (1986).
172. Id. at 178.
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unattractiveness of such an approach to law. Yet consider the fate of
a widow with an estate of $10 million under EGTRRA. Rather
roughly, if she were to die on December 31, 2009, her estate's tax bill
would be $3,000,000; hold on for one more second, into January 1,
2010, and the bill would be $0. The end-of-year drama would be even
more dramatic at the close of 2010; die before the stroke of midnight,
and die tax-free; survive into the first minutes of 2011, and owe
$5,000,000. And these numbers could all be multiplied by ten, or one
hundred, and so on. This pattern, where very large tax consequences
turn on the year, indeed, the moment, of death, is strangely close to
Dworkin's deliberately absurd example of abortion laws.
The
outcome is suitably inane, even by the standards of contemporary tax
law, that few might expect EGTRRA to remain intact throughout the
subsequent decade. But therein lies the rub: the impermanence of
EGTRRA, bad for tax planning, was good for the business of
Congress.
D.

CuriouserStill: Life After EGTRRA

EGTRRA all but guaranteed further legislative action on the
estate tax as the first decade of the new millennium wore on, and the
country grew closer to the bizarre state of the law just discussed.
Thus EGTRRA, in and of itself, gives reason to suspect that the ex
ante rent-extraction game was in play. Congress had, in this one act
of legislation, signaled that it had the power both to kill the estate tax,
as it had been signaling with its votes on H.R. 8 and as it in fact did in
EGTRRA for the year 2010, and to bring the tax back, as it did in
EGTRRA for the year 2011 and as the failures to actually enact H.R.
8 had already suggested. Viewed through the admittedly cynical lens
of this public choice model, EGTRRA's estate tax provisions were a
thing of genius. But how else can the Act's estate tax provisions be
interpreted? From the traditional special-interest group perspective,
the only "winner" from the 2001 legislation was the set of putative
estate taxpayers who knew with some certainty that they would die in
2010-no sooner, and certainly no later.
A contemporaneous journalistic account of the matter in the
influential weekly Tax Notes set out how EGTRRA's estate tax
provisions appeared to the cognoscenti at the time:
It is difficult to understand exactly what proponents of repeal
have accomplished after several years of bitter debate on this
issue. With a sunset provision, the proponents of repeal will
find themselves in the same position that they were in before
the enactment of the new bill. Once again, they will have to
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push for new legislation that the president will have to sign. In
effect, Congress has done little more than promise
to return to
17 3
the issue of estate and gift taxes in the future.
What this account misses-as the rent-extraction conception does
not-is that this result might have been exactly what Congress
desired. It is precisely the "return to the issue ... in the future" that

Congress wanted, for each return to the issue further filled its coffers.
Like all rent-extraction games, the story of estate tax repeal/nonrepeal has a timing dimension. There is good reason to believe that
there is a fundamental asymmetry in estate tax legislation. As long as
the tax exists, there can be frequent votes to reform or repeal it.
Moreover, as long as the tax exists, there are the Mancur Olson
groups that seek to keep or repeal it, the putative taxpayers with their
organizations on the one hand, the estate tax avoidance industries and
charitable organizations on the other. All of them are involved in the
debate. But once the tax is repealed, it would be hard, as a practical
and political matter, to bring it back. The tax raises little net revenue.
Re-instituting it would raise howls of alarm from the putative
taxpayers, but many of the current beneficiaries will have disbanded.
The lawyers, accountants, and insurers will move on to other
specialties, charitable foundations to alternate targets. The tightly
organized special-interest groups will dissolve or lose focus on the
narrow issue.
What EGTRRA did, then, was signal that Congress was serious
about killing the estate tax, without really doing so. Plausibility had
finally arrived. Every wealthy person concerned about estate tax
minimization or avoidance-with the exception of those who knew
with certainty that they would die in 2010-was given a reason to
lobby Congress for permanent repeal. But the opponents of repealthe estate tax specialists, insurance and nonprofit interests-had
reason to hope, too. For the repeal was suitably off in the future-set
to transpire after the conclusion of George W. Bush's second term,
should it come to that-such that there could be no assurance that it
would in fact obtain.174
EGTRRA did more than that. The unprincipled state of the
2009/2010/2011 years guaranteed some further votes as the decade

173. Buckley, supra note 68, at 2069.
174. Indeed, most practitioners viewed repeal as unlikely and saw uncertainty as good
for business. See David Cay Johnston, Lawyers and Accountants Expect Windfall from
Estate Tax Repeal, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2001, at C1.
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wore on and the people began to complain, rightfully, about the
arbitrariness and perversity of the law.

Congress was soon to learn what a golden goose it had created,
indeed. As it happened, there was little need to wait. In early 2002,
permanent estate tax repeal, in the guise of H.R. 8 (the Dunn-Tanner
Death Tax Elimination Act, again), reappeared.175 In February 2002,
roughly half a year after EGTRRA was signed, the Senate agreed to
the Kyl Amendment, as discussed above, which expressed the sense
of the Chamber that estate tax repeal should be made permanent, by
a vote of 56 to 42.176 Why even bother having a "sense of the Senate"
vote so soon after EGTRRA-when the sixty votes to permanently
repeal the estate tax were presumably lacking (see our queries
above)-and so long before the odd 2009/2010/2011 state of affairs
was to come into play? Presumably, it was to show yet again that
permanent repeal was indeed on the table, and was plausible, and this
the Kyl Amendment did perfectly well-by getting sixty-two
Senators, adding the flippers and nonvoters into the mix, on record as
supporting repeal. Of course, the Kyl Amendment vote also revealed
that forty-two Senators, at least, were prepared to vote against repeal.
Here again was perfect, and perfectly plausible, two-sided shakedown
territory. After briefly neglecting H.R. 8, which had been passed yet
again by the House a year earlier, in 2001,171 the Senate opened the
floodgates by voting to have a vote on the bill: several months
removed.178 Opponents of repeal admitted to "being caught off
guard" by the seriousness and rapidity of the move to make repeal
permanent. The bidding window was open, so to speak, and
newspapers reported that lobbyists flooded to Washington. 179 The
Senate wavered. With a veto from President Bush inconceivable,
projections consistently fell into the fifty-vote range, short-just
short-of the sixty needed to prevent filibuster. In the end, after
then-Senate Majority Leader Daschle (the Senate having switched
party affiliation after Senator Jeffords of Vermont left the Republican

175. For a summary of action taken on H.R. 8, see http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
bdquery/z?d107:HROO08:@@@x.
176. 148 CONG. REC. S676-77 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (debate and Roll Call Vote No.
27 on S. 2850). See infra Appendix I for the full Senate's voting record on the Kyl
Amendment.
177. 147 CONG. REC. H1457-58 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2001) (Roll Call Vote No. 84).
178. For the list of votes taken on H.R. 8, see http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlbdquery/z?
dl07:HROO08:@@@x.
179. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Battle on Estate Tax: How Two Well-Organized Lobbies
Sprang into Action, N.Y. TIMES, June 14,2002, at A34.
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party)18 accelerated the vote, it indeed came up short, with fifty-four
votes to kill the estate tax, and two abstentions.'81 But yet again, as
Appendix I shows, there were five flippers from the 2000 H.R. 8 vote,
with Feinstein (D-Cal.) joining the four who had flipped on the Kyl
Amendment (McCain, Murray, Torricelli, and Breaux), and the two
nonvoters (Crapo (R-Idaho) and Helms (R-N.C.)) were otherwise
consistently pro-repeal. Senator Johnson (D-S.D.), who had flipped
for anti-repeal on H.R. 8 to pro-repeal on the Kyl Amendment, now
flipped back to anti-repeal. With the nonvoters voting, any four of
the flippers staying on the repeal side of the fence would have made
for permanent repeal.
The failure to kill the estate tax in the middle of 2002 did not end
matters. Not by a long shot; not for a week. On the day of the vote,
as reported on the front page of The New York Times and other
national newspapers, Senator Phil Gramm (R-Tex.), a leading
opponent of the tax, told his followers not to worry. 82 We could vote
again on estate tax repeal, Gramm was quoted as saying, later in the
year, after October, when but fifty votes would be needed. 18 3 Gramm
even floated a date for the next vote on permanent repeal: November
5, 2002. That is, Election Day." 4 What did Gramm mean? He could
have been referring to two alternatives for a simple majority vote on
repeal. Either the provision could be attached to an autumn
reconciliation bill, or it could be voted on after expiration of the Byrd
Rule, set to expire in October 2002, such that the ten-year rule of
subparagraph (E) could be avoided.1 85
Gramm's confident prognostication raised a troubling question,
however. If the Senate could have killed the estate tax with fifty
votes in October 2002, as Gramm knew, why did they even bother to
vote under the sixty-vote rule in place in June (and to vote to have
this vote, and so on)?
An even stranger question followed: When it got to October,
with the midterm elections looming and Republicans firmly
committed to killing the estate tax-or so they said, over and over180. See id.; Katherine Q. Seelye & Adam Clymer, Balance of Power: The Power Shift:
Senate Republicans Step Out and Democrats Jump In, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2001, at Al.
181. 148 CONG. REC. S5434 (daily ed. June 12, 2002) (Roll Call Vote No. 151).
182. See Stephen Dinan, Senate Republicans Unable to End Estate Tax Before 2010,
WASH. TIMES, June 13, 2002, at A06, available at 2002 WLNR 389028; Carl Hulse, Effort
to Repeal Estate Tax Ends in Senate Defeat, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2002, at Al.
183. As Estate Tax Repeal Dies, Supporters Vow To Fight On, CONG. DAILY, June 13,
2002, available at 2002 WLNR 11726368.
184. Id.
185. See id.
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why was there in fact no vote to kill the estate tax? In its place, there
was a vote-to extend the sixty-vote Byrd Rule! This vote passed
unanimously.186 No one even proposed, in public at least, taking
advantage of the window after the expiration of the rule to kill the
estate tax. Once again, at a moment in the story when they could
have dealt a death blow to the estate tax, Congress not only did not
do so, but they also made it more difficult to ever do so.
The calendar year 2002 would not end until there was one more
bizarre twist of fate. Republicans scored important victories in the
midterm elections of 2002, regaining control of the Senate that they
had lost after the Jeffords defection."8 Some pundits and Republican
politicos opined that tax cutting had much to do with this victory. a8 8
Making EGTRRA's tax cuts permanent became a mantra, of sorts,
and legislation was introduced to do just that. Within weeks,
however, the talk had changed from making all of EGTRRA's cuts
permanent to making its individualincome tax rate cuts permanent.189
A popular President in control of both chambers of Congress
somehow, some way, could not go all the way in killing the estate tax,
even when more than sixty Senators seemingly could be found to
support the move. Once again, the action seems backwards to a
traditional special-interest group conception: broad stretches of
taxpayers were being helped, a little bit each, where the small groups
with high stakes were being relegated to the back burner, again.
The story continued into 2003 and the 108th Congress. Early in
the year, Senator Kyl (R-Ariz.) proposed an amendment to the
Budget Resolution for Fiscal Year 2004 that called for permanent
repeal of the estate tax. The Senate agreed to Kyl's amendment by a

186. The extension of the Byrd Rule passed on October 16, 2002, by unanimous
consent in the Senate. See DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF S. BUDGET COMM., SUMMARY OF
THE FY 2004 REPUBLICAN BUDGET CONFERENCE REPORT 70 (Comm. Print 2003),
available at http://budget.senate.gov/democratic/budgetresfy04/fy04_gopbudgetsummary.
pdf. Apparently, the Byrd Rule continues to be extended. Id. (indicating that the rule was
extended through September 30, 2008).
187. Mitch Frank, Why the Senate Is Now Back in G.O.P. Hands: Credit Democratic
Apathy and a Hustling Campaigner-in-Chief,TIME, Nov. 18, 2002 at 48; Moderate,
Conservative GOP Factions Win New Troops, CONG. DAILY, Nov. 6, 2002, available at
LEXIS News & Business Library.
188. Frank, supra note 187.
189. This retreat can be seen in President Bush's State of the Union speech given on
January 28, 2003, where he talked about making income tax cuts permanent but did not
mention estate taxes. See President George W. Bush, The State of the Union Address
(Jan. 28, 2003) (transcript available at 149 CONG. REC. H212-15 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2003)
(statement of Pres. Bush)).
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slim majority, 51 to 48,19° with one abstainer, Zell Miller, a then-

Democrat of Georgia, a predictable pro-repeal vote. By now, there
were no fewer than nine flippers. 9' But permanent repeal never
materialized in 2003. The year 2003 also once again saw significant
tax legislation, in the form of a major reconciliation bill, the Jobs and
Economic Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act ("JGTRRA"). 92
This Act accelerated various income tax provisions of EGTRRA,
forming a further feature of George W. Bush's pattern of deep tax
reductions, and leading to projections of massive deficits in the near
and longer terms.193 The money spent on non-estate tax reduction
made ultimate repeal of the tax less likely ever to happen. Yet

JGTRRA did not touch the estate tax, although the very existence of
major tax legislation on the agenda kept the issue of estate tax repeal
194
in play.
As the presidential election year of 2004 bloomed into view,
President Bush once again hit the stump, calling for permanent repeal
of the estate tax in his State of the Union speech and out on the
campaign trail-seemingly unembarrassed that this at-times highly
popular President had been unable to orchestrate an event deemed

inevitable by his allies just four years before. The many "flippers"
(who changed votes) and "skippers" (who missed critical votes)
seemed to pay no price whatsoever at the polls, nor, from what we
190. 149 CONG. REC. S4109 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2003) (Roll Call Vote No. 62). See
infra Appendix I for the full Senate voting record on this amendment.
191. These nine flippers were Breaux (D-La.), Collins (R-Me.), Feinstein (D-Cal.),
McCain (R-Ariz.), Murray (D-Wash.), Snowe (R-Me.), Landrieu (D-La.), Baucus (DMont.), Bayh (D-Ind.), and Johnson (D-S.D.).
192. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27,
117 Stat. 752 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). And in fact, by
2003 those seeking to kill the estate tax had begun to reconcile themselves to the notion of
a less-than-complete victory, content to hew away at the tax, rather than eliminate it
entirely. Representative Kyl, notable for his virulent opposition to the tax, began sub rosa
efforts to raise the exemption level and lower the tax rate on inherited assets. Lobbyist
Mark Bloomfield, president of the American Council for Capital Formation, also saw
increased support for his less-than-full repeal efforts, which had in the past been rebuffed
by the full-repeal constituency. See Jonathan Weisman, Estate Tax Opponents May Be
Forced To Compromise, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2003, at E01.
193. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Can Tax Cuts Increase the Size of Government?, 18 CAN. J.
OF LAW & JURIS. 135,135 (2005).
194. "I've consistently been for full repeal, but I don't think the votes exist here in the
Senate for it," said Sen. Blanche Lincoln, an Arkansas Democrat and a member of the
Senate Finance Committee. Tom Herman, Tax Report: Gridlock Likely on Estate-Tax
Plans, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2003, at D2. Lincoln pined for, and did not find, " 'a
common-sense solution that can work now instead of just talking about this for eons.' "
Jonathan Weisman, Estate Tax Compromise Sought; House Set To Pass Repeal, but
Supporters Know Senate Votes Aren't There, WASH. POST, June 18, 2003, at E01.
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can tell, even to have been seriously questioned about their differing
votes. In April, the House was again readying to vote on permanent
repeal, as they frequently had done throughout the period. And the
Democrats, for their part, were hardly making hay with opposition to
repeal-no serious proposal was ever raised to strengthen the tax, and
John Kerry, by early spring the presumptive Democratic nominee,
took no strong stand one way or another. Later, Kerry would float
the idea of a $4 million exemption for families, and $10 million for
farms and family-owned businesses, hardly restoring any meaningful
redistribution of wealth to the landscape, but, once again, keeping the
two-sided rent-extraction game in full play.'95
And so it did not surprise us-although it seemed once more to
catch commentators off guard-that the House of Representatives in
the 109th Congress again voted, in the spring of 2005, for estate tax
repeal.'96 By this time, things had begun to look stranger in the
Senate. At a time in the story, yet again, where they seemed to have
the votes and the popular support, Republican Senate leaders, such as
John Kyl, long a point person for the repeal movement, began to back
off their attempts at total repeal, now claiming that they lacked the
votes, or that the new budget situation made total repeal difficult. 9 7
Estate tax opponents began openly discussing compromises, such as a
higher exemption level, perhaps $10 million per person, or even the
$3.5 million set for 2009, and a lower tax rate, such as fifteen percent,
as the influential Stephen Moore, of the conservative anti-tax group
Club for Growth, had started to discuss. 198
The story continued into the summer of 2005. After so much talk
of compromise, the votes needed for complete repeal finally seemed
to be missing in the Senate. 199 Yet Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist
(R-Tenn.) still pushed for a high-stakes vote on complete repeal of
the estate tax. 200 Before the Senate's month long summer break,
195. John Kerry's Framework to Cut the Deficit in Half and Invest in Affordable Health
Care and Better Schools, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Apr. 7, 2004, http://releases.usnewswire.com/
GetRelease.asp?id=28532.
196. Mary Dalrymple, Estate Tax Repeal Vote May Doom Deal, SFGATE.COM, July 25,

2005,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2005/07/25/national/wl63228D66.
DTL.
197. See House Votes To Repeal, supra note 17; Rosenbaum, supra note 17; Weisman,
supra note 16; see also GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 280 (reporting the rumor
that Kyl was seeking a compromise and Kyl's denial thereof). This is another point in the
story inconsistent with the Graetz and Shapiro analysis.
198. See Jill Smallen & Charlie Mitchell, The Week on the Hill, 37 NAT'L J. 1154, 1154
(2005).
199. Dalrymple, supra note 196.
200. Id.
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however, no vote occurred, 20 ' and the estate tax issue was further
prolonged. With the idea of repeal seemingly effectively dead in the
Senate, the focus shifted once again to compromise. Senator Kyl
reinvented himself as a man for reforming, without repealing, the
estate tax20 2 : Kyl's plan tracked the Moore proposal, to raise the
exemption level to $3.5 million and cut the tax rate to fifteen percent,
while restoring a stepped-up basis for assets acquired on death. 20 3
The careful reader might be tempted to ask at this point why that
particular compromise proposal had not been floated before, as for
example during consideration of EGTRRA's strange structure. After
all, it has the simple appeal of effectively taxing capital gains at death
as, for example, Canada now does, in lieu of an estate tax. But an
even more careful reader might note that this "compromise" proposal
was little more than repeal in drag, a tax so weakened that opponents
soon began to think that outright repeal (with a carryover basis)
would be a better outcome-for themselves, that is, for opponents of
repeal!2" Hence this late stage shift to a compromise was, in fact, the
opening of another round of pitched all-or-nothing votes, and more
shakedown schemes.
While this reform option was gaining momentum, and with
permanent repeal seeming dead at last, the Senate nonetheless
scheduled a vote on estate tax repeal to be the first order of business
upon reconvening after their month-long summer recess.20 5 After the
devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina, however, and the resulting
financial burden on the federal government, more pressing matters
flooded the Senate's agenda and it became politically unattractive to
move ahead with the vote.20 6 As a result, the estate tax's death was
delayed yet again. 20 7 A vote on repeal during the 109th Congress is
still theoretically possible, but if it does not pass, there is some
speculation by pundits that Congress could pass a compromise to cut
estate tax rates by two-thirds. 218 Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa),
like Kyl, long a stalwart in the anti-estate tax movement and

201.
202.
203.
204.

Editorial, The State of the Estate Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2005, at A14.
Id.
Id. On basis discussion, see supra note 165.
See Leonard E. Burman et al., Tax Break: Options for Reforming the Estate Tax,

107 TAX NOTES 379,381 (2005).

205. CircumstancesForce Frist To PostponeEstate Tax Vote, OMB WATCHER, Sept. 6,
2005, http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/3082/1/382.
206. Floyd Norris, How To Assure the Very Rich Stay that Way, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9.
2005, at C1.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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Chairperson of the Senate Finance Committee, was quoted in
January 2006 as saying:
If we could get to a $5 million exemption with a 15 percent rate,
I think that would be a decent compromise. That's not going to
satisfy the President, but I think that that's the best I can do in
the United States Senate in order to get the votes to get it
passed.2 °9
Pardon our skepticism, but we suspect that, if anything happens at all,
a higher exemption level is more likely to occur than a significantly
reduced rate, the higher rate/high exemption level being a feature of
the reverse Mancur Olson phenomenon throughout its long, and
growing, life span. This is also something that could have been done
yesterday, as it happens.
E.

Roads Not Taken

Two aspects of the legislative status quo as we write this stand
out as especially odd. One, as just noted, the estate tax continues to
have high exemption levels and high marginal tax rates:
a
combination that seems perverse from a sensible policy or revenueraising perspective, and one counter to the trend in tax policy since at
least Ronald Reagan in the 1980s (individual income tax rates had
actually begun their descent under John F. Kennedy in 1963).21 ° Two,
EGTRRA left the law with that high exemption level/high marginal
rate structure until 2010, when the tax is altogether repealed, only to
be brought back, high marginal tax rates and all, in 2011. The
combination of these aspects makes things even more bizarre. The
estate tax reductions/repeal in EGTRRA were costly, under the
revenue-scoring provisions in effect in Washington. Congress could
have taken the money it in fact used in estate tax reduction and used
it instead to lower the rates across the ten-year period. It did not do
SO.
The status quo did not arise from lack of more logical
alternatives. Like most major legislation, EGTRRA was subject to
many amendments on the Senate floor. Among the more than thirty
substantive amendments (that included thinly-veiled spending

209. Interview by Ryan Donmayer & Mike McKee, Bloomberg News, with Senator
Charles Grassley (Jan. 26, 2006), available at http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof-blog/
2006/01/grassley-lowrat.html.
210. See, e.g., Jerry Tempalski, Revenue Effects of Major Tax Bills 9-14 (Office of Tax
Analysis, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Working Paper No. 81, 2003), available at http://
www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/ota8l.pdf.
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proposals for education, vaccine research, and other pet projects)
were alternative proposals to reform the estate tax.21' Votes to leave
the estate tax out of EGTRRA entirely failed by a vote of 42 to 57that is, not by the sixty-vote margin needed for a permanent repeal.
Compromise reform proposals failed as well. Senator Dorgan
(D-N.D.) offered an amendment that would have sped up to 2003 and
made permanent the increase in the exemption level and the
reduction in the top rate that the bill allowed in 2009, but eliminated
the temporary repeal.21 3 This "reform, don't repeal" amendment was
rejected on a vote of 43 to 56, with essentially the same supporters as
for the Conrad amendment, to eliminate estate tax repeal.214 Senator
Feingold (D-Wis.), who by 2002 found himself the only member of
the Senate to support neither reform nor repeal, proposed an
amendment to retain estate taxes only for estates in excess of $100
million.215 Was this a joke? If so, it was a joke that nearly became
law: forty-eight Senators, mostly Democrats, voted for it.216 The
game was replayed in 2002, with Senators Dorgan and Conrad (DN.D.) again offering amendments to H.R. 8 that would similarly have
modified but not repealed the estate tax, allowing higher exemption
levels and a lower marginal rate. 217 The Conrad Amendment, which
would have essentially restored the 2003 version of the estate tax, was

211. 147 CONG. REC. 6, 8666-67, 8698 (2001) (Roll Call Vote No. 123) (text of
Amendment 695); 147 CONG. REC. 6, 8665-66, 8700 (2001) (Roll Call Vote No. 122) (text
of Amendment 703); 147 CONG. REC. 6,8667,8703 (2001) (Roll Call Vote No. 124) (text of
Amendment 713); 147 CONG. REc. 6, 8760, 9035 (2001) (Roll Call Vote No. 135) (text of
Amendment 726); 147 CONG. REC. 6, 8806, 9048-49 (2001) (Roll Call Vote No. 150) (text
of Amendment 748); 147 CONG. REC. 7,9049, 9050 (2001) (Roll Call Vote No. 151) (text of
Amendment 770); 147 CONG. REc. 7, 9055-56 (2001) (Roll Call Vote No. 158) (text of
Amendment 781).
212. The Conrad Amendment (#158), which proposed a clean elimination of repeal,
failed in a bipartisan vote of 42 to 57, with six Democrats voting against eliminating repeal.
The Dodd Amendment (#123), which proposed greater spending by both eliminating the
estate tax repeal and raising income tax rates, failed by a vote of 39 to 60. 147 CONG. REC.
7,9055-56 (2001) (Roll Call Vote No. 158) (text of Amendment 781).
213. 147 CONG. REC. 6, 8703 (2001).

214. Id.
215. 147 CONG. REC. 6,8760 (2001).
216. Six Republicans voted in favor of Feingold's amendment, barely balanced by the
eight Democrats who voted against-including four (Baucus, Cleland, Lincoln, and
Wyden) on record as supporting elimination of the repeal. The switch in votes suggests
that the close vote was close in number only, that is, that the leadership ensured that at
most forty-nine votes would be cast in favor of the amendment. See 147 CONG. REC. 7,
9035 (2001).
217. A summary of the Conrad Amendment is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery[D?d107:3:SP03831. A summary of the Reid Amendment is available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:SP03832:.
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defeated by a vote of 38 to 60.218 The Reid Amendment, essentially
making permanent the 2009 version of the tax, failed by a vote of 44
to 54.219
Logic suggests that all or at least most Senators-with the
possible exception of Senator Feingold-should support the reform
proposals. The proposals sped up the schedule imposed by EGTrRA
to increase the exemption level and reduce marginal rates, going to a
simpler, higher exemption level across the board. Aside from being
far more principled than EGTRRA, these bills offered significant
estate tax reduction for the interim years 2003-2008, and thus would
be expected to be popular with opponents of the tax. Recall that
fifty-nine Senators had voted for permanent repeal in 2000, prior to
Clinton's veto; over sixty voted for EGTRRA with its unprincipled
one-year repeal; fifty-four voted in June 2002, for permanent repeal.
And flippers abounded-making the 108th Senate one with enough
votes to kill, or not, the death tax. Yet repeal supporters consistently
voted against those reform efforts.
Of course, there are reasons why some repeal supporters may
vote against the reform proposals: they may believe that they will
eventually succeed in obtaining their first best choice of a permanent
repeal, and that an interim reform would lower the likelihood of a
total victory. 22° But the overall pattern of votes suggests that this
attitude would have to be suspiciously rampant to explain the
outcome. Consider the three policy options on the table in 2002 and
later:
(1) Permanent repeal (H.R. 8);
(2) Higher exemption levels, lower tax rates without permanent
repeal (Amendments 3832 and 3831, for example, would
raise exemption levels to $3.5 to $4 million, while providing
additional exemptions for family farms and businesses); and

218. See 148 CONG. REC. S5344-46 (daily ed. June 12,2002).
219. The Conrad Amendment, # 3831, allowed an individual exclusion of $3.5 million
and featured a fifty-percent maximum rate. The Dorgan Amendment, # 3832, allowed an
individual deduction of $4 million, the rates specified in EGTRRA for 2009, and extra
deductions for family businesses. Both amendments were introduced on June 12, 2002.
148 CONG. REC. 77, S5433-34 (2002) (text of Amendment 3831); 148 CONG. REC. 77,
S5407, S5412, S5462 (2002) (text of Amendment 3832).
220. See Meade Emory, Letter to the Editor, Another Take on the Estate Tax Situation
in Congress, 105 TAX NOTES 1705, 1706 (2004). But cf Edward J. McCaffery, The Estate
Tax Stalemate Debate Continues, 106 TAX NOTES 373, 373 (2005) (responding to Emory,
supra).
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(3) Nothing (keep EGTRRA status quo).
Policy Option 2 is, in a sense, a logical subset of Policy Option 1,
as we have suggested. But the actual outcome of the Senate votes,
taken at their face value, suggests, with the exception of Senator
Feingold (who preferred Option 3 and possibly even an invigoration
of the estate tax that was never on the legislative table), that every
Senator ranked Policy Option 3 as his or her second best outcome.
This made compromises impossible. Repeal supporters (including
some Democrats) ranked matters as:
1>3>2
whereas repeal opponents (including some Republicans) ranked
matters as:
2>3>1
Only this policy preference ordering explains the visible votes. Now
in neoclassical economic theory, there is no disputing tastes, or
preferences, as a general matter, 221 but we suggest that the ex ante
rent-extraction phenomenon-in which Congress is milking a
lucrative issue for itself-is the most parsimonious explanation of this
pattern of suspiciously prevalent revealed preferences.
A second reason for the persistence of the troubling status quo
may be that both parties, Republicans and Democrats, felt that they
had a good election issue, and so were happy to take their votes to the
people, as Senator Gramm seems to have thought.22 In fact, this
argument simply gives a rhetorical reason for the seemingly odd
revealed preferences just described. But as such it is not compelling.
It is highly doubtful that many voters had deep, well-formed
preferences on the issue. The particular positions left standing after
the spring 2002 votes were especially unlikely to sway many voters.
Democrats would have to believe that constituents would support
their attempts to weaken but not kill the estate tax, even though this
hardly betrayed a commitment to meaningful redistribution of wealth;
Republicans would have to believe that they would score votes by
holding fast to a "repeal or bust" strategy, even though this strategy
hurt people who might die before 2010, and left matters highly
uncertain for all. (It is also the case that Republicans had to
believe-quite plausibly, we think-that the average voter would not
221. George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM.
ECON. REV. 76, 76-77 (1977).
222. Hulse, supra note 182.
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figure out that the majority party almost certainly could have
repealed the tax in toto, on its own, and certainly could have
eliminated the problem for all but a handful of taxpayers, had it,
alone, made different choices.) 223 It is simply hard to believe that very

many voters had the preferences sketched out above, and would not
prefer a sensible compromise and getting on with other issues to the
continued preoccupation with the issue and unprincipled status quo.
Finally, the prevalence of flippers, with seemingly no price paid at the
polls, confirms the conviction that estate tax repeal is not a ballot box
issue. 224
Now it is true that in both major election cycles after EGTRRA,
2002 and 2004, Republican candidates and President Bush
prominently featured their support for repealing the death tax, and
the inadequacy of the alternatives offered by Democrats, in campaign

speeches.225 In the presidential campaign of 2004, Bush repeatedly
advocated permanent repeal of the estate tax, as he had in 2000;226
Kerry, not unlike Gore, made no strong argument to retain it.
Similarly, some Democrats in what were thought to be the most
competitive races, such as Senator Jean Carnahan of Missouri,
promoted their reform proposals at every campaign opportunity.227
But we suspect that these campaign pledges were meant for a
different audience than the average voter: these were messages going
223. As Stephen Moore of the tax-cutting Club for Growth noted, " 'There are
Republicans who want this debate to last forever, keep the [campaign] money flowing in,
keep the Democrats off guard.' " Weisman, supra note 16.
224. Consider the results of the flippers and skippers in the various election years. In
2002, the flipper Landrieu (D-La.) was re-elected; the flipper Torricelli (D-N.J.) withdrew
from the race amid unrelated allegations of bribery and corruption. The skipper
Domenici (R-N.M.) was re-elected. In 2004, the flippers McCain (R-Ariz.) and Murray
(D-Wash.) were re-elected; Breaux (D-La.) did not seek re-election, and the skippers
Bennett (R-Utah) and Crapo (R-Idaho) were re-elected; Helms (R-N.C.) retired from the
Senate in 2003. In 2006, the skipper Feinstein (D-Cal.) is up for re-election; we are betting
that she makes it. In sum, no flipper or skipper has yet to lose a re-election bid, and the
situation is unlikely to change any time soon.
225. Heading up to the 2004 election, Congress passed the American Jobs Creation
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418. The Act did not affect estate tax repeal,
and was estimated by the CBO to cost the federal government $4.9 billion in 2005 and
$10.1 billion from 2005-2009. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE, H.R.
4520: AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 2004, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.
gov/ftpdocs/60xx/doc6007/hr4520pgoR.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2006). Thus, Republicans
in taking credit for tax reductions while continuing to call for estate tax repeal ought to
have been queried on why they had not been able to repeal the tax, or at least to have
enacted some compromise reduction in it.
226. The Issues: Estate Tax, CBSNEWS.COM, Oct. 12, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2004/10/12/eveningnews/main648814.shtml.
227. John Berlau, Message Received, INSIGHT ON NEWS, Nov. 26, 2002, at 18, available
at 2002 WLNR 5520916.
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out to the groups with money and a stake in the small but monetarily
significant game.2 28 Yet more proof in the pudding obtains as we
write: the 2004 Republican gains in the House and Senate, which
were said to have brought permanent repeal closer, have seemingly
set things back to the same compromise discussions that were avoided
when Republicans had less power. 229 Elections aside, the spigot
continues to flow; sic transitgloria mundi, in politics these days.
F. Summing Up
We believe that an ex ante rent-extraction phenomenon alone
explains what Congress has and has not done with regards to estate
tax repeal. Perhaps the best proof of this lies in the lack of
persuasiveness of alternative explanations.
Consider the three
leading candidates.
A traditional special-interest model cannot explain the curious
twists of fate because no group-except for lobbyists-really wins in
the story. EGTRRA only rewarded those who knew with certainty
that they would die in 2010; it left things uncertain for everyone else.
The very uncertainty may have been good for those who do estate
planning, except for the not unrealistic fear of total repeal. Once
again, EGTRRA kept all special interests on the edge of their seats,
or wallets, poised to give more as the decade unfolded.
Second, ballot box analysis does not carry much weight. Because
there has been no strong popular outcry one way or another, estate
tax repeal remains a marginal issue to most voters at best, and
virtually all lawmakers have signaled a willingness to at least weaken
the tax.23° The politically popular position seems to be against the tax,
and would certainly not seem to support the inane compromise
reached by EGTRRA and2 maintained
since. Various flippers paid no
1
polls.
the
at
price
apparent
Finally, it is extremely hard to see what Congress has done as
being in the public interest, either from an efficiency perspective
(where the better policy of lowering the rates and broadening the
228. A recent editorial contends that misguided Democrats, propping up the estate tax
for the ostensible revenues it generates from the most wealthy, ought to submit to the
reality of an ill-timed tax that collects little revenue and argues that for the sake of turning
off the spigot, they ought simply to support repeal. Editorial, Turn Off the Spigot,
SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 16,2005, at B6, availableat 2005 WLNR 4106740.
229. Editorial, Not So Permanent,WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2005, at A10 (noting that the
back-and-forth, without permanent repeal, persists, despite GOP advantage and
Democratic election promises).
230. See McCaffery, supra note 220, at 373.
231. See infra Appendix I.
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base was never even proposed) or from an equity one (because the
particular compromise reached is unprincipled, whatever one thinks
of the estate tax, and sensible compromises were consistently
rejected).
What is left standing is the ex ante rent-extraction story. The
estate tax issue over these pivotal years was an issue of high stakes to
small, well-organized groups. It was two-sided, with money for all.
By the late 1990s, repeal had become plausible, and plausibly longlived. And Congress strung the issue along, repeatedly voting,
rejecting sensible compromises, and finding a way at every turn to
keep the issue alive-to keep the spigot open, as it were.
V. EXTENSIONS

What we have called the reverse Mancur Olson model or ex ante
rent extraction is a simple, armchair prediction following from two
facts: that politicians care about money and that they are rational.
These facts alone suggest that politicians will use their powers where
and when they can to generate special-interest groups-to lobby them
or to be lobbied by them. Tax is an obvious subject of congressional
power, fertile ground for rent-extraction possibilities, a general
phenomenon of which the reverse Mancur Olson game is an instance.
And hence it should not be a surprise that we found a strong,
extended example of the syndrome in the estate tax repeal/non-repeal
story-though we must admit that some of the rich details surprised
even us, hardened cynics by now.
We further believe, moreover, that ex ante rent-extraction games
are common, though we reiterate that we have no interest in claiming
that it explains all or even any specifically quantifiable part of
legislative action. But it is not just a tax story. Consider, quickly,
three further tales.
A.

Medical Malpractice and Tort Reform
The 2004 presidential election, featuring Democratic VicePresidential candidate John Edwards, a former plaintiff's attorney,
cast a spotlight on the issue of tort reform. 32 The apparent flash
point belied a simple truth: in virtually every session of Congress
232. Antony Collins, U.S. Plaintiff Bar Set for a Fresh Assault, LEGAL WK., Nov. 24,

2004, available at 2004 WLNR 18649099; Lawrence R. Jacobs & Michael Illuzzi, In the
Shadow of 9/11: Healthcare Reform in the 2004 Presidential Election, 32 J.L. MED. &
ETHics 454, 457 (2004); see also Kathryn Zeiler, Turning from Damage Caps to
Information Disclosure: An Alternative to Tort Reform, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. &

ETHICS 385, 385 (2005).

2006]

SHAKEDOWNAT GUCCI GULCH

1227

over the last decade, lawmakers have considered some bill to cap
punitive damages, medical malpractice awards, or other
settlements. 23 3 Additionally, mass torts-such as asbestos-have been

the subject of particular legislative debate. 234 The issue has been
"hot" for quite some time, largely because of the underlying
dynamics. Democrats-for whom lawyers, especially trial lawyers,
are the leading campaign contributors 235-consistently oppose any
such caps. Republicans, for whom doctors and insurers are major
donors,236 typically propose excessively restrictive caps, like $250,000
or less for non-pecuniary damages such as pain and suffering.23 7

Here again we have an issue of high stakes to small groups; it is
of low salience for most voters and hence unlikely to affect many
elections; 238 action is plausible; and the issue is two-sided and

potentially long-lived. Once damage caps are in place, they become
part of the landscape, are hard to change, and the special-interest

groups in the economy reconfigure themselves. With these conditions
in place, our predicted outcomes obtain: votes happen over and over,
with obvious compromises-midrange caps-never obtaining
support. 23 9 The ineluctable back-and-forth is such that even Congress

233. For a chronicle of the past two legislative sessions, see, for example, Andrea D.
Stailey, Note, The Health Act's Same Old Story, Different Congress Dilemma:
Overhauling the Health Act and Unifying Congress as a Remedy for Tort Reform, 40
TULSA L. REV. 187 (2004).
234. The Senate has had six hearings specifically on asbestos litigation over the last
three years. See United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, http://judiciary.senate.
gov/search notice.cfm?description=asbestos&Submit=Submit (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
This focus on particular types of torts is also strangely reminiscent of Dworkin's
"checkerboard" legislation parody; Dworkin mocks the idea of treating accidents caused
by different machines differently. DWORKIN, supra note 171, at 167.
235. Throughout the course of the 2004 election, lawyers and law firms comprised the
second-highest campaign contribution group, sending nearly $167 million to political
candidates. Seventy-four percent of their contributions were to Democrats. See Center
for Responsive Politics, Lawyers/Law Firms: Long-Term Contribution Trends, http://
www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?Ind=K01 (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
236. In the 2004 election cycle, the health industry ranked fifth overall, with total
donations of over $67 million, sixty-two percent of which were directed to Republicans.
See id.
237. See Lou Dobbs, Tort Reform Important to U.S. Future, CNN.COM, Jan. 6, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/01/06/tort.reform/.
238. Matthew C. Quinn, Election 2004: Tort Reform Galvanizes Donors Not Voters,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 18, 2004, at A7.
239. In 2004, a Republican Senator proposed a bill that would, among other things, cap
non-economic damages at $250,000. The bill stalled in the Senate and other piecemeal
medical liability legislation was advanced. None of these matters passed. In 2005, a
House Democrat proposed a bill that would cap non-economic damages at $878,000. See
Tort Law: Medical Professional Liability, http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/mpl.
html (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
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has a sense of humor about the stillborn proposals. Representative
Rahm Emanuel (D-Ill.) jokes, "We take up legislation that we have
taken up before that is going nowhere 24
and
going nowhere fast. It is
0
Congress.
this
in
here
Day
Groundhog
With President Bush's 2004 re-election and the Republican gains
of seats in both houses of Congress, intuition suggested that passage
of some tort reform package was imminent. 241 And, indeed, on at
least one front, Bush appeared to have gained a victory in the war
over legal reform, signing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005-an
act that attempts to curb excessive fees collected by class action
lawyers and better protect the interests of individual class action
plaintiffs-on February 24, 2005.242 And yet both sides-with the
obvious and expected absence of a congressional middle ground-are
still steeling for further battle. The posturing is pronounced, with
lawyers, doctors, and their attendant groups claiming early victory.2 43
Contested piecemeal actions remind the groups that their
lobbyists and Congress can sometimes pass legislation: note that it is
critical to the reverse Mancur Olson phenomenon that things
sometimes do happen, because otherwise rational interest groups
would stop playing. This means, of course, that estate tax repeal may
one day come-or not-but only after decades of seemingly futile
votes. Plausibility underscores loyalties and defeats the onset of
futility. But it's still Groundhog Day, all over again.
B. Military Spending
Currently, the United States defense budget exceeds $400
billion.2" It has been well-noted that the defense budget is slanted
240. 150 CONG. REC. H4141 (daily ed. June 15, 2004) (statement of Rep. Rahm
Emanuel).
241. Robert G. Seidenstein, Torts: The System Under Fire, 13 N.J. LAW. 2493, 2493
(2004) (noting that even though the Republicans gained seats in both houses, the
legislation is not a fait accompli); The War on Tort, ECONOMIST.COM, Jan. 26, 2006, http://
www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?story-id=3598225.
242. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. For a
description of the practical effects of the Act, see Ruth Bahe-Jachna et al., New Federal
Legislation:

The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, GREENBERG TRAURIG ALERT,

http://www.gtlaw.com/pub/alerts/2005/0302.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2006). This was a bill
that had previously looked unlikely, and found great support from financial services
companies. See Sheryl Fred, Vying For Votes: Class Action Reform Backers Give
Generously to Key Democrats, CAPITAL EYE, http://www.capitaleye.org/inside.asp?
ID=118 (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
243. Correy E. Stephenson, Doctors, Lawyers Claim Victory in Tort Reform Battle,
KAN. CITY DAILY REC., Nov. 25, 2004, availableat 2004 WLNR 13184042.

244. Esther Schrader, Bush to Boost Military Budget by 4.8%, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 5,
2005, at A22.
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towards "big weapons" programs at the expense of more ordinary
matters, such as routine increases of troop salaries. 245 Large defense
and other programs, such as NASA, create "bidding wars" among the
handful of players able to deliver such programs. Here again, highstakes, small groups, multiple sides, plausibility, and lengthy terms
(because of the scale of the contracts) obtain. The best-case scenario,
for Congress, is to propose a small number of high-stakes weapons
programs, a few more than can realistically be enacted. This they do,
even when they-that is, Congress-are asking for systems that the
armed forces are not requesting.24 6
In his valedictory address, President Dwight Eisenhower
famously decried the military-industrial complex. 247 At present,
despite the incoming broadsides from commentators and the popular
media, particularly in this age of terrorism, 248 big-ticket defense
contractors continue to occupy positions of preeminence in the
military budget.2 49 The exigencies of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan led
the Pentagon to muse openly about potential cuts to the weaponstechnology portion of the budget.10 Commentators considered a
possible sea change from vast spending on technology to personnel, a

245. See, e.g., BRIAN J. FINEGAN, THE FEDERAL SUBSIDY BEAST 17 (2000) ("[Onethird to one-half of all defense expenditures are nothing more than handouts to favored
interests with no real military purpose .... ). In a current incarnation, ongoing trilliondollar efforts to upgrade the Army's technology have begun to interfere with the
workaday demands of the defense forces. All the while, transparency is lacking. Boeing,
one of the primary contractors of future technology, specifically for work on the vaunted
Future Combat Systems is taking in $21 billion. The company benefits from an exemption
from disclosures required under the Federal Truth in Negotiations Act, despite having
been embroiled in a number of contracting scandals in the past few years. Tim Weiner,
Drive to Build High-Tech Army Hits Cost Snags, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,2005, at Al.
246. Weiner, supra note 245.
247. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American
People, 21 PUB. PAPERS 1035 (Jan. 17, 1961) ("In the councils of government, we must
guard against the acquisition of unwanted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the
military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists
and will persist.").
248. See, e.g., Robert L. Borosage, Editorial, Budget Offends Values of Working
Americans, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Feb. 10, 2005, at 19A, available at LEXIS
News & Business Library ("The military is also the largest cesspool of waste, fraud and
abuse in the federal government."); Matthew Miller, Editorial, Something Smells Rotten in
Pentagon Budget, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Dec. 19, 2004, at 29A, available at
LEXIS News & Business Library.
249. Sheryl Fred, Ctr. for Responsive Pol., The Best Defense: A Guide to the Interests
Driving the FY2004 Defense Budget, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/defensebudget/
indexl.asp (last modified Oct. 1, 2003).
250. James Flanigan, Troop Costs Take Bigger Bite Out of Defense-ContractPie, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 2, 2005, at Cl; Fred Kaplan, Rumsfeld's Dubious Deficit Cutting, SLATE, Dec.
31, 2004, http://slate.msn.com/id/2111611/.
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shift that would fundamentally alter the nature of the defense
industry. 1 President Bush's proffered budgets, however, tell a
different story. While troops see increases in both numbers and
salary, the high-tech industry does not face the feared chopping
block. 2 In fact, even though the White House has sought to reduce
the rate of military growth in the 2006 budget, astute observers have
noted the future increases in the picture. Loren Thompson, an expert
on military affairs for the Lexington Institute, notes that the Pentagon
is "proposing to increase weapons purchases by huge amounts in
future years in order to obscure the fact that they are backing away
from their investment plan in the near term. '253 Any downshift in
spending also comes from a higher baseline, as Pentagon research and
development costs have spiked forty percent between the fiscal years
2002 and 2005.254
Perhaps the recently-proposed military budget by President Bush
incorporates a concession to congressional control of the military
purse, 255 and thus aims for measured progress rather than dramatic
savings. After all, congressional military spending so profligate that it
sometimes exceeds the requests of the Pentagon indicates the type of
close ties between the defense industry and Congress,2 56 a murky
relationship at best brought into some light by the recent travails of
Representative Randy "Duke" Cunningham. 7 Small wonder, then,
with Congress and defense contractors so intertwined, that the
legislators jealously guard the industry that provides sustenance.
Explaining the relationship from the congressional point of view,
Representative William Moorhead (D-Pa.) analogized Lockheed's
possible bankruptcy to "an 80-ton dinosaur who comes to your door
251. Flanigan, supra note 250.
252. Id.
253. See Schrader, supra note 244.
254. Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1026,
1115 n.73 (2003) ("[M]ilitary spending means more influence for military contractors,
which may lead to political pressure for more spending."); Kaplan, supra note 250.
255. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-13.
256.

See BARRY M. BLECHMAN, THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY: CONGRESS

AND U.S. DEFENSE POLICY 56 (1990)

(noting that "every defense secretary since
McNamara has wanted to reduce the department's overhead, but has been prevented from
doing so by Congressional resistance").
257. See Charles R. Babcock & Jonathan Weisman, Congressman Admits Taking
Bribes, Resigns, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2005, at A01. Cunningham (R-Cal.) admitted to
taking $2.4 million in bribes, "including a Rolls-Royce, a yacht and a 19th-century LouisPhillippe commode." Id. Cunningham, an eight-term House Member was a member of
the influential House Appropriations Defense subcommittee and the Intelligence
committee. He "demanded, sought and received" bribes from four co-conspirators,
including two defense contractors over the past five years. Id.
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and says, 'If you don't feed me, I will die.' And what are you going to

do with 80 tons of dead, stinking dinosaur in your yard? '25 8 A
common practice in congressional budgeting for military matters is
the "follow-on imperative," or the sequential provision of weapons
systems contracts to different large companies, outside normal
bidding processes, in order to keep them well-fed and alive.25 9

Maintaining a sufficient number of groups as well as the plausibility of
favorable action demands attentive legislation. In the District of
Columbia, at least, dinosaurs never die.
C.

Regulation of the BroadcastSpectrum

Finally-though we could happily go on---consider congressional
action on the broadcast spectrum. When Congress auctioned this off,
it could have allowed a large number of players to bid on bandwidth.
Congress instead divided the spectrum into large, discrete chunks,
artificially generating bidding wars among small groups with high
stakes .26 These groups then lobby-or, in our worldview, get forced
to lobby-to get or keep the goods.

While commentators have often criticized Congress and the
Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") for poor
management, they typically consider current policy a function of
regulatory ineptitude.26

Observers seem simply to think that the

FCC is "merely" miscorrecting the market. 262 Former FCC Chief
258. Id.
259. Id. (citing Joel Yudken, Economic Development, Technology, and Defense
Conversion: A National Policy Perspective, in THE OBSTACLES TO REAL SECURITY:
MILITARY CORPORATISM AND THE COLD WAR STATE, IN
CONVERTING THE DEFENSE ECONOMY AND BUILDING PEACE

REAL

SECURITY:

141, 149 (Kevin J.

Cassidy & Gregory A. Bischak eds., 1993)).
260. Ronald Coase began the discussion of the Federal Communication Commission's
("FCC") misallocation, an idea subsequently taken up by many scholars. See R.H. Coase,
The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 12-27 (1959) (explaining the
rationale for the present FCC methodology); see, e.g., ROGER NOLL ET AL., ECONOMIC
ASPECTS OF TELEVISION COMMERCIAL REGULATION 112-20 (1973) (outlining the
FCC's practices in television licensing); Douglas W. Webbink, How Not To Measure the
Value of a Scarce Resource: The Land-Mobile Controversy, 23 FED. COMM. BAR J. 202,
204-08 (1969).
261. See John C. Roberts, The Sources of Statutory Meaning: An ArchaeologicalCase
Study of the 1996 TelecommunicationsAct, 53 SMU L. REV. 143, 145-47 (2000) (discussing
the FCC as the "poster child" for regulatory ineptitude).
262. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969)
("Before 1927, the allocation of frequencies was left entirely to the private sector, and the
result was chaos. It quickly became apparent that broadcast frequencies constituted a
scarce resource whose use could be regulated and rationalized only by the Government.
Without government control, the medium would be of little use because of the cacophony
of competing voices, none of which could be clearly and predictably heard.").
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Economist Thomas Hazlett sees the matter differently. Hazlett
asserts that the political economy of the broadcast spectrum reflects a
considered policy of rent extraction, rather than congressional or
FCC incompetence. 63 The system ends up being mutually beneficial
to regulators and licensees, both of whom receive higher rents as a
result of the artificial scarcity generated by government control.
Agents for organized broadcasting interests favor the licensing
regime. But Congress prospers as well.
As a pacifier to consumers, lawmakers have imposed limited
"public interest" requirements on broadcasters to create the illusion
of responsible stewardship of a limited resource. 264 However, only in
1993 did Congress permit the FCC-not Congress-to hold auctions
for spectrum licenses, and even then it did so only on a limited
basis. 265 Recently, the rent-extraction policy has been extended to the
digital television transition as well.26 As the technologies change,
Congress continues a relationship with broadcasters under which the
market positions of a select few broadcasters depend on continued
favorable legislative action. As Ken Johnson, spokesman for W.J.
"Billy" Tauzin, former Democrat and former Republican from
Louisiana and now a highly paid lobbyist for the pharmaceutical
industry,2 67 dutifully noted: "This is very valuable real estate, prime
space, and broadcasters aren't going to get it for free. There's going
to be a quid pro quo, and broadcasters ' are
delusional if they think
268
that quid pro quo is going to be minimal."
We couldn't have put it better ourselves.

263. Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of the Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum,
33 J. LAW & ECON. 133, 137-43 (1990).

264. Thomas W. Hazlett, All Broadcast Regulation Politics Are Local: A Response to
Christopher Yoo's Model of Broadcast Regulation, 53 EMORY L.J. 233, 234-37 (2004).
265. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(1) (1993) (explaining "competitive bidding"); Daniel
Barnes, Market Reforms in Telecommunications Licensing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 439, 445-46
(1996). For an argument that the public trust doctrine that governs environmental law
should apply to the electromagnetic spectrum, see Patrick S. Ryan, Application of the
Public-Trust Doctrine and Principles of Natural Resource Management to Electromagnetic
Spectrum, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 285, 334-47 (2004), available at http://
www.mttlr.org/volten/Ryan.pdf.
266. Thomas W. Hazlett & Matthew L. Spitzer, Digital Television and the Quid Pro
Quo, 2 Bus. & POL. 115,121 (2000).
267. See Frank Ahrens, Tauzin Quits Chairmanship, Will Retire from House, WASH.
POST, Feb. 4, 2004, at A09, availableat 2004 WLNR 16681382 (describing Tauzin as one of
the most powerful Republicans in the House).
268. Sharon Schmickle, Legislators, Broadcasters Hope To Clear the Air over TV
Technology, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Sept. 17. 1997, at A10.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The traditional view of politics features the special-interest
model, given full academic dress in 1965 by Mancur Olson in his
classic work, The Logic of Collective Action. Contrary to a primitive
intuition that majorities may tyrannize minorities as Madison had
feared, 269 this now-standard view maintains that small groups with
high stakes in political action get formed and come to the power
centers, relentlessly lobbying legislators to get their way. Specialinterest groups are the "bad actors" in the political process, corrupt
predators preying on innocent and well-meaning lawmakers.
While we do not deny that this characterization sometimes,
maybe even many times, happens in the real world, we do not think it
is the whole story. Legislators are rational people, and they want and
need money. Rational people who want and need money and who
have power will use that power to get money. Congress has
extremely important powers over taxing, spending, and regulating.
Rather than wait for special interests to come to them, we suspected
that rational legislators would proactively solve the Mancur Olson
problems, using their agenda-setting abilities and other tools to create
and perpetuate issues of high stakes to small groups.
We found a prime example in the saga of estate tax repeal/nonrepeal. Here was an issue of very high stakes to a very small group.
Although Congress may not have initially sensed that it had a golden
goose on its hands, once repeal of the tax in toto became plausible,
they woke up and smelled the coffee, to use another metaphor. Here
was an issue with small groups, high stakes, two sides, and plausible
long-lived action. Sure enough, Congress has strung the issue along,
repeatedly voting before resolving anything, and showing that it could
kill, or not, the tax. All the while, money has poured into its coffers.
Further examples abound. We mentioned briefly tort reform, with its
pitched battles over damage caps; defense spending, with the highstakes frenzy for big weapons programs; broadcast spectrum sales,
with large and lumpy auctions. The telltale signs are repeated votes
over issues without sensible compromise ever obtaining. It looks like
partisan bickering, but it is not. To those who know how to look for
it-it can be well-hidden, at the source-there is money, money
everywhere.
So much is, we think, descriptive. Ex ante rent extraction can
happen in theory; we believe we have shown it happens in practice as
well. What to do about the matter, from a normative point of view, is
269.

THE FEDERALIST No. 10
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less clear. Here, we fear, our answers are less readily forthcoming.
Ours has been a project in positive or descriptive social science: a
hypothesis drawn out on a chalkboard, and tested in the laboratory of
practical politics. No part of this project has involved claiming that ex
ante rent extraction is good, bad, or indifferent. But we cannot avoid
the deep-seated instinct that something is awry. The estate tax story
illustrates this. Why is Congress voting over and over again on such a
limited issue, leaving the law with a clearly unprincipled compromise,
unable even to vote on obviously principled ones? At the same time,
the perpetuation of the game gives a large reason why money persists
in politics, and favors insiders-all insiders-against outsiders-any
outsiders. Resources are diverted to unproductive games and
sensible democratic resolutions to public policy problems are not
even considered.
For the time being, our best and brightest hope lies in the light
shone by the story itself. There is something unseemly about rent
extraction, after all. Congress can take comfort in the traditional
version of politics, blaming special-interest groups while claiming to
try to do the right thing. It is harder to carry on once the people
invert their gaze and start watching the watchdogs. We note, with
some pride, that awareness of our theory seems to have come to the
estate tax repeal debate.2 7 But light alone may not go far enough.
As many of the quotations above have suggested, Congress can be
quite brazen about the games it is playing. We must thus consider
more structural reform, aimed at curtailing and limiting the agendasetting powers of legislators.
Reform will not be easy; getting money out of politics never
really is. At a minimum, our analysis suggests inverting our gaze,
away from the special interests currying favor with legislators, and
over to the legislators who, like Dr. Frankenstein, may have created
their own monster. Structural reforms to budgeting rules and vote
protocols may be more central to campaign finance reform than
campaign finance reform itself; we need to pay better attention to the
reasons parties give money to politicians rather than just to the fact
that they do. We do not yet have answers to this challenge; we hope
that our analysis has helped to better pose the questions.

270. See Editorial, supra note 228 (quoting views of Edward J. McCaffery that the
GOP may be just play-acting at killing the tax "because any permanent solution would
turn off the spigot").
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We conclude with the thought and hope that, in the end, it is time
to better watch the watchdogs-before they help to "organize" all of
US.
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APPENDICES

These Appendices include several tables that present Senators'

estate tax-related voting records and data on campaign contributions
to them. In each of the tables, boxes shaded in gray signify "antirepeal" votes. Boxes shaded in black signify "pro-repeal" votes. A
blank white box indicates that the Senator was not in office at the
time of the vote.

Vote histories on the following estate tax repeal measures from
the 106th through the 108th Congress are included in each appendix
table: (1) H.R. 8 pre-veto (7/14/00, 106th Congress): a bill to phaseout the estate and gift taxes over a ten-year period;2 71 (2) Conrad

Amendment #781 (5/22/01, 107th Congress):

an amendment to

H.R.1836, to eliminate the repeal of the estate tax;272 (3) Kyl

Amendment #2850 (2/13/02, 107th Congress): an amendment to
express the sense of the Senate that the repeal of the estate tax should
be made permanent by eliminating the sunset provisions; 273 (4) Waive

Gramm Amendment #3833 (6/12/02, 107th Congress): a motion to
permanently repeal the estate tax; 274 and (5) Kyl Amendment #288
(3/20/03, 108th Congress): an amendment to permanently repeal the
estate tax.275
All data on voting records and campaign contributions presented
can be found, respectively, on the U.S. Senate's Web site 276 and the
Center for Responsive Politics Web site.277
271. See U.S. Senate, Roll Call Vote No. 197, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/
roll call lists/roll call votecfm.cfm?congress=106&session=2&vote=00197 (last visited
Apr. 17, 2006).
272. See U.S. Senate, Roll Call Vote No. 158, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/
roll call-lists/roll call votecfm.cfm?congress=107&session=l&vote=00158 (last visited
Apr. 17, 2006).
273. See U.S. Senate, Roll Call Vote No. 28, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll
calllists/rollcallvotecfm.cfm?congress=107&session=2&vote=00028 (last visited Apr.
17, 2006).
274. See U.S. Senate, Roll Call Vote No. 151, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/
roll call lists/rollcallvotecfm.cfm?congress=107&session=2&vote--00151 (last visited
Apr. 17, 2006).
275. See U.S. Senate, Roll Call Vote No. 62, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/
roll call lists/rollcallvotecfm.cfm?congress=108&session=l&vote=00062 (last visited
Apr. 17, 2006).
276. See U.S. Senate, Legislation and Records, Recent Votes, http://www.senate.gov/
pagelayout/legislative/a -threesectionswithteasers/votes.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
277. See The Center for Responsive Politics, Political Action Committees,
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/index.asp?cycle=20048party=A (last visited Apr. 17,
2006). See generally The Center for Responsive Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org (last
visited Apr. 17, 2006).
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Appendix I. Senate Votes on Estate Tax Repeal in the 106th-108th
Congress
Appendix I.A. Individual Senators' Votes on Estate Tax Repeal
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Appendix II. Money Contributed to Flipping and Skipping Senators by
Pro-Repeal PACs, 1998-2004
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Appendix Ill. Money Contributed to Consistent Pro-Repeal Senators
by Pro-Repeal PACs, 1998-2004
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$33,000

$500

$-

$-

$2,000

$-

$2,500

$7,000

$ 10,000

$7,500

$9,999

$4,000

$38,499

$8,000

$ 2,000

$5,000

$ 5,000

$-

$20,000

$8,000

$ (1,000) $ 10,000

$-

$4,000

$21,000

$ 10,000

$5,000

$5,000

$6,500

$6,500

$37,000

$11,000

$2,000

$10,000

$6,000

$2,000

$31,000

$ 17,000

$-

$ 17,000 $ 16,500

$2,000

$52,500

$6,000

$10,000

$10,000

$2000

$32,000

$ 12,000

$ 1,500

$5,000 1$ 10,000 L$3,000

$31,500

$750

$-

$5,000

$00

$11,000

$5,0OO

$6,000

$-

$4.000

$-

$-

$750

$15,000

$5,000

$25,000

$10,000 $10,O00

$4,000

$40,000

$-

$ 5,000

$2,500

$ 1,000

$14,500

$6,000

$3,000

$ 5,000

$-

$-

$16,000

$10,000

$ 10,000 $ 10,000 $ 10,000 $ 10,000

$10,000

$50,000

$6,000

$

$5,000

$ 5,000

$2,000

$18,000

$6,000

$-

$ 10,000

$4,500

$4,000

$24,500
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106th
Cong

Senator
[Bold =
Current
Senator]

107th
Congress

o

E
<

D

108ngPr-eelP
thPro-Repeal
Co

a

0

E

Y

Y

R-KS)

Roth
(R-DE)

Santorum
R-PA)
Sessions

,,,,

,,

AR-AL)
Shelby
R-AL)

Y
Y

Smith

Y

-j

,j

[
i

Smith
(R-OR)

Stevens
(R-AK)

Sununu
R-NH)
Talent
(R-MO)
Thomas
(R-WY)
Thompson
R-TN)
Thune
(R-SD)

,

i.

,,

39 Thurmond
(R-SC)
70 Vitter
71

Warner
(R-VA)

72 IWyden
(B-OR)

1
!i ::
i'I~~

tion

z

$5,000

$15,000

$ 6,500

$2,000

$41,500

$3,000

$ -

$-

$-

$-

$3,000

$ 9,000

$2,000

$ 7,500

$ 3,000

$8,250

$29,750

$5,000

$11,000

$3,000

$39,000

$11,500

$-

$11,000

$10,999

$7,000

$40,499

$11,000

$6,000

$10,000

$3,500

$5,000

$35,500

$17,000

$6,000

$3,000

$-

$ (1,000)

$25,000

$12,000

$1,000

$4,000

$2,500

$-

$19,500

$7,000

$10,000

$ 10 000 $ 10,000

$5,000

$42,000

$11,000

$1,000

$1,00

$1,000

$1,000

$15,000

$5,500

$7,500

$ 10,000

$8,500

$8,500

$40,000

$7,000

$10,000

$10,000

$11,000

$11,000

$49,000

$10,000

$2,000

$10,000

$2,000

$5,000

$29,000

$-

$-

$-

$1,000

$-

$1,000

$1,000

$20,000

$10,000

$20,000

$20,000

$71,000

$-

$-

$-

$-

$-

$

$10,000

$-

$10,000

$5,000

$5,000

$30,000

$8,000

$1,500

$ 5,000

$ 3,000

$ 2,000

$19,500

$ -

$16,500

$2,000

$-

$32,500

$5,945

$8,882

$6,644

$3,892

$34,521

1 $14 000

St

m;

$13,000

,

Aver

0

C

zz

z

z

(R-OK)

Roberts

0m

-

Nickles
Robb
D-VA)

PACss

E
"
E
<
co r co

-a
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$9,158

$ 10,000 $ 10,000

$ 4,802 1$ 5,433 1$ 5,932 1 55.134 1 $ 4.009

$ 18,297

T

Total! $659,376 $428,040 $ 6 3 9 .5041 $478,368 $ 2 8 0 .2 2 4

$2,485.512
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Appendix IV. Money Contributed to Consistent Anti-Repeal Senators
by Pro-Repeal PACs, 1998-2004
106th 107th Congress 108th
Cong
Cong
Senator
[Bold =
Current
Senator]

0

d

co

OL

N/V

;

:5 0

a
4ts

0
Akaka
0-HI
Biden
D-DE
Bingaman
D-NMV
Boxer
0D-CA)
Bryan
D-NV
Byrd
D-WV
Cantwell
D-WA_
Carnahan
D-MO
Carper
0D-DE)
Chafee, L.
R-RI
Clinton
D-NY
Conrad
0-NO
Corzine
0D-NJ)
Daschle
(D-SID
Dayton
0-MN
Dodd
0D-CT)
Dorgan
0-ND
Durbin
0-IL
Edwards

:5

E
4 Z-

Pro-Repeal PACs

06

2

E~ <
OEc

C11
E2m

-'A

U-0

-e
'5

tA

Z

Z

0~.-s
-e

z

$10,000

$-

$-

$-

$-

$10,000

$-

$-

$-

$-

$-

$-

$10,000

$-

$-

$-

$14,000

$-

$-

$-

$-

$14,000

$1,000

$-

$-

$1,000

$-

$2,000

$7,000

$-

$2,000

$-

$-

$9,000

$-

$-

$-

$-

$-

$-

$2,500

$-

$-

$-

$-

$2,500

$3,050

$ -

$-

$ -

$ -

$3,050

$12,000

$-

$10,000

$

$32,000

$2,000

$-

$-

$ -

$-

$2,000

$10,500

$-

$10,000

$5,500

$5,000

$31,000

$-

$-

$-

$-

$-

$-

$22,400

$-

$3,500

$3,500

$2,000

$31,400

$-

$-

$-

$-

$-

$-

$12,000

$ -

$

$-

$-

$12,000

$12,000

$ -

$-

$ ,000

$-

$18,000

$7,000

$-

$-

$-

$-

$7,000

$-

$-

$-

$-

$-

$-

$10u,000

$-

$10,000

$-

$-

$ 20,0003

$9,000

$-

$-

$4,000

$-

$13,000

$9,000

$-

$-

$-

$-

$9,000

$5,000

$-

$7,000

$-

$-

$12,000

$18,000

$-

$-

$-

$-

$18,000

$10,000

$6,000

$6,000

$7,000

$-

$29,000

$10,000

$1,000 $11,000

O NC

Feingold
0-WI
Graham
(D-FL)
Harkin
0-IA
Hol[ings
D-SC
Inouye
D-HI
Jeffords
(R-VT)
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106th
Cona

i~1

107th Congress 108th
I Cong
1~1I

IF

Pro-Repeal PACs

"o
Senator
[Bold =
Current
Senator]

45
E
4~&; E
0

o

E
4v

LL M

-e
a-

--

cc

a

Kennedy
(-MA)
Kerrey
(0-NE)
Kerry
(D-MA)
Kohl
(O-WI)
Lautenberg
(D-NJ)
Leahy
(0-VT)
Levin
(D-MI)
Lieberman
(D-CT)
Mikulski
(D-MD)
Moynihan
(D-NY)
Obama
(D-IL)
Projected to Vote Anti-Repeal
Pryor
(0-AR)
Reed
(0-RI)
Reid
(0-NV)
Rockefeller
(0-WV)
Salazar
I Projected to Vote Anti-Repeal
(D-CO)
Sarbanes
(0-MD)
Schumer
(0-NY)
Stabenow
0D-MI)
Wellstone
(D-MN)
Average

a

z

$-

$-

$-

$ 5,000

$-

$5,000

$1,000

$-

$-

$-

$-

$

$-

$-

$-

$-

$-

$-

$-

$2 ,000oo $-

$-

$6-

$-

$ 2,000

$-

6-

$-

$-

$-

$9,000

$-

$-

$-

$

$9,000

$11,000

$

$ 5,000

$ 5,000

$-

$21,000

$14,986

$-

$-

$-

$-

$14,986

_____

$

$-

$7,000

$ 2,000 $13,000

~

+

V

$10,000

5,000

$1,000

$

$

$-

$-

$1,000

$10,000

$-

$-

$-

$

$10,000

$10,000

$-

$5,000

$3,000

$ -

$18,000

$5,000

$-

$-

$-

$

$-

$-

$-

$-

$-$

I

$5,000

$9,999

$-

$-

$

$

$9,999

$13,500

$-

$5,000

$-

$-

$18,500

$-

6

$-

6-

6-

$-

:rnntriutih n

$ 6,443

$ 1,633

Standard

$5,719

$ 894
$3,038
I,$
5 I,
4

Deviation
Total

a

$7,000

$-

1

z

Z

0~0)
-

1$289,935 J$5,985j1 $73,485

$ 9,454

$ 1,0221 $ 222
$2,299

$850
I ,

I

$9,423
2,3

$45,9901 $9,990IJ$425,430
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Appendix V. Money Contributed to Flipping and Skipping Senators by
Anti-Repeal Insurance PACs, 1998-2004
106th

107th Congress

I Cong
Senator

I

*0

<
ME

O6

Senator]

108th

Anti-Repeal Insurance PACs

I Cona

a)

00

E~ <
E M

!

,c, E)

0

0

z

Senators Who Flipped from PRO-REPEAL to ANTI-REPEAL
1
2
3

Breaux (D-LA )
Collins (R-ME)
Feinstein 0D-CA)

4

McCain (R-AZ)

5
6
17

Murray (0-WA)
Snowe (R-ME)
ITorricelli (D-NJ)

y

~T
Y

$2,000
$6,500

$ 4,000
$4,000

$ 2,000
$2,000

$8,000
$12,500

$7,000

$1,000
$-

$ $ -

$8,000

$7,000

$4,000
$5,000
$7,000

$1,000
$5,000
$9,000

$$2,000
$ 1,000

$5,000
$ 12,000
$17,000

$7,000

Senator Who Flipped from PRO-REPEAL to ANTI-REPEAL to PRO-REPEAL to ANTI-REPEAL
11

1Landrieu (D-LA)

I $ 5,000

$

-

$-

$5,000

Senators Who Flipped from ANTI-REPEAL to PRO-REPEAL
(R-PA)
Voinovich (R-OH)

1ISpecter
2

$7,500

$10,000
$
$ 5,000 1 $ 7,5001 $ 2,000

$17,500
$ 14,500

Senators Who Flipped from ANTI-REPEAL to PRO-REPEAL to ANTI-REPEAL
11

IBaucus(D-MT)

2
3

[Bayh (0-IN)
Johnson (D-SD)

1$11,0001 $19000 $16,5001 $46,500
1$6,000 1$3,000 1$6,500 1$ 15,500

77

$5,000

$11,000

$3,000

$ 9,000

Average Amount Given to Flipping Senators

$6,000

$5,731

$2,692

$14,423

Standard Deviation

$2,131

$5,480

$4,530

$10,770

$18,000

$17,193

$8,076

$43,269

Total Amount

Senators Who Would Be Consistently PRO-REPEAL if Not for Skipping One or More Votes
1

Bennett (R-UT)

2

Crapo (R-ID)

3
4
56

&

NN

$1,000

$6,000

$5,000

$12,000

$3,000

$2,000

$5,000

$10,000

$2,000

$1,000

$2,000

$5,000

$T
$2,000

$$-

$$1,000

$_
$3,000

$1,000

$_

$_

$1,000

Average Amount Given to Pro-Repeal Skipping Senators

$1,500

$1,500

1 $2,167 1

$5,167

Standard Deviation
Total Amount

$957
$9,000

$2,141
$9,000

$2,115
$13,002

$4,450
$4,450

omenici (R-N);
Helms (R-NC)
-Hutchinaon (R-AR
Miiier 0-GA

,

,

NN
N
N/V
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Senators Who Would Be Consistently ANTI-REPEAL if Not for Skipping One Vote

11
12

jDaschle (D-SD)
K1ohl
(D-WI)

INN

NNV

0
0

g

Average Amount Given to Anti-Repeal Skipping Senators
Standard Deviation
Total Amount

$ 14,5001 $ 13,000
$I $1 $7,250
$7,250
$14,500

$6,500
$6,500
$13,000

$ 12,000

$ 39,500

$-

$-

$6,000
$6,000
$12,000

$19,750
$19,750
$39,500
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Appendix VI. Money Contributed to Consistent Pro-Repeal Senators
by Anti-Repeal Insurance PACs, 1998-2004
107th Congress
Anti-Repeal Insurance PACs

15

Senator
[Bold = Current
Senator]

Abraham (R-MI)

z

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
!O

$6,000
$$4,000
$$2,000
$1,000
$5,000
$ 3,000
$8,000
$1,000

____

Alexander (R-TN)
Allard (R-CO)
Allen (R-VA)
Ashcroft (R-MO
Bennett (R-UT)
Bond (R-MO)
Brownback (R-KS)
Bunning (R-KY)

,

NN

Burns (R-MT)

!

Campbell (R-CO)
Cleland (D-GA)
Chambliss (R-GA)
Coburn (R-OK)
Cochran (R-MS)
Coleman (Fl-MN)
Cornyn (R-TX)
Coverdell (R-GA)
Craig (R-ID)
Crapo (R-ID)

."''

:>s.

F,;

Projected to Vote Pro-P

1;

'T'

:
If

DeMint (R-SC)

NN

I

z

0

I-

$1,000
$1,000
$2,000
$"
$ 3,000
$6,000
$3,000
$1,000
$ 9,000
$4,000

$2,500
$$6,000
$2,500
$1,000
$5,000
$3,000
$ 3,000
$ 7,000
$ 3,000

$9,500
$1,000
$12,000
$2,500
$6,000
$12,000
$11,000
$7,000
$ 24,000
$8,000

$-

$-

$3,000

- I

$-

$"-

$8,000
$2,500

$3,000

$-

$11,000

$-

$-

$2,500

$3,000
$$ 2,000
$3,000
$4,000
$3,000

$ 2,000

$$4,500
$ 3,000
$1,000
$2,000
$5,000

$5,000
$7,500
$5,000
$8,000
$6,000
$10,000

$3,000
$
$4,000
$"
$2,000

$10,000

$-

$-

$10,000

Y

$3,000
$2,000
$2,000
$10,000
$4,000
$3,000
$4,500
$2,000
$6,000
$3,000
$2,500
$9,500
$11,000
$6,500
$15,000

$1,000
$$1,000
$6,500
$$$4,000
$500
$6,000
$5,000
$1,000
$15,000
$$7,000
$7,000

$1,000
$5,000
$2,000
$1,000
$6,500
$$3,000
$4,000
$6,000
$4,000
$4,000
$13,000
$2,000
$4,000
$6,000

$5,000
$7,000
$5,000
$17,500
$10,500
$3,000
$11,500
$6,500
$18,000
$ 12,000
$7,500
$37,500
$13,000
$17,500
$28,000

$2,000
$1,000

$$2,000

$1,000
$1,000

$3,000
$4,000

$2,000

$$-

$-

$2,000

$ -

$10,000

$1,000
$4,000
$2,000
$5,000

$13,500
$24,500
$15,000
$11,000

Ensign (R-NV)
Enzi (R-WY)
Fitzgerald (R-IL)
Frist (R-TN)
Gorton (R-WA)
Graham (R-SC)

I

Gramm (R-TX)
Grams (R-MN)
Grassley (R-IA)
Gregg (R-NH)
-

Hatch (R-UT)

$-

Cl)

F

DeWine (R-OH)
Dole (R-NC)
Domenici (R-NM)

Hagel (R-NE)

$3,000

0)-

Helms (R-NC)
Hutchinson (R-AR)
Hutchison (R-TX)

NN

¥

Inhofe (R-OK)
Isakson (R-GA)

Pro

$10,000

,

$11,500
$10,500
$2,000
$ 2,000

Kyl (R-AZ)
Lincoln (D-AR)

Lott (R-MS)
Lugar (R-IN)

t

$1,000
$10,000
$11,000
1 $4,000
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Anti-Repeal Insurance PACs

Senator
[Bold = Current
Senator]

6
17
$8
19
50
51
32
53
54

E

Pro

Z

$5,000
$4,000

$ $5,000

$3,500
$5,000

$ 8,500
$14,000

$1,000

$1,000
$2,000

$-

$-

$1,000

$$"

$2,000
$1,000

$3,000
$3,000

$2,000

$4,500

$-

$6,500

$20,000

$1,000

$11,500

$32,500

$2,000

$7,000

$3,000

$12,000

$ 5,000

$ -

$2,000

$2,000
$9,999

$$10,000

$$10,000

$7,000
$2,000
$29,999

$7,000

$6,250

$-

$13,250

59Sessions (R-AL)
3Shelby (R-AL)

$7,000

$ 3,000

$3,000

$13,000

$5,000

$-

$6,000

$11,000

3Smith (R-NH)

$1,000

$-

$-

$11,000

$6,000
$

$7,000
$ 1,000

$ 24,000
$3,000

$
$

$ $1,000

$4,000
$1,000
$ 3,000
$1,000

5Robb (D-VA)
56Roberts (R-KS)

i

5Roth (R-DE)
58Santorum (R-PA)

Y

32Smith (R-OR)

53

a3

:5

Mack (R-FL)
Martinez (R-FL)
McConnell (R-KY)
Miller (D-GA)
Murkowski, F (R-AK) (
Murkowski, L (R-AK)
Nelson (D-FL)
Nelson (D-NE)
Nickles (R-OK)

S-

0

_j

;'

Y

Stevens (R-AK)
SSununu (R-NH)

35Talent (R-MO)
36 Thomas (R-WY)
57

Thompson (R-TN)

$2,000
$4,000
$

4i!
...

........

,8 Thune (R-SD)
59 Thurmond (R-SC)
70 Vitter (R-LA)

IPo

71 Warner (R-VA)

ii ii

72 lVyden (D-OR)

£1

$ 3,000

$

$ -

$2,000

$

$ (1,000)

, $-

Po

$1,000
$1,000
Average Contribution
Standard Deviatiol
Total

-

I
$-

$ 4,049

1 $2,344

$ 3,975

$3296

$291,499

J$168,750

$-

$1,000

$1,000

$-___

$-

$2,000
$1,000

$2,500

$8,892

$ 2,869
$180,000

$8,216
$640,249
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Appendix VII. Money Contributed to Consistent Anti-Repeal Senators
by Anti-Repeal insurance PACs, 1998-2004
I

107th Congress

E

Senator
[Bold = Current
Senator]

.

--

,,IIt"

Anti-Repeal Insurance PACs

E

aj

.Z
0

Akaka (D-HI)
Biden (D-DE)
Bingaman (D-NM)
Boxer (D-CA)
Bryan 0D-NV)
Byrd (0-WV)
I
Cantwell (D-WA)
Carnahan (D-MO)
Carper (D-DE)
Chafee, L. (R-RI)
Clinton (D-NY)
Conrad (D-ND)
Corzine (D-NJ)
Daschle (D-SD)
Dayton (D-MN)
Dodd (D-CT)
Dorgan (D-ND)
Durbin (D-IL)
Edwards 0D-NC)
Feingold (D-WI)
Graham 0-FL
Harkin (0-IA)
Hollin s (D-SC)
Inouye (D-HI)
Jeffords (R-VT)
Kenned (D-MA)
Kerrey (D-NE)
Kerry (D-MA)
Kohl (D-WI)
Lautenberg (D-NJ)
Leahy(D-VT)
Levin (D-MI)
Lieberman (D-CT)
Mikulski (D-MD)
Moynihan (D-NY)
Obama (D-IL)
Pryor (D-AR)
Reed (D-RI)
Reid (0-NV)
Rockefeller (0-WV)

$1,000

$
$

$$-

$1,000
$-

$1,000

$

$-

$1,000

$3,000

$$-

$$$-

$3,000
$$-

-

$-

$-

$$5,500

$$ 1,000

$$11,500

$1,000
$$3,500
$$ 18,000 $12,000

$2,750
$13,500
$47,500

______

_____
_____
$_
$ 5,000

$1,750
$10,000
$17,500
$1,000

$-

$-

$1,000

$14,500

$13,000

$12,000

$ 39,500

$18,000

$14,000
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11Salazar (D-CO)

[Vol. 84
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Average Contributionj 1

Standard Deviationj
Totall

$3,447

$2,211

1$1,500 1$7,158

$4,776 1$4,443 1$3,126 1 $11,545
$155,099 1$99,500 1$67,500j1$322,099

